1;Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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have taken the form of the villagers' increased involvement in the greater market economy, the necessary migration of more and more villagers to the expanding cities with their newly developing economic opportunities, and, of course, the increased impingement of the government on the rural areas.

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In this study of a peasant community, I will describe and analyze the manner in which the Taiwanese agricultural villager is being transformed from a peasant primarily involved in a basically subsistence type of agriculture to one who is becoming more and more involved in the market economy of the country and who has widespread contacts with an urban way of life. I will show how such developments are interrelated with and have increasingly effected certain changes in village social organization, community and kinship solidarity, and some of the general patterns of village life. However, we will also see that the cultural and social changes have been weighty in some areas of life and scant in others.

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These changes in the Taiwanese village are perhaps far less dramatic and less drastic than those which the Chinese Communists are now attempting to institute among the Chinese peasants on the mainland, where in the past social change was relatively slow due to its massive size, poor system of communications, and lack of an effective centralized government organization. In order to achieve a strong Communist state, the Chinese Communists are consciously attempting to accelerate the process of urbanization, breaking down the traditional large kinship-group oriented rural society and the provincialism of the entire Chinese population. They hold that a single-class Communist society can be achieved only through the total transformation of the agrarian population, dominated by a peasant mentality, into an agrarian proletariat with a national and social consciousness. The commune system has perhaps been one technique used to speed the urbanization process and to develop an "urban mentality" by transforming the thought processes of a large agrarian segment of the population through education, mass organizations, and group cooperation as well as by changing its standard of living. It is unfortunate that we are unable to observe this changing phenomenon on the mainland today, because we are undoubtedly missing much which would greatly contribute to our understanding of the process of change in such a complex society. There are, of course, qualitative and quantitative differences between the mainland and Taiwan, much as there are differences between various areas of the mainland. Nevertheless, by observing and analyzing the nature of culture change in Taiwan, we may not only be able to understand the changing Taiwanese situation but may also gain insights into the nature and development of Chinese culture and society generally and, perhaps also, by analogy derive

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1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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just north of the Tropic of Cancer—the winters of this coastal area, unlike the interior, are cold and raw while the summers are extremely 132 hot and humid. Winter temperatures seldom fall below the middle forties, but icy winds frequently blow with almost gale force across from the mainland and the Strait of Formosa. Although the area itself never has snow, on a clear January or February day snow-capped peaks of the high interior mountains to the east can be seen from the village.

As in most of Asia, rain is seasonal. Between 80 and 85 percent of the annual rainfall comes during the late spring and summer months (April to September) (Chen, 1950:5).[1] During the heaviest rains and the late summer typhoon season, roads as well as paddy fields are often T flooded. In this particular area, frequently the rain alone makes it 132 possible to transplant the rice seedlings, for the irrigation water is 243 often late in reaching the Hsin Hsing area, lying as it does so far from F the mountain headwaters. With the passing of the rainy season the 132 weather is relatively dry for the remainder of the year, and all crops T depend almost entirely on water from the elaborate irrigation system.

433 For two decades or more this area has been able to harvest three 24 crops annually. In the irrigated areas two crops of rice are grown; sometimes a vegetable or some other crop is substituted. The third dry crop is usually wheat or sweet potatoes. On dry land, two or possibly three crops a year are grown as well. Such intensive cultivation has T been made possible through a favorable climate, irrigation facilities, [161] and an increased availability of chemical fertilizer. It has also come [464] about partially as a result of the population increase, which has provided additional labor to work the available land and to exploit previously undeveloped lands. T

361 Although most of the original inhabitants from the mainland settled 167 on the relatively fertile coastal plain where Hsin Hsing is located, 311 the land resources could not be fully exploited because of their small 178 number. Today, this situation is reversed, and in spite of large-scale irrigation, land scarcity makes it necessary for parts of expanding families, 464 and even whole households, to move to urban centers to find work. Land scarcity in the whole Hsin Hsing area is so severe that even T villagers who remain there must go outside the village to earn a liveli- F hood for their families or to supplement the family income. Although 464 the problem may be unusually acute in Hsin Hsing village and in 311 some neighboring villages, it must nevertheless be recognized that it is 161 characteristic of a large part of Taiwan. If the population of the rural areas of the island continues to grow at its present rate, the land scarcity which is now so severe in the Hsin Hsing area will undoubtedly become a major problem for the greater part of the Taiwan countryside.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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F 175 ists brought a change in regime to Taiwan. This is known as the
648 "Restoration." At the outset the Taiwanese people welcomed the
change, feeling that the coming of the Chinese represented a reunion
F with their own "race." With the advent of peace; there was a general
return of men to the land. Only one Hsin Hsing villager had been
175 killed in the war in Southeast Asia. The other villagers from Hsin
648 Hsing who had surrendered or been taken as prisoners while working
in Japanese labor groups were returned to Taiwan in ships. The re-
722 turn of these men to the land was followed by a general population
727 increase, and in the Hsin Hsing area this quickly aggravated the prob-
161 lem of land scarcity; tenancy became a greater problem than ever
423 before. Families could neither buy nor rent enough land to support
themselves adequately, and, in addition, the war period had brought
464 about a significant alteration in local patterns of division of labor. In
[178] the absence of the men the women had assumed new roles and respon-
[462] sibilities and had begun to take an active part in the operation of the
land. This change was so well established that from about 1948 on it became possible for the men to work elsewhere for periods of varying length to supplement the family's farm income. This was the beginning of a new and ever-increasing trend of mobility to Taipei, a trend not confined to the Hsin Hsing area, although it may have begun there earlier than in most other parts of Taiwan. Some men hired out as farm laborers or worked as itinerant merchants in the area. But it is significant that local industrial development has been so slight that it has offered no economic alternatives to the villagers.

Tn After 1949, when the movement of the remnants of the Chinese
175 Nationalist forces from the mainland to Taiwan was halted, the
423 regime instituted a new policy of government rule and reform. The
[648] Land Reform Acts between 1949 and 1953 were the most important
aspect of this policy. The Land Reform, the increased availability of
[241] fertilizer, the infusion of great quantities of economic aid from the
[434] United States, and the great increase of supplementary income from
Tn villagers working in Taipei have all contributed to an apparent rise in
[161] the Taiwanese farmer's standard of living. But the basic problem of
population pressure and land scarcity continues to worsen, affecting
both economic and social aspects of village life.

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LANGUAGE AS AN INDICATION OF HISTORICAL SEQUENCE

In 1958 there were four main languages spoken in Taiwan: Japanese, Taiwanese, Mandarin, and Hakka. The latter three are usually referred to as dialects of Chinese, but since they are not mutually intelligible, they are actually different languages, and will be referred

landownership rights as well as the types of ownership patterns in 423
Taiwan tend to foster such fragmentation and scattering of landholdings. 428
The ownership of land is for the most part inherited in equal
shares by the family's sons, including any son or sons by adoption.
Although by law daughters may also inherit land, since they are usually
married out of the family they do not participate in the inheritance.

All of the land owned by villagers comes under the official heading 423
of privately owned land. Land can be owned by individuals or families
under individual or joint ownership. Individual-ownership land is a
piece of surveyed land which is owned and registered in the name of a
single owner. Joint-ownership land is land surveyed as a single field
and recorded in the name of one representative owner which is actually
owned jointly by a number of people; each of the joint owners
owns a portion of the surveyed field and cultivates his plot separately.
The third kind of private-ownership land is corporate land. There are 423
only a few relatively insignificant instances in Hsin Hsing of village 618
patrilineal kinship groups (*tsu*) owning corporate land. In each case
the landholding is small and is recorded in the name of the eldest *tsu*
male—who in some instances has long since died. Most often *tsu* land
is leased—usually on a rotation basis—to *tsu* family members. The [778]
rent paid is used to finance *tsu* functions such as the upkeep of the
tsu's main ancestral-worship room (no Hsin Hsing village *tsu* has an
ancestral temple) and sometimes the expenses of ancestral worship.
The land reform law has technically eliminated the category of such [178]
tsu or corporate landholdings.

Neither the earlier Japanese nor the present land tenure system 423
permits subtenants in Taiwan; there is no such concept of ownership 427
or tenancy of "subsoil" or "land surface" as was found to exist in many
instances on the mainland (as discussed in Fei, 1939:174–196). According
to both the law or official records and the villagers' concept of
land tenure, a family—usually under the name of its senior male
member—owns land. The land may be cultivated by that family itself
or, for various reasons, leased to a tenant. The tenant cultivates the
land and pays a predetermined rent—usually in kind—to the landlord.
Until the 1949–1953 Land Reform Acts, tenants had no rights on
the land except those granted by the landlord. Land reform has radically
changed this. Today tenants and their families have certain
rights on the land they cultivate and therefore a greater degree of
security.

In spite of the pressures of the constantly increasing population on 464
the land, there has been little development of any kind of important [433]
local industry. Except in some scattered brickworks and menthol-distilling
factories in the area, there is little demand for the labor of

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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and seeing the show, and only partially because of the cost. When the villagers do attend, they generally go in small groups of young boys, or young girls, or a group of older women.

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CLOTHING

The villagers' clothing, like their food, is marked by simplicity and a show of thrift. It is not at all uncommon to see a villager wearing work clothes which have been patched several times. Even for special occasions such as a marriage or a large *pai-pai* festival most villagers still dress very simply.

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The style of clothing usually varies with age. Older villagers generally wear the traditional Chinese clothing of pantaloons and jacket, although in very hot weather men of all ages wear shorts and a T-shirt when working. In colder weather boys and men (other than the older and more traditionally dressed men) wear ordinary khaki wash pants and several shirts, and a sweater or jacket if they happen to own one. For protection against the cold, a villager depends on a number of layers of clothing, usually cotton, rather than a few layers of woolen items. The cotton padded jacket is worn more by older men and women than by young people.

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While older women wear the more traditional clothing, younger women and girls prefer and usually wear the Western-style dresses, skirts, and blouses which have become very popular since the war. Such clothes are usually made to order either by village seamstresses or in Lukang. Young girls and women wear the Chinese tunic dress (*ch'i p'ao*) on the occasion of their marriage, on special outings to Lukang or Taipei, and during important village festivals. Many of the older villagers tell of the old days when "everyone, including the rich, wore coarse cloth, since in those days people were thrifty." But today, these old people complain, "people are no longer satisfied with coarse cloth and want to wear the better cloth."

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Still, few villagers remember ever having made their own cloth. "Cloth has practically always been purchased in Lukang or from itinerant merchants." Before the Japanese period, inexpensive undyed cloth was apparently imported from the mainland, and during the Japanese period, cloth manufactured in Japan was used. Since the end of the war, the Taiwanese textile industry has grown rapidly, mainly in the vicinity of Chang-hua City and Ho-mei, and today all the cloth used by villagers is Taiwanese-made.

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Nowadays there is a great deal of specialization, and it is both uneconomical and difficult for villagers to make their own clothing unless a member of the household, usually one of the daughters, has studied sewing. A family's clothing is usually made to order by locally

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government to the village officials. Copies of *Harvest Magazine*, an 204
agricultural magazine published by the JCRR, are received monthly
by several village subscribers.

A bus runs past the village almost every hour during the daytime. 494
The bus travels between Lukang and Chi Hu, and at both places
connections can be made with buses going to various cities where there 484
are trains to other parts of Taiwan. Most of these transportation facili- 489
ties have been available since Japanese times, although they were not 178
then used as frequently as they are today. Now that so many villagers
work and live in Taipei, individuals and their families move rather
regularly between the village and this city. Villagers in the area have
increased their mobility a great deal during the last decade, and today,
most villagers, including older people and adolescents, have travelled
at least once to Taipei.

Within the general village area the most important means of trans- 493
portation is the bicycle. Almost every village family owns at least one 177
bicycle and a few are two-bicycle families. For the villagers the bicycle
is an extremely practical machine. It can transport several people at a 178
time to the fields and can also carry small animals and produce to
market. The people in the Hsin Hsing area had some bicycles during
Japanese times, but they were expensive and thus fell into the luxury
class. At that time most things were still carried by hand. Since the
restoration of Chinese rule, and especially since the growth of the
bicycle industry in Taiwan, the bicycle has become less expensive and
is now practically indispensable in village life.

CONNECTIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

The steadily increasing impingement of the outside world on the 177
village, as well as the concomitant development of extensions beyond
the village, make it evident that Hsin Hsing and the other villages of
the immediate area are far from being small, isolated units.

Not only are transportation facilities and general means of commu- [489]
nication available but they are used regularly by most of the villagers. [20]
The general economic and social connections of Hsin Hsing extend far
beyond the limits of the village and even the district. Contact with
people from other places is quite frequent. The general store in the 443
village has a limited stock of merchandise which is usually overpriced, [435]
so the villagers buy only a few necessary items there. On the other
hand, men and boys frequently congregate there, especially during the [517]
agricultural slack season, to talk and to play chess and other small
gambling games. As the site of the village bus stop along the Lukang- [498]
-Chi Hu road, the store also serves as an important vantage point for
the dissemination of news and gossip of the area, since so many people [203]
regularly go past by bus or bicycle.

[3

The Land and the Agricultural Process

To understand present-day life in Hsin Hsing, it seems fruitful 121
to look first at the nature of village livelihood and recent changes in it.
By examining the nature of the economic change and especially its
consequences—for example, the ways in which the villager, in order to
improve or at least maintain his livelihood, has become increasingly
involved in complex relationships beyond the village limits—we will
be better able to understand the changes in other areas of life, such as
social organization, village leadership and cooperation, family and
kinship, and life history and religion. It will be seen in the following [128]
chapters that the changes produced in these other aspects tend to
reinforce the processes of change in the economy, and hence in the
village generally.

Agriculture and the land-man relationship have always been the 241
basis of the livelihood of Hsin Hsing villagers. The major part of 433
village income, in fact, still comes from sources related to the land. But
the land resources, both in quantity and productive capacity (as al- [434]
ready briefly noted in Chapter 2 in the section on population and its
economic base), have not kept pace with the natural population in-
crease. And yet, from all available evidence, in spite of the imbalance
between agricultural income and productivity and natural population
growth, the village income and standard of living have risen.

While this is important, our main concerns in Chapters 3 and 4 will [128]
be the nature of the economic organization in Hsin Hsing village, the
developments which have brought about changes in the area, and how
these have enabled the villagers to deal with the imbalance of land
productivity to population.

Two major developments have affected Hsin Hsing and many sur- 433
rounding villages as well: one is the effort, by government and vil- 654
lagers, to improve agricultural methods and the land tenure system so 434
as to increase productivity and support more people; the other is the 242

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1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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[423] apparently ever-increasing tendency of the villagers to turn from their
[242] traditional land-based economic pattern to other sources of income.
[167] This has mainly taken the form of migration from the village to urban
centers. We shall see that these developments have affected both liveli-
[621] hood and standard of living in Hsin Hsing. But we shall also see,
[628] especially later, that they have produced changes in social and politi-
[602] cal patterns as well and that all the developments have, by mutual
reinforcement, affected village life by weakening community organiza-
tion and solidarity, thus broadening the emphasis of village relation-
ships beyond village, area, and kinship group.

T In Chapter 2 we saw that in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries the local population was relatively small. Dry cultivation was
175 practiced in the area until the present expanded irrigation system was
161 created. Agricultural production per unit of dry land had been low,
241 and required so many man-hours that villagers preferred to supple-
433 ment their family income with other forms of labor if available. In
that period the port city of Lukang was an important outlet for local
464 village labor. Fortunately, soon after the demise of the port, irrigation
[434] facilities in the area expanded rapidly, and thus agriculture—mainly
wet-rice—successfully absorbed much of the village labor as produc-
tion increased. Middle-aged villagers report that thirty-five years ago,
when they were boys, most of the villagers grew rice in wet fields.

T For more than twenty years in the Hsin Hsing area, farmers have
241 cultivated three crops a year on their irrigated and dry land. The
irrigated crops are the more important, since irrigated land comprises
312 93.3 percent of the cultivable acreage. Depending on the amount of
water available for irrigation at the appropriate time, the farmers
devote the first two of the annual crops to rice; if the water supply is
insufficient, they plant other crops instead. The third is a winter crop,
when there is no water for irrigation. The farmers may use all the
cultivable land for it.

The first two crops of the year are usually wet-rice which is grown,
naturally, on the irrigated land. The growing season for the two rice
crops covers the period from early February to early November. Since
the villagers' land is scattered throughout the area and irrigation
T schedules vary from one place to another, there is a resulting difference
[433] in rice-planting times for the Hsin Hsing farmers. The yield of the
first crop may exceed that of the second by as much as 25 percent,
because of the difference in season and available irrigation water be-
tween the two growing periods.

Tn There are two major types of rice grown in Taiwan; their periods of
243 maturation are slightly different. One type is the native *tsai lai* rice,
and the other is *p'eng lai* rice, introduced into Taiwan by the Japa-
nese. *P'eng lai* rice generally brings a better market price, but the type
grown depends mainly on the type of soil in the field.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

241 434 [461] Such substitute crops, especially various kinds of vegetables, require more attention and labor than rice but have the greater advantage of yielding a larger and quicker cash profit. However, the farmer who grows these crops must use part of the cash he makes to buy rice, which must be used in exchange for fertilizer (obtainable only through government agents), for payment of taxes and/or rent, and for his family's consumption. Perhaps for these reasons, and also because one must be willing to take a chance with a new crop which may sometimes become diseased or fail completely, other farmers prefer to grow rice on their small landholdings and earn the necessary supplementary income by finding employment in Taipei, returning home to work the land during the busy seasons.

241 312 Sometimes, however, the decision to switch to another crop is forced upon even the most conservative rice grower. A shortage of irrigation water or a delay in its arrival may make it impossible to grow rice at all. If the last possible calendar date for transferring the rice into the paddy fields passes before the irrigation water arrives, the farmer is forced to substitute a crop which does not depend upon large quantities of water at special times.

244 178 434 To date farmers who have chosen or been forced to grow vegetables have found it both interesting and exciting, perhaps because it is still relatively novel. And although the new crop does require a great deal more work than rice, the vegetable growers seem to find great pleasure in comparing and discussing the progress of their vegetable crops. This apparent trend toward the cultivation of vegetables began about four or five years after the restoration of Chinese rule, at about the same time Hsin Hsing villagers began to go to Taipei in search of supplementary income. The trend was apparently created by the villagers' need for additional income, but at the same time it was made possible by significant changes in the procedure for growing vegetables.

244 In the early years before and just after the restoration, farmers planted vegetables mainly for their own use. A very few planted some cucumbers, peanuts, and maize as cash crops. Insects, a major problem, deterred many farmers from large-scale cultivation of vegetables for market sale. The vegetables had to be planted and harvested by certain dates for fear of the coming of insects. Because there were no [789] insecticides, the villagers sometimes used ritual practices such as charms, the action of shamans, or village worship to get rid of the [242] insects. Recently, however, the increased availability of insecticides has all but eliminated the insect threat, and most vegetables can now be grown almost anytime. The only limitations are those of temperature and water. Today some vegetables can be found in the market throughout the year, thus offering the population a greater variety of vegetables.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

In Hsin Hsing village, intensive cultivation of vegetables for market 244
sale began with the onion, the red pepper, and then the green pepper. 433
Often, too many farmers planted the same vegetable, its market price 435
dropped, and most of them then switched to another vegetable that
promised a good market. Today many farmers carefully watch the
market situation and through the radio, or more usually by word of
mouth, observe the fluctuations in the price of various vegetables.

A progressive farmer who hears about a new vegetable crop being 244
grown in the area or reads about a new crop in an agricultural magazine 248
like *Harvest Magazine* may then try to learn how to grow the 178.
same vegetable by setting aside a small portion of his land for the [204]
experiment. Such was the case with the green pepper. It was first
planted in Hsin Hsing for market about 1955. By 1958 there were
more than eleven farmers marketing it.

In recent years more and more land surface in Hsin Hsing, as well as 311
in the area generally, has been given over to the cultivation of vegetables. 244
One estimate holds that today the Hsin Hsing land devoted to
market vegetables is twice what it was eight or nine years ago and still
increasing. In fact, a reliable informant estimates that, exclusive of 434
income from labor outside the area, approximately 10 percent of the 24
village income is now derived from marketing vegetables, 70 percent
from rice, 10 percent from the mint plant, 5 percent from farm labor, 178
and 5 percent from miscellaneous sources. Such an increase in vegetable
cultivation certainly represents a trend toward crop diversification,
with the result that now the area is becoming much less the one-crop
area (rice) for which it was formerly known.

In addition to farmers who substitute vegetable growing for partial 249
or total rice cultivation on their land, there are a few farmers who 434
grow mint or sugarcane. While the vegetable farmers are men who 178.
were forced by climatic or economic necessity to grow alternate crops,
the mint and cane growers are men who, by virtue of sufficient land
and money, can afford to gamble on reaping a greater profit from the
cultivation of an alternate crop. Such men chose to grow mint or
sugarcane because they are long-term crops demanding much less
labor, time, and energy than is required for vegetable cultivation.

The man who grows mint instead of rice usually has contacts outside 249
of the village. He must be familiar with the menthol oil market, and 381
especially with the local menthol-distilling factories which can distill
his mint crop for sale to the dealers. At the same time, he must have
enough time to tend to all the details of arranging for the distillation
and sale of the menthol. Two of the few villagers in Hsin Hsing who
frequently grow mint are former landlords who have many contacts
outside the village through politics and business dealings.

The mint plant, planted only once a year, yields four harvests dur- 249

249 ing the course of that year. It can be planted anytime after the cold in mid-February and throughout March. The harvest then starts with the first cutting, about mid-May and throughout June. Once cut the crop grows again; in forty days it is ready for cutting. The third crop matures in about fifty days and the fourth in about sixty days. The last crop is harvested toward the end of November, before the cold weather and winds again set in.

249 184 Since sugarcane requires eighteen months to cultivate, the man who plants it instead of rice is usually one who has land enough—probably over one *chia*—to allow him to put a decent acreage into cane and still have enough left for crops which bring more immediate returns. And he must have enough capital or other means to finance his family during the long growing season of the cane.

249 433 435 178 Before the war, when the price of sugarcane was higher than it is today, many farmers in Hsin Hsing and the surrounding area grew this crop. Now, however, few farmers are willing to tie up their land for one crop of cane when the fields, over the same period of time, could otherwise produce four different crops. Those few farmers in the area who have recently cultivated sugarcane have done so in the belief that it would bring a greater profit than they could get from rice. However, in 1958 they were disappointed when the low market price of sugar brought them even smaller profits than they would have realized from rice. Today, despite the coaxing and cajolery of agents of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, even these few farmers are loath to plant sugarcane, and the acreage devoted to cane in the area is steadily decreasing.

244 243 [312] The third annual crop is grown during the winter when there is no irrigation water available. In Hsin Hsing village and the area generally, the crops cultivated are wheat, sweet potatoes, soybeans, or vegetables such as the green bean. All are crops which do not require much moisture and can tolerate the cold and the strong winter winds. In fact, wheat cannot withstand the hot and often wet weather of the spring, summer, and early fall of the first and second crop periods, but needs rather cooler weather.

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THE VILLAGERS' VIEW OF THE CALENDAR AND THE AGRICULTURAL CYCLE

[171] [177] The basic traditional calendar in Taiwan is lunar, and lunar months are referred to here by numbers just as they are by the villagers. The more recent solar calendar is used when villagers refer to recently introduced legal functions such as school activities, tax collection, military conscription, and so on. Farmers almost always use lunar references when they discuss calendar dates for various agricultural

231 [454] she answered, "when the pigs are big enough." In explanation she continued, "Do you think that a poor family like ours could afford to *buy* two pigs in order to give our son a proper wedding?"

Almost every family in the village raises at least a few pigs. They are of three types: the native Taiwanese, the Berkshire, or a crossbreed of [343] the two. These pigs are kept in sties which are typically constructed with mud floors, bamboo sidewalls and straw roofs; they are either attached directly to the side of the house or situated several yards away. Some rather recently constructed sties in the village, however, are more modern; they are specially designed with cement or brick [474] floors and walls and cement tile roofs. The local Pu Yen Hsiang Farmers' Association usually subsidizes the construction of a few such sties in each village every year, paying about one-quarter of the total cost of construction.

For the most part, the care and feeding of pigs is the responsibility of the village women and older children. Much time is spent preparing pig food. This consists of sweet potatoes and certain green vegetables grown especially by the farmer for his pigs and other livestock. This is all cooked in a starchy water called "rice soup," which is the water in which the family's rice is washed before it is cooked. According to the [474] Farmers' Association and government agricultural agencies, it is not [232] necessary to cook pig food, but their word has not been very effective [177] in the village. Most villagers, despite the great amount of time it takes, still continue to follow the traditional way of preparation in the [178] belief that pigs will not grow fat on raw sweet potatoes.

Every few days the pig sty is cleaned out. This is usually done for [241] the important purpose of collecting the excrement and the rice straw, which partially covers the floor, for use as fertilizer. Compost is made from the dung and used for various crops. Uncovered compost heaps are usually found alongside the pig houses, and it is not unusual for some garbage to be added to the heap. Children as well as fowl can often be seen climbing on the open compost heap.

[232] When a pig becomes ill it is common to call a local veterinarian. Sometimes the farmer himself will give the sick pig a shot of the penicillin which can now be readily purchased in Lukang.

Possibly as a result of a lack of selective breeding, a somewhat inadequate diet and inadequate use of antibiotics, unsanitary living conditions and the climate, pigs in Hsin Hsing usually take from nine to fifteen months to reach full size, a good deal longer than similar breeds take in America. When a pig does reach full growth, a tax must be [651] paid by the farmer to the government at the Public Office before it is slaughtered. The tax must be paid whether the farmer is selling the [432] pig or using it for his own purposes. Pigs are usually sold to a butcher from a village in the area or from Lukang.

in three market towns or cities: Yuan Lin, almost fifteen miles from 443
the village; Chang-hua, about ten miles; and Taichung, about twenty- 476
five miles. Often some of the men in Hsin Hsing who grow the same
vegetables cooperate in the marketing operation. Since the market
price is usually about the same in each one of the three markets, the
men agree in advance where each will go to sell his vegetables. This
prevents any one market from being flooded with a vegetable and thus
lowering the price. The choice of market is arbitrary, and if one man
happens to get a better price for his vegetables, he is considered lucky,
and no more is thought about it. Perhaps the next time the men will
change markets.

If the villager has a large enough load to take to the wholesale 442
market, it may take him several days to sell his vegetables. In that 443
event he usually sleeps in the market unless he happens to have some [602]
relative such as a *ch'in ch'i* in the town with whom he can stay; a hotel
is considered too expensive. A few villagers ship vegetables like peppers
or cabbages by truck freight to more distant markets in the cities of
Kaohsiung or Taipei. This is done with the aid of a vegetable broker
with whom they have made contact; he also takes care of the sale of
the vegetables in the market for a percentage of the profit. The villager and the broker use the mails to maintain contact about prices
and shipping arrangements. Although only a few villagers now work
with a broker, it seems likely that more will adopt the method, for it
permits the farmer to sell to the best advantage in different parts of
the island.

After a farmer harvests his rice crop he dries it in the sun and stores 251
it either in bamboo-and-mud bins in the house or else in very large, 343
round, white-plastered bamboo or wooden storage bins in front of the
house. This latter method is mostly used by those farmers who produce
a large amount of rice. The rice is held in these storage places until it [454]
is time to make payment in kind for land rent, land taxes, or for
fertilizer. The number of these large rice bins that now go unused and [177]
unrepaired is evidence that the villagers are right when they say they [178]
were able to keep and store much more rice for later sale on the
market under the Japanese.

After the operating expenses are paid and any surplus is sold, the 256
remaining rice is stored unmilled for the family's use. As it is needed, [435]
the villagers have their rice milled, usually in the next village, at a cost
of about NT $2 for every one hundred *chin* of rice. Of one hundred
chin of unmilled rice, approximately twenty *chin* is lost when the rice
is husked and polished. The husks then belong to the mill, but the [231]
farmer can take home the product of the polishing, the ground rice
powder, to feed to pigs and other livestock. The farmers usually pur- [432]
chase the husks from the mills to use as fuel for cooking stoves. [354]

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The presence of women working on the farm has been quite accepted in the rural areas since World War II, when manpower was in such short supply. Village women whose husbands spend a good deal of time working in Taipei are especially active on their own land. However, the heavier fieldwork such as plowing, harrowing, and transplanting is not considered women's work. Therefore, if the male of the household is away at the time, the woman must hire the necessary labor. Frequently, men who work in Taipei and still retain a small piece of land in the village come home for the busier farm seasons to take care of their own land if their Taipei job permits. Generally, these men hire or exchange labor for the harvest. They usually remain in the village area for the entire harvest period and work on other people's land in order to make their return to the village more profitable.

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Hiring labor for plowing a field, planting hills of sweet potatoes, transplanting rice seedlings, or even harvesting a mint field is rather simple; the farmer merely hires the few individuals necessary to do the job, usually from his own village. They may be specialists in plowing or transplanting rice seedlings, or they may be just ordinary villagers who are hired to weed the rice paddies or harvest a mint crop and are pleased to get the extra work when they are not busy with their own fields. On the other hand, hiring labor groups for the harvesting of rice and sugarcane is quite a different matter and quite complex.

One very important type of labor group hired to harvest rice is a group of ten people. This group is most frequently all male, although women may be included and sometimes make up as much as half of the group. The male laborers usually prefer not to have women in the group; women cannot handle the heaviest jobs such as carrying the baskets of rice to the farmer's house, which makes it necessary for only the men in the group to do this exhausting work. Men over the age of seventeen or eighteen and below fifty-five are preferred for the harvest work. On the other hand, since women laborers are easier and cheaper to hire, many landholders prefer to have some women in the labor team to cut down on harvesting costs. However, if it is imperative to complete a harvest quickly, then even the landholder prefers not to hire women; it is felt that they tend to slow up the work. In the latter case, it is not unusual to hire more than ten people in order to complete the harvest in the shortest possible time.

Frequently, the hired labor teams have the same small core of men each year. The core group is usually composed of men from the same village who have little land of their own. Such a group often hires out in villages throughout the immediate area and may even go to other areas whose harvest is earlier than the Hsin Hsing area. A single Hsin Hsing villager who does not belong to such a group can sometimes find work in a labor group outside his own village, but then only if he has [602]

474 [454] the basis of the profits of the Farmers' Association, dividends in the form of towels, soap, or tea sets are regularly given to members.

The members of each village unit of the Farmers' Association elect a "small unit head" who is the Farmers' Association's agent in the village. It is his job to distribute association literature and to notify the [654] members of meetings and classes. It is also his job to record the amount of land for which each farmer wishes to obtain fertilizer from the Food Bureau through the auspices of the Farmers' Association in [465] exchange for rice. Although the unit head used to receive NT $50 a [178] month to cover his expenses, in 1958 the arrangement was changed so that now he receives only the actual office supplies necessary for his [207] job. In each village in Pu Yen Hsiang, the unit head is given a radio [204] by the Farmers' Association for his use as long as he holds the position. He also regularly receives a newspaper, which is an organ of the provincial government, and *Harvest Magazine*.

The members in each village elect one representative for every fifty members to the association's governing body. These representatives in turn elect a supervisor, who then appoints the General Secretary who actually runs the *hsiang* Farmers' Association. The General Secretary is the highest paid employee of the organization and is in charge of the many other paid employees. The main duty of the representatives is to attend the annual meeting of representatives to vote on the yearly program and budget which has been worked out by the General Secretary and his staff.

474 Today, most of the villagers and employees of the Pu Yen Hsiang 654 Farmers' Association feel that the local units are relatively independent. However, there are Farmers' Associations on the *hsien* and provincial level which are supposed to "teach" and to lead the operation of the local organizations. The local units in turn pay fees to the higher level units. In addition, there is a section in both the *hsien* and provincial government's agricultural departments which deals with farmers' organizations and supervises the operations of the Farmers' Associations. Thus, there is control of the operations of the local Farmers' Associations by these three higher levels. The monthly program, budget, and proposed special programs of the local associations are first discussed in local committee, and then the proposals and budget are sent to the Hsien Farmers' Association for suggestions and to the government agency for approval, changes, or rejection.

Both farmers and staff members of the association generally seem to agree that such guidance and supervision by upper levels of the government is a good thing. It is felt that the supervision of the *hsien* government is grounded in the law and assures the farmer that the programs and large amounts of money handled by the Farmers' Association will be properly administered. However, since the organiza-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

These
clubs, which are very popular in Hsin Hsing, are similar to the clubs 452
formerly found in many parts of mainland China (Fei, 1939:267–274) 426
and in Japan (Embree, 1939:138–147). Loan clubs, usually with ten to [171]
fifteen members, are organized by a man or woman who is considered
reliable and trustworthy and who needs a large sum of money for some special purpose such as building a new house, buying some land, or paying for engagement gifts or dowry. The members, enlisted by the organizer, are usually his relatives, friends, or neighbors or sometimes even acquaintances of any of the others. The members are generally people who are interested in being of help to the organizer in his financial need, but there are others who participate only because they hope to make a profit.

The operation of such a moneylending club is quite complex. By means of such a system a person in financial need is often able to obtain an interest-free loan which is to be paid off over a fairly long time—usually more than a year—in equal monthly installments.[8] If the amount involved is very large, such a club may use rice instead of money for the initial loan and for all payments. Under this system, all the payments are made twice a year, that is, after each rice harvest, over a period of years. For the most part, only rice growers participate in this latter transaction.

Generally speaking, then, the problem of farm credit has not yet been solved in the Hsin Hsing village area. A very large proportion of small farmers in financial need must still borrow money under the traditional high-interest systems. The problems of poor credit facilities, along with other financial burdens of the land, seem to be a factor in the increase in the number of families which are forced to find ways of supplementing farm income.

Agent for the Provincial Government's Food Bureau 175

It is only through the increased use of fertilizer that it is possible 648
for the Taiwanese farmer to cultivate the land so much more inten- 241
sively than before. In the middle and late 1930's Japanese chemical 654
fertilizer and bean cake imported from Manchuria was used in
Taiwan. Then, as now, the fertilizer was distributed for the govern- 439
ment by the local Farmers' Associations. Under the Japanese, however, [474]
the villagers report, the system of distribution and payment for the [178]
fertilizer was quite different. Then, the farmer could easily obtain as
much fertilizer and bean cake as he needed and desired so long as it [437]
was available. The cost of the fertilizer could be paid in cash (as could [432]
the land tax) after the sale of the rice harvest to a merchant. Now, [178]
payment for the fertilizer is only made in rice, partly before and partly
after the harvest. Today, the government, operating through the pro- 241
vincial government's Food Bureau, has a monopoly on the importa- 439
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1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

villagers in premodern Taiwan also had relationships with other vil- 312
lages and areas, it is evident that the recent expansion of agriculture 628
has made the increase in their outside relations both possible and 572
necessary. During a period of drought while I was in the village, I
found the villagers both aware and concerned with whether the pro- [829]
vincial government would hold the large mountain water resources
back in order to generate electric power or would release the water
earlier to be used for irrigation.

The effect that irrigation has had on the villagers' outside concerns 312
is no different from the effect on their lives of the recently expanded 178
operations of the Farmers' Association through its facilities and, espe- 474
cially, its improved extension services.

But perhaps one of the most striking changes in the village has been 178
in land utilization—the important switch to vegetable growing, a cash
crop, which necessitates a development of interest in marketing. This 311
change in land utilization is very closely related to land tenure prob- [44]
lems such as land scarcity and the recent important development of [423]
out-migration of villagers to the city. These will be discussed in the [167]
next chapter.

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entirely and finding a new tenant. Thus, while a tenant felt he would have some security on the land, if he could cement his relationship with his landlord or landlords, even such security was of questionable duration. And the tenants' problem was worsened by the small size of the fields, which meant that it was not uncommon for a man to have more than one landlord.

427 A good many landlords who rented land in the area to Hsin Hsing villagers did not live there. A number lived (as some still do) in relatively distant villages, and a few, usually businessmen, lived in Lukang or Taichung City. Since absentee landlords usually did not rely exclusively upon their land rents for a livelihood, they were often [731] not very strict with their tenants. In the event of a crop failure, the villagers recall that most of these absentee landlords were willing to allow a rent reduction, perhaps even more so than the landlord who lived in the village area. It was not, of course, easy for the absentee landlords to operate their land by themselves or to find a new tenant or hired laborer to take care of the land for them. The landlord who lived in the village area could operate the land himself with hired laborers or else easily find a new tenant.

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The tenant whose landlord lived in the immediate area considered the maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing* an important factor in determining his tenure. He apparently realized, nevertheless, what a slender reed it was, since he admitted that absentee landlords were easier to deal with. Keen competition for land, especially in the postwar period, resulted in a constant danger that other would-be tenants might approach the landlord and offer him a higher rent or other concessions. Under such circumstances the tenant could only try to fulfill all of his obligations to the landlord with the hope of maintaining a precarious goodwill.

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I heard of several landlords in Hsin Hsing village and the immediate area who switched tenants every year, with hardly a word of explanation, as they received better rental offers. Although such landlords were extremely unpopular in the countryside, there was little that tenants could do. These landlords were well known in the area for such practices, and when labor was in short supply during the extremely busy part of the agricultural season, many local farm laborers refused to work for them. This technique of getting back at unpleasant landlords is still used today. One landlord family in Hsin Hsing was greatly disliked by the villagers in the postwar period and to this day often has difficulty in obtaining labor at harvesttime.

The case of this family is an excellent example of the landlord-tenant problem in Hsin Hsing. Good feeling and mutual aid had existed between the old landlord, who was head of his family, and many of his tenants. After the death of the old man—which was prior

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(In the following pages this unculitvated land will not be considered, since we are concerned only with productive land.)

Neither the total amount of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers nor the actual number of farming families changed significantly as a result of the land reform. Nevertheless, there were striking internal 423 178

TABLE 13

BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL LAND CULTIVATED (OWNED AND OPERATED) AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES IN EACH CATEGORY IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE FOR PRE-LAND REFORM (1949–1951) AND POST-LAND REFORM (1957) 423 311

Land classification	1949–1951		1957	
	Area *chia*	Number of families	Area *chia*	Number of families
Privately owned (individual, joint, corporate)	25.8204	62	29.5567	62
Land reform land	—	—	15.3716	36
Tenanted land	35.7376	58	16.2925	38
Total number of farming families	—	92	—	90
Total land surface cultivated	61.5580	—	61.2208	—
House and other uncultivated lands	2.9909	—	2.9909	—
Total land surface owned and operated, cultivated and uncultivated	64.5489	—	64.2117	—

changes in the land tenure situation in the village, especially after the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953, which greatly affected the figures on landownership and tenancy. Privately owned land rose to 29.5567 *chia* (71 acres), and an additional 15.3716 *chia* (37 acres) of leased land sold to the former tenants under the 1953 act caused tenancy to decline to 16.2925 *chia* (39 acres).[2] 423 178 [427]

EFFECTS OF THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM

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The 61.5580 *chia* of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers at the time of the 1949 "Regulations Governing the Lease of Private Farm Lands in Taiwan Province" was of two types: leased land and privately owned land. (See Tables 13 and 14.) Of this, 35.7376 *chia*, or 58.1 percent of the total, was rented by fifty-eight Hsin Hsing village households. Actually, there were a few more tenants, working a few very small plots of land, who were not recorded or given contracts in 1949. These few had been persuaded by their landlords to allow themselves to be classed as laborers instead of tenants. The remaining [427]

[text continues on p. 101 -- Analyst]

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Hsing villagers had been reduced to slightly over 16 *chia*. Almost 4
423 *chia* of the privately owned portion of tenant land had been sold by
the owners to their Hsin Hsing tenants after the 1951 Rent Reduction
427 Act (and before the 1953 act of expropriation). More than 2 *chia* of
671 public land, eight plots rented to four Hsin Hsing villagers, were
432 made available to these farmers for purchase over a ten-year period by
virtue of the 1951 Land Act which governed the sale of public farm-
[659] lands. And in 1953, under the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, the government
purchased an additional 13.5 *chia* (in forty-six plots) of privately

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TABLE 16

AREAS AND TYPES OF LAND CULTIVATED BY 90 HSIN HSING HOUSEHOLDS
AFTER LAND REFORM, 1957

	Paddy field	Dry field	Total (*chia*)	Percent (*chia*)
Owner-cultivated	42.2345	2.6938	44.9283	73.4
Tenanted	14.9100	1.3825	16.2925	26.6
Total	57.1445	4.0763	61.2208	100.0
Percentage	93.3	6.7	—	—

TABLE 17

AREAS OF CULTIVATED LANDS IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE BEFORE AND AFTER
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND-TO-THE-TILLER PROGRAM

	Before implementation		After implementation (1957 records)	
	Area (*chia*)	Percent	Area (*chia*)	Percent
Owner-cultivated	25.8	41.9	44.9	73.4
Tenanted	35.7	58.1	16.3	26.6
Total	61.5	100.0	61.2	100.0

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427 owned Hsin Hsing tenant land from the landlords and made it available to the 33 former tenants for eventual ownreship. One of these
671 33 families had also purchased public land under the 1951 act.

432 With the completion of the Land Reform Program of 1953, the land
659 tenure picture for Hsin Hsing village had changed radically. According to the September, 1957, records, as a direct or indirect[8] result of the land reform, the amount of land leased by villagers was reduced by almost 55 percent from 35.7 *chia* of land in 1949 to 16.29 *chia* in 1957. Whereas in 1949 land leased by villagers had represented 58.1 percent
423 of the total cultivated land, by 1957 it was reduced to 26.6 percent of
427 the total. (See Tables 13, 14, 16, and 17.) (See Map 4 for distribution
178 of village landholdings.)

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Prior to land reform, 14.6 percent of the leased land in Hsin Hsing was owned by Hsin Hsing villagers and 85.4 percent by outsiders, including public enterprises. (See table 14.) After land reform, in 1957, only about 9.1 percent of the leased land was village owned; 90.9 percent was owned by outsiders. (See Table 18.)

TABLE 18

TENANTED LAND IN HSIN HSING VILLAGE, 1957

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	Paddy (*chia*)	Dry (*chia*)	Total	Percent
Land surface tenanted	14.9100	1.3825	16.2925	100.0
Tenanted land owned by Hsin Hsing landlords	1.4753	—	1.4753	9.1
Tenanted land owned by landlords outside Hsin Hsing	13.4347	1.3825	14.8172	90.9

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In the pre-land reform period (1949–1951), of the 92 farming households in Hsin Hsing village, 58 households (63.0 percent) were tenants, and of these 30 (or 32.6 percent of the village's farming households) owned no land whatsoever. (See Table 19.) In the post-land reform period, the 1957 records show ninety farming households listed in the village of whom only 38 (42.2 percent) were tenant households; of these only 9 (10 percent of the total number of farming households)

TABLE 19

NUMBER OF FARMING FAMILIES IN HSIN HSING BY SIZE OF CULTIVATED LAND, 195

Amount cultivated in *chia*	Own all land	Mixed owner-tenant owns more than half	Mixed owner-tenant owns less than half	Pure tenant	Total number of farming families	Percent of farming families
Less than 0.1	4	—	—	—	4	4.3
0.1–0.3	6	1	1	7	15	16.3
0.3–0.5	8	—	6	8	22	23.9
0.5–1.0	9	2	11	12	34	37.0
1.0–1.5	4	1	3	2	10	10.9
1.5–2.0	2	—	—	1	3	3.3
2.0–2.5	1	—	—	—	1	1.1
2.5–3.0	—	1	1	—	2	2.2
Over 3.0	—	1	—	—	1	1.1
Number of families	34	6	22	30	92	—
Percent of families	37.0	6.5	23.9	32.6	—	100.1

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owned no land, while the remaining 29 tenant householders were partial landowners as a result of the Land Reform Acts. (See Table 20.)

TABLE 20

NUMBER OF FARMING FAMILIES IN HSIN HSING BY SIZE OF CULTIVATED LAND, 1957

Amount cultivated in *chia*	Own all land	Mixed owner-tenant owns more than half	Mixed owner-tenant owns less than half	Pure tenant	Total number of farming families	Percent of farming families
Less than 0.1	4	—	—	—	4	4.4
0.1–0.3	12	1	—	3	16	17.8
0.3–0.5	11	5	1	3	20	22.2
0.5–1.0	18	9	7	2	36	40.0
1.0–1.5	5	2	1	1	9	10.0
1.5–2.0	2	—	—	—	2	2.2
2.0–2.5	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.5–3.0	—	2	—	—	2	2.2
Over 3.0	—	1	—	—	1	1.1
Number of families	52	20	9	9	90	—
Percent of families	57.8	22.2	10.0	10.0	—	99.9

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TABLE 21

AREA OF FARMS CULTIVATED BY 36 FARMERS WHO PURCHASED LAND THROUGH LAND REFORM, 1957

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Kinds of farmland	Area in *chia*		Percent
Land purchased under Land-to-the-Tiller Program		15.3716	59.6
Paddy field	13.0115		—
Dry land	2.3601		—
Land originally owned and cultivated by farmers themselves		4.5224	17.5
Paddy field	4.4374		—
Dry land	0.0850		—
Leased land		5.8980	22.9
Paddy field	4.7665		—
Dry land	1.1315		—
Total area		25.7920	100.0
Paddy field	22.2154		86.1
Dry land	3.5766		13.9

423 The rest of the land worked in Hsin Hsing in the post-land reform period consisted of the already mentioned 15.3716 *chia* purchased either under the 1951 act for the sale of public land or the 1953 Land-to-the-Tiller Act, plus the 29.5567 *chia* owned by the villagers as indi-

vidual, joint, or corporate owned land. However, if one considers the 15.3716 *chia* of land which changed ownership under land reform as

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TABLE 22

NUMBER OF FAMILIES PURCHASING LAND UNDER LAND-TO-THE-TILLER PROGRAM, AND AREA OF FARMS THEY CULTIVATE
Part A. Pre-Land Reform (1949–1951)

	Number of farmers later to purchase land		Area of farms cultivated (*chia*)			
Size of class (*chia*)	Number of families	Percent	Paddy field	Dry field	Total area	Percent
Landless: farmers owning no land	19	52.8	—	—	—	—
Less than 0.1 (*chia*)	4	11.1	—	0.0610	0.0610	1.3
0.1–0.3	7	19.4	1.0425	0.0240	1.0665	23.6
0.3–0.5	3	8.3	1.0784	—	1.0784	23.8
0.5–1.0	3	8.3	2.3165	—	2.3165	51.2
1.0–1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—
1.5–2.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.0–2.5	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.5–3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Over 3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	36	99.9	4.4374	0.0850	4.5224	99.9

TABLE 22

NUMBER OF FAMILIES PURCHASING LAND UNDER LAND-TO-THE-TILLER PROGRAM, AND AREA OF FARMS THEY CULTIVATE
Part B. Post-Land Reform (1957)

	Number of farmers to purchase land		Area of farms cultivated including previously owned land (*chia*)			
Size of class (*chia*)	Number of families	Percent	Paddy field	Dry field	Total area	Percent
Landless: farmers owning no land	—	—	—	—	—	—
Less than 0.1 (*chia*)	2	5.5	0.3369	0.0130	0.3499	1.8
0.1–0.3	7	19.4	1.3775	0.2000	1.6373	8.2
0.3–0.5	10	27.8	3.6438	0.2482	3.8920	19.6
0.5–1.0	13	36.1	7.7481	0.5918	8.3399	41.9
1.0–1.5	3	8.3	3.5210	—	3.5210	17.7
1.5–2.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.0–2.5	1	2.8	0.8218	1.3321	2.1539	10.8
2.5–3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Over 3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	36	99.9	17.4489	2.4451	19.8940	100.0

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423 the equivalent of owner operated land (and legally this is how it is considered), then it is notable that of the 61.2208 *chia* operated by the villagers in 1957 44.9283 *chia*, or 73.4 percent, was privately owned and the remaining 26.6 percent tenant operated.

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Thirty-six families, about 40 percent of the Hsin Hsing village farming families, were benefited by the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953. Before the reform program, 19 of these 36 families owned no land at all, and their livelihood depended strictly on the land they rented and whatever outside income they had. However, the other 17 families, besides their rented land, owned only about 4.5 *chia* of land, most of which was paddy field. After the Land Reform Program, which affected almost 15.5 *chia* under the 1951–1953 acts, land that these 36 families cultivated as owners increased to 19.9 *chia*, of which about 17.5 *chia* was paddy. In 1957, 19 of these same 36 households continued to work a little below 6 *chia* of land as tenant farmers. (See Table 21.) This tenant land is cultivated under the strict enforcement of the 37.5 percent Rent Reduction Act.

The change in the landholding status of the 36 families directly affected by the reform program is shown in Table 22, Parts A and B. Before land reform only 3 of the 36 owned more than 0.5 *chia* of land, but in the post-land reform period, 17 of the 36 owned more than 0.5 *chia*. The average area purchased by Hsin Hsing tillers under the reform was 0.44 *chia*, usually in one and sometimes two plots of land per family. This means that in Hsin Hsing village, of the 54 plots of land sold to the tillers by the government, the size of the average plot sold was less than 0.3 *chia* of land.

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Chang Yen-t'ien (1954:86) writes that in Taiwan about 46.44 percent of the total pre-reform tenants, including part-tenants, purchased land through the reform program. But he notes that "more than half of the former tenant families . . . are still entirely or partly under the influence of tenancy."

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For Hsin Hsing village, the records show that 62 percent of the 58 pre-reform tenants purchased some land reform land, and the figure is probably this high because of the higher rate of tenancy in Hsin Hsing than in Taiwan as a whole. Thirty-six households, or 65.5 percent, of the 58 are still to some extent tenants, however. This is mainly because the land they rented happened to be part of the 3 *chia* of land the landlord could retain under the 1953 law. While this was

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true for landlords in all of Taiwan, the average land purchase figure may be larger for the whole of Taiwan than for Hsin Hsing because elsewhere in Taiwan there were large tracts of public land available for purchase and, in addition, at the time of the restoration there was little Japanese-cultivated land in the immediate area of Hsin Hsing for Hsin Hsing villagers to take over. These factors have gener-

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ally contributed to a lower average amount of land tilled by owners in Hsin Hsing than in other villages and areas.

The two major improvements in the land tenure situation as seen in Tables 19, 20, and 23 are: first, the significant increase in landownership and decrease in tenancy, especially the decrease in the number of pure tenants; and second, the large increase in the number of Hsin Hsing mixed owner-tenants, who in 1957 owned more than half the land they cultivated.

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It can also be seen from Table 23 that, in 1957, 70 of the 81 land-

TABLE 23

STATISTICS ON LANDOWNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION FOR HSIN HSING VILLAGE: PRE-LAND REFORM (1951–1952) AND POST-LAND REFORM (1957)

Size of class (*chia*)	1951–1952 Number of farming households	1951–1952 Percent of households	1957 Number of farming households	1957 Percent of households
Own no land at all	30	32.6	9	10.0
Own less than 0.1	12	13.0	9	10.0
0.1–0.3	18	19.6	18	20.0
0.3–0.5	12	13.0	19	21.1
0.5–1.0	13	14.1	24	26.7
1.0–1.5	4	4.3	6	6.7
1.5–2.0	2	2.2	2	2.2
2.0–2.5	1	1.1	3	3.3
Total Landowners	62	67.5	81	90.0
Total farming households	92	99.9	90	100.0

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holding families still owned less than one *chia* of land, and 46 of the 81 owned less than a half-*chia*. Thus, the land reform brought about virtually no increase in the total amount of land cultivated by Hsin Hsing villagers or increases in the number of families cultivating the land in each size category. While the reform produced important changes in the internal nature of the land tenure situation, it did not and could not solve the basic problem—an insufficiency of cultivable land coupled with rapid population growth.

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Of the 115 households registered in the village in 1957, only 90 households can actually be considered farming families. The 25 registered households of Hsin Hsing village which do not cultivate land at all must be classed as village nonfarming, landless families. The breadwinner in such families may work locally as a hired farm laborer or may have gone off to work in Taipei because of the land scarcity. Once assured of an adequate living in the city, a few of such men sold off or gave up the very small portions of land they were cultivating. Once well settled in Taipei, a few brought at least part and sometimes

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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the land reform act, and used the money for additional investments.

Many former landlords have done poorly at business, and some have even failed because of their lack of experience and training. Others have maintained their economic investments in the villages. Several formerly large landholders in the two villages adjacent to Hsin Hsing continue their activities in their villages and the surrounding area very much as before. Although their landholdings were cut significantly by the land reform, they nevertheless retain their maximum three *chia* of land. Also, in some instances, a number of landlords prior to the 1953 act managed to retain control of more than the three *chia* limit by legally dividing their family and then transferring portions of their land to the names of other members of their family. By virtue of their positions many landlords, especially those who worked as minor officials or civil servants in the local administration or who were well acquainted with officials, became aware of the ins and outs of the proposed land reform laws and so knew exactly how to manipulate their landholdings legally in order to retain as much land as possible.

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Even today landlords may, and do, buy land in excess of three *chia* and then hire laborers to till it for them. As long as they do not rent the land out they seem to be safe from legal action. A few landlords who manage to buy additional land are still doing so in the names of other members of their family and in such cases then actually rent the land out to tenants. But it appears that the fear of another Land Reform Program in the future, as well as the increased movement of the landlords' economic interests outside the rural area, serves to deter many landlords from attempting to reaccumulate landholdings, even by the devious but legal means.

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Another frequent activity of landlords who have chosen to maintain their economic interests in the Hsin Hsing area is that of moneylending. The small farmer, having little to offer as security, still continues to resort to the local moneylender for cash or other loans. The local moneylender lends fairly large amounts for longer periods of time than any agency of the government or association but, of course, at extremely high interest rates.

The landlords will continue to engage in moneylending as long as the farmer has credit difficulty. If a good profit can be made from moneylending, it is evident that the wealthy landlords will not willingly transfer their economic interests into more productive economic activities.

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Traditionally, the village landlord has played a major role in the leadership of his village and its immediate vicinity. During the Japanese period, such leadership roles were greatly reinforced by the Japanese, who preferred to handle village problems through the wealthy landlord class rather than by dealing directly with the "peas-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ants." The Hsin Hsing villagers readily recall that the local Japanese police and officials showed respect only for the well-to-do landlords. Consequently, if the villagers were to get along successfully with the Japanese, they had to work through their landlords. They usually elected a landlord to handle local village affairs and to represent village interests in dealing with the Japanese authorities.

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The arrangement was also to the landlord's advantage. As the official leader, he wielded greater power by which he could more easily manipulate the villagers, and even the tax collector, to his own advantage. His recognition as a leader by his fellow villagers and by the authorities also increased his prestige.

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Not only was such a landlord the elected village political leader but he might often be an informal leader as well, a person who took an active part in most of the social and religious affairs of the village. He usually contributed money and time to help make these affairs a success. The efforts of the landlord helped to build up his reputation as a public-spirited citizen. Frequently, he assumed the role of mediator in discussions of village and intervillage problems and in disputes between his own villagers or even between members of other villages. When the landlord's efforts as a mediator extended beyond his own village, he enhanced his own reputation in the whole area and that of his village as well.

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These conditions continued after the restoration into the post-land reform period. Today, the landlord class continues in the rural area and wields power in local grass roots politics as well as in socioeconomic affairs. In most villages the recognized leaders are still those who are rich, maintain big landholdings, and have had a fairly good education. Such people may also have influence—perhaps by virtue of a relative—in some government agency. It is still a great advantage to a village to have a wealthy representative of the landlord class to deal successfully with authorities. Many, if not most of the government officials, are drawn from this class, since they are educated and usually wealthy.

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However, this picture is beginning to change. Village affairs are being profoundly affected as many former large landlords and traditional local leaders transfer their economic interests and activities away from the land to new business interests elsewhere. When a landlord gives up his major economic interests in the area, it is usually not long before village social, religious, and political activities become much less important to him. Because the personal advantage is gone, he is no longer concerned with maintaining his status or leadership role. He may even move his residence out of the village in order to be closer to his new economic interests.

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Villages suffering such a loss of local leadership have reacted in two

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village cleavages worked for his advantage, as did his membership in one of the larger village *tsu* groups with a following that worked hard in the election. [554] [618]

In Hsin Hsing, then, although this man bears the official title of mayor, he is not really accepted as village head. Today, Hsin Hsing village, like many other communities, seems to be virtually leaderless. In Hsin Hsing and in some other villages observed, this has led to a state of civic disorganization in meeting many village problems, especially those concerning relations with other villages. (An example of just such a problem will be discussed in Chapter 6.) T [182]

The post-land reform period in the rural area shows signs of being one of social as well as economic transition. Although the landlords still form a definite and important class, the changes taking place may mark the beginning of a decline in the almost exclusive leadership of the landlord or gentry class. There are incipient signs of instability in a traditional social system which had grown out of an unequal distribution of rural wealth and income as a result of the land tenure system. The Land Reform Program which has led many landlords to withdraw their interests from the rural villages appears to be leading to some equalization of social status in rural Taiwan, which may in turn enable new village leaders to become effective. T Tn 178 423 556 565 622

In the past and, to a lesser degree, in the present, there have been capable villagers who had no opportunity to compete with the landlord class for primary village leadership. Now, perhaps for the first time, these people will have some opportunity to manifest their leadership abilities. But many traditional attitudes must be cleared away before such new leaders can gain widespread acceptance. In addition to actual economic equalization, there must be a more complete equalization of social status in the village. There must be a change in the villagers' own attitudes toward leadership and authority, for they have not yet been emancipated from their respect for wealth and power and the use to which these two can be put in the manipulation of people and politics. T Tn 178 571 554 829 622

Although the accomplishment of change in this attitude toward leadership and authority is still a long way off, it should be noted that respect for a man is not based entirely on his wealth and power. These qualities in themselves are not enough, but must be accompanied by evidence of responsibility toward the village, active participation in village affairs, and at least an outward appearance of "not looking down on less fortunate fellows."

The consequences of village social disorganization are not fully apparent. However, definite signs of such disorganization were seen in the last chapter in the problems of community organization and cooperation over irrigation, and will be seen in later chapters in the T Tn 622 182

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problem of village solidarity. It is perhaps too soon to tell how successful these new leaders will be, but it seems likely that if disorganization continues as a result of the gradual withdrawal from leadership by the landlord class, the most capable among the aspirants for village leadership may find, by necessity, increasing acceptance from their fellows.

EFFECT OF LAND REFORM ON THE LAND MARKET

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In the Hsin Hsing area, another effect of the Land Reform Program appears to be a decrease in the free circulation of land, especially in land for rent. Because the 1951 Rent Reduction Act is still in effect, tenants who have contracts are remaining on the land and not giving up their right to tenancy. The landlord can no longer freely change tenants, even when the contract period ends, unless the tenant wishes to give up his rights. At the same time, as the value of rents decline, "the value of leased farm land . . . [is] lower than that of owner cultivated-land" (T'ang, 1954:63). Thus, many landlords do not want to sell their land when its value is low. But even more, under such conditions prospective buyers would gain little from buying land occupied by a tenant who has a contract and a fixed rent.

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Landlords who have been tilling some land themselves will very rarely rent it to anyone now. To do so would mean that the landlord, although receiving his 37.5 percent rent, would have little control over his own land. As a former large landlord put it, "Before the Land Reform the landlord made the rules if he wanted more rent. Today the government makes the rules." If the landlord should find that for some reason he no longer can till the land himself, it is more likely that he will hire laborers to work the land. Formerly, he would probably have rented it out. Thus, there is very little land available today for anyone wishing to rent it.

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There also seems to be little turnover of publicly and privately owned land which was purchased from the government by former tenants under the 1951 and 1953 acts. Only under great financial stress will such villagers give up their rights to assume full ownership at the end of the ten-year amortization period. According to the 1953 act, a farmer who is unable to continue payments on such land may ask the government to repurchase the land for resale to other farmers. "The Government shall in such a case reimburse to the purchaser in one lump sum the purchase price already paid" (T'ang, 1954:191, translation of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, 1953, Chapter IV, Article 29). However, despite the law, when such instances have arisen in the Hsin Hsing area, the land has not been resold through the government but by the farmer directly to another farmer who has approached him for additional land to support a growing family.

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432 recently represented the largest portion of land available for purchase
[427] on the open market. Even such land, however, does not necessarily add
a great deal to the land market, since much of it had already been
rented out.

423 The result of this static condition in the land market appears to be
556 an ossification of socioeconomic mobility *within* the rural area. The
178 traditional means for improving one's family's status by acquiring
more and more land and the advantages which accrue to the landed
are no longer so readily attainable. The main outlet now available for
[167] those who have hopes of improving their economic condition is to
acquire some kind of business interest, usually outside the Hsin Hsing
area, and, in such a case, those people rarely remain part of their
native village.

LAND SCARCITY IN HSIN HSING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

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167 We see that in spite of the Land Reform Program (and perhaps
in part because of it) and in spite of the apparent increase in the
productivity of the land, there has been a continuing land-population
imbalance and hence an increasingly serious land scarcity in the rural
area. Some of the attempts to solve this continuing problem have
already been discussed here. For the remainder of this chapter we will
[128] examine in some detail the consequences of one solution to this
problem—out-migration—for the villagers, their families, and for the
village as a whole, particularly in role behavior and attitudes toward
the land.

Even now the problem of a growing population and a resulting land scarcity in the area has greatly affected the lives of many villagers. The most important effect has been an increased mobility to new centers of employment such as Taipei, where villagers carry on small business
enterprises or more usually work as unskilled laborers. This trend
[171] toward increased mobility has already spread to other villages of the
area, and is likely to become more extreme all over the island as the
population pressures increase.

464 The lack of any extensive light industry in the area which could
423 absorb excess local labor leaves little alternative for families which do
not have enough land to support them. Even a Hsin Hsing village
166 family which has enough land to support all its members and keep
most of them occupied for the greater part of the year must nevertheless contend with the problem of agricultural slack seasons. Some of the young men and women of such families may possibly find employment in the local menthol oil factory or brickworks. Whether full- or part-time, the job is close enough to home so that the villager can go home whenever his labor is required by the family.

home whenever his labor is required by the family. Other young men 000
peddle vegetables in the slack season. The only equipment necessary is 443
a strong bicycle. The young men go to the market town of Yuan Lin 469
early in the morning to buy vegetables and then sell them along a [493]
regular route of villages. Very often they peddle in villages where they [602]
have friends or *ch'in ch'i* relatives who can introduce them to potential
customers. A young man peddling vegetables can earn NT $10 or [465]
more a day, which he will give to the head of the household.

A few village men earn money as rice or land brokers in the local 463
area. There are also several village men who earn extra income as [434]
professional cooks at weddings or other local festivals. A few of the older
men may on occasion still go up into the interior mountains or hills [178]
for several days to find herbs which they sell to Chinese druggists, but
this part-time occupation is not as commonly engaged in now as it was
in the past.

Several girls and young women of the village have recently gone 464
away from home to work in a sugar factory in the mountains. The 249
sugar companies send men to the villages to recruit them; later a 166
company truck comes to pick up all the recruits from the area and take
them to the factory, where they live in dormitories.

Village women and girls also weave fiber hats at home in their spare 46
time. The white fiber, made from the bark of a tree, is supplied by 294
factory agents from Lukang who travel from village to village leaving
the fiber with the women, picking up the completed hats on subsequent
stops. The women, who may work on one hat sporadically for
several days, receive between NT $6 to NT $12 for each hat depending
on the quality of the fiber worked. These hats are then finished in [439]
small factories for export.

The most important outlet for the excess labor of the Hsin Hsing 464
village area since the late 1940's has been employment in Taipei. The 434
income for the villagers earned by work or business in Taipei has been
steadily increasing, as has the number of villagers going there. The 167
village representative and his son, who is employed in the district [624]
Public Office, estimated that 35 percent of the total village income in
1957–1958 was derived from work or business outside the village area,
mainly from work in Taipei. Most villagers send their earnings home
in small sums, either by registered mail or by a fellow villager. The
remaining 65 percent of the village income was estimated as follows:
about 45 percent from rice production, 6.5 percent from the marketing
of vegetables, 6.5 percent from the sale of menthol oil, 3 percent from
farm labor, and 4 percent from other sources. The income which the
villager earns as a laborer in Taipei is not included for tax purposes
with the farm income.

In 1958 there were about one hundred Hsin Hsing village residents 464
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464 either working or doing business in Taipei. This group was composed
167 mostly of men, although a large number of boys above the age of
sixteen and also some women and girls were included. Other than a
small minority who have their own business, most of these men worked
as pedicab drivers, coolie laborers, or clerks in stores. Men who have
some land in the village usually have jobs driving a pedicab or pulling
a vegetable cart which permit them freedom to return home for the
[472] harvest or other busy agricultural seasons. Some villagers, who have
been in Taipei long enough to save some money, manage to buy their
own pedicab or vegetable cart. Those who do not usually rent them by
the day.

[462] It is common for girls or women to work as cooks or domestic servants.
[357] Villagers who work as house servants or clerks have frequently
been referred to their jobs through a relative, friend, or fellow villager
[466] before leaving the village. The villager usually lives in the home or
store of the employer. On the other hand, the villager engaged in the
[362] other forms of labor usually shifts for himself. In such cases, if the
man does not have his family in Taipei, he often shares a small room
with several other villagers who also work in the city. The men share
the room rent and get their meals at restaurants or sidewalk food
stands.

464 If the young male villagers live in their employer's quarters, their
167 activities are usually rather closely supervised. However, young males,
883 especially those who work as pedicab drivers and live on their own,
783 often get into trouble—drinking, gambling, frequenting bars, and visiting
prostitutes. Sometimes they fall in with groups of boys who
593 engage in gang fights. The boy's family first notices something is wrong
[466] when he fails to send money home. The family either questions other
adult villagers who have returned from Taipei or writes to a villager
in Taipei to discover what is wrong. When they find out about the
boy's activities, they send word to him to return home.

464 Another group of young villagers likely to get into difficulties in
167 Taipei is the younger married men who leave their wives in the village.
Sometimes, they become involved with other women in the city
[578] or even take a second wife. This results in family conflict and occasion-
[595] ally leads to divorce and bad feeling between the husband's family
[837] and that of his first wife.

[434] While most parents are aware of the possibly corrupting influences
on their sons who go to Taipei, they nevertheless rationalize their fears
because the additional income is so useful to the family. It is only after
something happens and the boy is actually in trouble that they call
him home.

462 Not only has working in Taipei had direct gross effects on the men
178 who go there but it has also greatly affected the role of women and
167 children who remain in the village.

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children who remain in the village. Although the women often help 178
out in the field when the men are in the village working the land,
their main concern is still running the households and tending the
livestock. However, once the husband is gone, the wife must take on
added responsibilities for the farm operations. She must hire people to
plow, transplant seedlings, weed, and perhaps harvest the crop if the
man cannot leave his work in Taipei. She must pay wages and arrange
for the payment of taxes and exchange of rice for fertilizer. She must
make many decisions, frequently without the benefit of her husband's
counsel and opinion. In addition, she herself must spend a good deal
of time in the fields supervising laborers or checking the flow of irrigation
water. Her role in the household is greatly changed, as is her [592]
relationship to her children, since it is she alone who is responsible for
their care and discipline (the problem is not so serious in extended [855]
family households where there is more than a single adult couple in
the family).

Even the role of the older children is affected since they must assume 857
tasks at much younger ages than they normally would. There is more 178
work for them in the fields, and perhaps there are younger children to
take care of while the mother is in the fields. Sometimes, children are
kept so busy that they cannot attend school regularly.

Frequently, the separation of the husband from the family may 167
prove unsatisfactory for everyone. The woman, burdened with added
responsibilities of both household and land, may prefer to move to 593
Taipei with her husband and so keep the family together. At the
outset she may make occasional short visits to Taipei, and finally, if
her husband has established himself in either a good job or a small
business in Taipei, he will send for her and perhaps the children to
live with him in Taipei. However, women whose husbands are not so
well established in the city must continue in their unstable situation
in the village.

Most village families or parts of families which have moved to 167
Taipei live together in the Wan Hua section in a very small commu- 62
nity of their own. In addition to the more than twenty Hsin Hsing
village families congregated together in Wan Hua, there are more 369
than sixty families in this section from the general area of Hsin Hsing.
Before 1955 these village families were scattered all over the city, but [796]
now the Hsin Hsing village families and many families from nearby
villages join together as a group to perform some of the same religious
ceremonials they did in the village itself.

Once the whole family moves to Taipei, there seems to be a general 167
weakening of ties with the native village, and they usually go back 593
only for special festivals. In addition, it appears to be more and more 596
usual for families who have made a success of a small business in 369

167 593 Taipei to sell out their land and leave the village entirely. Such cases
596 have even included joint families, where the whole family, including
369 the old parents, have made the move.

Such increased out-migration of whole families has thus resulted
167 from both the scarcity of available land and the apparently adverse
423 effect of the Land Reform Program on the possibility of acquiring
land for purchase or especially for rent. Just as many landlords now
178 realize that the accumulation of land is no longer a safe capital invest-
464 ment, many villagers, who in the past sought social mobility through
[556] increased landholdings, now see this avenue as relatively limited. In-
[454] creasingly, they now look to other nonagriculturally-based sources of
livelihood and social mobility.

It appears then that much of the villager's traditional sentiment for
167 his land and, to a lesser extent, his ancestral home not infrequently
423 takes second place if there is a surer way of earning a livelihood and
178 accumulating status and wealth. Again, as we have seen, even land-
464 lords who traditionally had the greatest sentiment and attachment for
family and ancestral home have now in many instances been selling off
829 their remaining landholdings as more secure and lucrative economic
opportunities present themselves in the city.[5] This pattern is not perhaps so unusual; after all, many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia as well as in Taiwan who left their homes on the mainland and made their fortunes abroad never returned to China but later had their families join them.

167 The families which prosper in Taipei undoubtedly prefer life there
to what they had in the village, but there are still many villagers who
464 work and live in Taipei only because they cannot manage to earn
423 enough to support their families on the land. With very little land in
the village, they have no capital to invest, and once in Taipei they
241 must take whatever work is available. The people say that a villager who goes to Taipei as a coolie laborer, as most do, "usually goes as a water buffalo." Such men may very well prefer to stay on the land, but they have no alternative. Although they dislike working in Taipei as "beasts of burden," they frequently complain (along with the villagers who remain tied to the land) that a farmer's life is hard and bitter. "A farmer must go to the fields and work very hard even in rainy or windy weather. He must irrigate the fields if the crops need water, and sometimes pedal water all night to irrigate the fields. In addition, he must
[651] pay rice to the Farmers' Association [meaning the Provincial Food
Bureau] for taxes and in exchange for fertilizer. In other words, the
[437] Farmers' Association takes the rice away from the farmers after they
harvest their crops."

178 At the same time, the villager who remains on the land has dreams
829 of "glory" for the next generation. He usually does not want his son to

be a farmer like himself and "suffer on the land." He wants him to 178
become a businessman or teacher for "although teachers and minor 829
officials don't make much money, their work is easy." He wants his daughters to marry businessmen since "rather than having money only after the harvest, the businessman always has money coming in." Unfortunately, the farmer cannot always afford to educate his son beyond the primary grades. The family may not be able to afford middle school fees, or there may be a need for the boy's labor on the farm or for the income he can earn in some kind of menial work in Taipei. As for a daughter, in the traditional way of arranging marriages in rural society, often the best a father can do is marry her to the son of another poor farmer like himself. There is an old saying *"Men t'ang hu tuei,"* which means that a suitable marriage joins families of the same social standing. Thus, as the farmer sees it, his situation is a vicious circle: his socioeconomic condition itself bars any hope for improvement for himself or his children.

Yet, for most who remain in the village, there is a certain ambivalence in attitude. In spite of the statements just quoted, for many of them sentiment still runs high for life in the village and on the land. There is a certain amount of security on the land and in the village where life has meaning and regularity. There is a time for work and time for play, and the villager is somebody with a definite place in the scheme of things.

This sentiment is shared and actually more explicitly expressed by 167
the group of families in the village earlier described as unable to reap 178
an adequate living from their small landholdings. Of this group of 369
perhaps no more than ten families, the adult male members had 829
previously sought supplemental income in the city but were either unable or unwilling to adjust to city life. Some could not find secure jobs which would enable them to support their families there, and feared the effects, especially on their children, of the split household. Others had misgivings about exposing their families to the corrupting effects of urban life, even though it would have been financially feasible to move the whole family to the city.

It is the families of this group which have been influential in mak- 178
ing the growing and marketing of vegetables as a cash crop an impor- 244
tant part of village livelihood. They are willing to take the gamble 434
still present in vegetable growing, since they see it as the only possible way of earning enough money on their insufficient landholding to enable them to remain in the village.

Thus, not only does out-migration of Hsin Hsing villagers to the 178
city have direct consequences for village life but the attempt of several 829
families to find ways for the whole family to remain in the village has 167
its effects on the village as a whole. Some of these farmers are success- 369

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5

178 ful, and their example influences other farmers in the area to change
167 their form of land utilization in order to raise their standard of living.
829 They have been an important internal influence toward acceptance of
369 change in the village, just as the out-migrants, linking village and urban center, have been an important external influence toward change in village life.

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Family and Kinship

The scope of the changed and extended relationships beyond the 121 571
village is very evident in the examination of the family and kinship
system, the life cycle, and religious and magical beliefs to which we 177
now turn. As in the preceding chapters, it will be observed that many 178
of the relationships that extend beyond the village, such as certain economically based connections and relations with matrilateral and affinal relatives, are not new phenomena either for the inhabitants of Hsin Hsing or for other Chinese villagers. The Chinese village has seldom been an isolated unit, and many traditional types of extended relationships common to the mainland will be evident in the structure of social relations in Hsin Hsing village. However, there are changes and modifications in these aspects of village life which can be directly related to the recent socioeconomic developments and increasing urbanization which were discussed earlier.

Chapter 5 will describe the nature and functions of the family and 128
kinship system in the village area, while Chapter 6 will examine interfamily and interpersonal relations, especially as they extend beyond the village and affect intravillage cooperation. Chapters 7 and 8 will indicate the interaction of the above relations and the economic factors of life with the life cycle and the magical and religious beliefs and practices.

THE *TSU*

Fukien, the ancestral province of the residents of Hsin Hsing, is 618
known for the predominance of the large common descent groups 171
called *tsu* organizations. As a number of writers have pointed out (Hu, 1948:14; Chen Han-seng, 1936:37; Lang, 1946:173; de Groot, vol. I, 1892:191) many villages in the provinces of southeastern China are inhabited exclusively by families bearing one surname, so that *tsu* and village are coterminous. In other villages which contained several *tsu*, each kept to itself in a separate neighborhood. So predominant

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body against pressures from outside. It has, in addition, a much
stronger basis for internal unity and cooperation. Thus, families which
belong to such single-*tsu* villages gain a substantial amount of security
618 from the situation.

While there are now few single-*tsu* villages, and apparently few fully
175 active *tsu* organizations in the Hsin Hsing area, during late Ch'ing
178 times and even into the early Japanese period there seem to have been
many *tsu* groups with unity and power which were active. Most of the
large *tsu* organizations were confined to individual villages, although
some extended into several. At the earlier date, it appears that these
organizations were either overseas sections of large mainland *tsu* or
had at least been formed on the basis of their earlier ancestral affiliations
in China (Barclay, 1954b:47). In the Hsin Hsing area these
affiliations were probably reinforced by the relative ease and frequency
of communication between the mainland and the nearby port of
Lukang.

618 Hsin Hsing villagers still tell how these *tsu* organizations and single-*tsu*
578 villages frequently took part in inter-*tsu* rivalry and fighting. Barclay
173 (1954b:47) has noted how these groups (which he does not define,
but refers to as "clans") engaged in "indiscriminate civil disorder" along
628 the line of the cleavages and antagonisms brought over from the mainland.
Older villagers say that during the late Ch'ing period there were
few government officers in the rural area to control these *tsu* groups, and
if an officer did appear, he could easily be bribed. With the advent of the
175 Japanese, however, the situation rapidly changed. The Japanese police
648 were not "polite" when a *tsu* organization "insulted or beat other
villagers." If *tsu* members "did wrong," they were beaten by the Japanese
618 who, unlike the Ch'ing dynasty officers, "could not be bribed."
628 The *tsu* members feared the Japanese officers just as any ordinary
villager did, and for this reason the *tsu* organizations were often reluctant
to support members who got into trouble. As a result the *tsu*
began to lose their unity and power: ten to twenty years after the
Japanese had taken over the government of Taiwan, the activities of
the *tsu* villages and organizations had significantly decreased in the
Hsin Hsing area. As we have already seen in Chapter 2, the port of
[182] Lukang lost its importance as a channel of communication with the
mainland soon after the Japanese arrived. As the movement of people
between Taiwan and the mainland ceased, relations between the
Taiwanese *tsu* and the paternal *tsu* on the mainland broke down.
This was very likely another factor contributing to the weakening of
Taiwanese *tsu* organizations after the Japanese occupation.

618 There are now few *tsu* organizations which are strong enough to be
of major influence in the Hsin Hsing area as a whole, and only three
of the approximately twenty-two villages are inhabited exclusively

618 That Hsin Hsing *tsu* are more than merely ceremonial is seen in the way various individual unrelated families, because they share a common surname with a *tsu*, try to identify with it and, to a small degree, do absorb some of the hoped for and actual sociopolitical benefits and security which seem to accrue to members of the larger village *tsu* organizations. (This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.)

618 627 Each village *tsu* can therefore be seen as attempting to exert sociopolitical influence in the village and sometimes also in the immediate area in competition with other *tsu*. So as not to weaken its position in face of the rest of the village, each *tsu* works hard to confine its internal conflicts within the *tsu* itself. Therefore, their own respected (and usually well-off) elders serve as mediators for the solution of intra-*tsu* conflict. In case of inter-*tsu*, general village, or intervillage conflict, these same *tsu* leaders have usually been recognized by the villagers as the most likely people to be able to bring a conflict to a successful solution.

618 As we have seen above and will see more of here and in Chapter 6, the Hsin Hsing village area kinship organizations, despite their relatively small size and minimum formalization, nevertheless do display a relative functional equivalence to Hu's (1948) and Freedman's (1958) images of a *tsu* and thus are clearly to be considered as *tsu* organizations, as they are by their members. One might further note that for the *tsu* organizations in Hsin Hsing village, there appears to be no inherent relationship between structure and function. The most important feature of such groupings is that their activities (such as their sociopolitical ones) be carried out within the local community and perhaps the larger area, and these seem to be carried through here with a minimum of formal structure. Since *tsu* is not to be thought of as a static organizational phenomenon but rather as having a kind of evolution with stages going from incipience through decay, a *tsu* in its early or incipient stages of development could then exist on a very small scale, be rather weak in its formal organization and activities and even in its functional effectiveness, and yet still maintain itself as a *tsu*.

178 618 [648] [423] What is also worth noting (and what we will see more of in Chapter 6), is that conditions in the Taiwanese rural area have been working against the likelihood of these unelaborated *tsu* ever developing into truly mature *tsu*. This seems to be true in the case of the adverse effect on the rural *tsu* organizations by the Japanese during their period of occupation of Taiwan and the recently changing socioeconomic conditions, such as the Land Reform Program, which prohibit the *tsu* from acquiring corporate landholdings and inhibit *tsu* members from achieving great landed wealth within the rural area. In addition, it also appears that as a result of these past and recent developments the

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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villagers feel a need to turn outward away from the village. Therefore, although the villagers themselves continue to see their local kinship-based organizations as *tsu*, not simply groups aimed at preserving a patrilineal tie, and also continue to try to make them function as *tsu*, their strong identity with, dependence on, and submission to the authority of their *tsu* organizations is now being undermined. 618 178

THE ECONOMIC FAMILY

In Hsin Hsing village the economic family, the *chia*, is the basic socioeconomic unit. It is "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage or adoption, and having a common budget and common property" (Lang, 1946:13). The household or *hu* may in theory include temporary residents such as relatives or servants in addition to the members of the economic family. Since there are seldom additional people in Hsin Hsing families (or in families in the area generally), the *chia* and the *hu* almost always coincide in the village, and the average number of persons in it for Hsin Hsing is 6.1. It is the *hu* which is officially registered at the local Hsiang Public Office and as such is considered the official tax unit.[4] 596 592 596 [651]

The economic family in Hsin Hsing may take one of three forms—conjugal, stem, or joint; sometimes a family may change through all three forms over a relatively short period of time. The most prevalent type of family in Hsin Hsing is the conjugal, the *hsiao chia-t'ing* or "small family." This family "consists of man, wife or wives, and [unmarried] children. Families of this type may be either complete or 'broken;' the category includes childless couples, families consisting of . . . unmarried brothers and sisters, single persons . . ." (Lang, 1946:14). Others prefer to consider the latter two forms of unmarried siblings or single persons as subconjugal families. Thus, in Hsin Hsing village, sixty-five households (about 66 percent of the total) are conjugal. These comprise only about 55 percent of the total population, since the average conjugal family consists of only 5.18 persons. 594 [162]

For the villagers, the ideal form of economic family is the joint family (*ta chia-t'ing*), usually comprised of at least three generations, and preferably more. According to Lang (1946:14) the joint family includes "parents, their unmarried children, their married sons (more than one) and sons' wives and children" and sometimes other relatives. Or there may be only one of the older parents and the married sons and their families; in another variant the oldest brother "presides over his [unmarried sisters], married and unmarried brothers, with their wives and his children and their children . . ." (Lang, 1946:14).[5] One can more specifically refer to this type as a fraternal joint family. 596

However, in Hsin Hsing village the *ta chia-t'ing*, although usually

596 performed in either the private or main *kung t'ing* by the smaller
618 group. Usually, it is the women who have married into and become
769 part of the *tsu* who perform most of the actual ancestral-worship rit-
353 uals in Hsin Hsing and other villages of the area. M. Freedman
778 (1958:85) also notes that "The rites performed in the [ancestral] halls
[of the *tsu*] were conducted by and in the presence of men; their
[562] daughters and wives played no direct part in the proceedings. In the
home, in contrast, it is clear that, whatever the theoretical inferiority
of women in the sphere of ancestor worship, they occupied a central
position in its performance."

596 Since there are no ancestral halls in Hsin Hsing village or in the
618 local area, this was the case. Worship of ancestors takes place exclu-
769 sively in the *kung t'ing* of the *tsu* or family. Ancestor worship per-
formed in a hall or in the *tsu kung t'ing* on certain few occasions
353 would be public, a formal observance for all to witness and theoretically
778 conducted by men. But more often in the Hsin Hsing area women con-
duct it. Ancestor worship, as it generally takes place, is on a small scale,
562 is private, and tends to be rather informal. As a result, the women, in
the presence of their children, usually take the main part in carrying
out ancestor worship. As some of the villagers noted, "The men are
busy, and the women are more religious anyway."

596 It is partially the unity of the religious family organization, which
796 continues even after the legal economic division of a larger family,
182 that gives the several newly independent *chia* a definite basis for co-
operation and a sense of common identity. Of this Freedman
(1958:23) has noted that the

> newly separated households were at least potentially members of one ancestor-
> worshipping unit in relation to recent forebears, and some forms of *ad hoc*
> [178] economic co-operation might be instituted between them. In other words,
> while the formal division of house and land, which was a ritually established
> [423] rupture at one point in time, created legally independent households, the
> relations between these households might diminish gradually in time rather
> than undergo a sharp transformation from involvement to indifference.

596 Although a joint family may not continue for many generations as a
182 single unit, it derives continuity from the maintenance of the religious
family, with its function of ancestor worship. To ensure such continu-
681 ity, marriage and adoption are a primary and conscious concern. In
597 addition to providing the family with the necessary descendants to
worship the ancestors, the institutions of marriage and adoption en-
769 sure the security of the family through growth and expansion. For the
parents these institutions mean security and care in old age as well as
in the afterlife. "One's future is in one's children" is a common saying
which has had much meaning in traditional China and which is still
no less important in the changing Taiwanese village. Besides these

interesting that of these 41 cases traced about 14 women, almost 35 582
percent of the total, were married into relatively urban places, including the 9 who went to Lukang. This is consistent with the attitude expressed by many villagers, that they prefer to marry their daughters to men doing work other than farming, since they feel that farming is a hard and insecure life.

Siaosiv and "Adopted Husband" Marriage

There are two other forms of marriage in the Hsin Hsing area. 583
Both of them have decreased in frequency but are nevertheless still 178
relatively important. These forms are especially important to rela- [184]
tively poor villagers, since they offer an institutional means of facilitating the marriage of people who might otherwise have financial difficulty.

One form which has been popular and frequently occurs in the Hsin 583
Hsing area is what Fei (1939:53), writing about Kaihsienkung on the 597
mainland, refers to as the 171

> *siaosiv* system, *siaosiv* meaning small daughter-in-law or more precisely the foster daughter-in-law.
>
> The parents of the boy will take a girl as foster-child at a very early age, the future mother-in-law even feeding her at her breast, and will take care of her up to marriage. All the elaborate proceedings such as match-making, marriage gifts, the sending of the meeting-boat and sedan chair, will not be needed, if the daughter-in-law has been brought up in her husband's house. Some of the *siaosiv* do not know their own parents. Those who have still maintained contact with their own parents, owing to early separation, will not be of special interest to them.

The system in the Hsin Hsing village area, although not referred to 583
as the *siaosiv* system, has basically the same form and function. How- 597
ever, because there are certain important differences in attitudes and details of operation between it and its Kaihsienkung counterpart, the system as practiced in the Hsin Hsing area will be taken up later in the discussion of adoption.

The other form of marriage, and the least common, is a matrilocal 583
(or more precisely uxorilocal) type in which a man marries and goes to 591
live with his wife's family. He is usually referred to by the villagers as
an "adopted husband." At the time of the marriage, the two families [612]
assume a *ch'in ch'i* relationship just as in any ordinary marriage. The boy's family sends a small dowry, and the girl's family provides the couple with the necessary bedroom furniture, which is the reverse of
the practice in an ordinary marriage. In the Hsin Hsing area, unlike [171]
similar practices on the Chinese mainland and in Japan, the husband
always seems to retain his own surname, but in going to live with his [551]
wife's family he accepts the authority of his father-in-law.

587 will marry a divorced woman are usually a widower with his own children, an older man, or sometimes a physically handicapped man. The Hsin Hsing divorcee married a widower with one child.

Such a second marriage is sanctioned by society, but its ceremonial observance is very unlike a first marriage and does not follow the traditional pattern. Rather than being brought in a sedan chair from her village to her husband's home, the woman makes the trip quietly with the matchmaker very early in the morning so as not to be seen by other people. While the necessity for the second marriage is realized and therefore accepted, it is not considered good taste to make a public display of an act which defies the ideal norms and traditions. It would show a definite lack of respect for custom and propriety and would be subject to criticism.

768 587 From middle age on a woman who is widowed usually prefers to remain in her husband's village, especially if she has been there a long time. If the family is undivided, she and her children will continue to live with her deceased husband's family, or if the family has previously divided, she and her children may continue to live as a separate household. A younger widow with young children is more likely to be a drain on the family's economy. Her deceased husband's family, frequently with the help of her own people, may soon very seriously consider her remarriage. A widow, like a divorcee, is limited in the types of husband she can find. If she is considered a good daughter-in-law and gets on well with the deceased husband's family, a marriage may be arranged with a younger unmarried brother. Although there is presently only one such case in Hsin Hsing village, this form of second marriage is not uncommon in the area and is perfectly acceptable.

[464] [178] In other cases, if a younger widow does not get on well with her deceased husband's family, has no financial resources, and cannot be supported by his family, she may go elsewhere to work in order to earn a living for herself and her children. (This is possible today because of job opportunities for women.) Or she may even return, with or without her children, to stay with her natal family at least until she can remarry. The question of the disposition of her children must be settled with her deceased husband's family, though it is more common for her children to accompany her as she enters her new life. Thus, although divorce causes the break-up of the family, the death of a husband does not necessarily cause any major change in the functioning of the family, especially if the woman is older and has grown children.

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ADOPTION

Two major types of adoption are recognized by the villagers in the Hsin Hsing area according to the particular reasons for the adop-

597 girl is already accustomed to the ways of the house, and has probably
583 developed a mother-daughter relationship with the wife of the *chia
chang.*

At the time of adoption, the family may have no intention of bringing
up a wife for their son, although they may change their minds
later. Whereas an apparently definite distinction between simple
[171] adoption and adopting a girl as a future wife for a son in the *siaosiv*
system of marriage (discussed below) was made by Fei's mainland
China Kaihsienkung villagers (1939:53–55), in the Hsin Hsing village
area no distinction based on reason for adoption need be made when
the girl is adopted. A girl adopted to be a daughter may later be
married to the family's son, and a girl adopted as a future wife for a
son may ultimately be married out just as if she were the adoptive
family's own daughter. And whatever the original intent of the adoption,
or what kind of marriage is eventually arranged for her, the girl
is usually treated very much as if she were a natural daughter of the
family that adopted her. It is for this reason that I have treated both
kinds of adoption under the same general heading.

597 A family which offers its daughter for adoption must usually give
the adopting family a payment of "milk money" at the time of adoption,
whether the girl is to be a regular daughter or the future wife of
[612] a son of the new family. Both the natal and adopting families consider
themselves to be *ch'in ch'i* as a result of the adoption. In fact, when
[584] the girl reaches marriageable age the adopting family will frequently
consult with her natal family about the potential husband and the
marriage negotiations. In many such instances the affinal relationships
then become a three-way affair between the girl's natal family, the
adopting family, and her husband's family.

597 When the girl is definitely being adopted into a family as a servant,
357 her family will often be given some money as recompense for the loss
of her services. In these cases, the girl is usually at least eight or nine
when adopted, old enough to be immediately trained and do useful
work in her new home. The Chinese law in Taiwan recognizes such
adoptions; however, it recognizes the girls as adopted daughters (*yang
nu*), not servants, and stipulates that they must be well treated and be
married out at marriageable age. When a girl is adopted to be a
servant, there is obviously little likelihood that the two families will
maintain a *ch'in ch'i* relationship, since the adoption is recognized as a
[178] purely business transaction. Such adoptions are no longer as common
as they used to be, although they still take place among some rich,
rural people. The sister of the former large landlord in Hsin Hsing
[184] had been "given such a girl as a wedding present." The practice is
[548] especially common in market towns and cities where girls are "sold" to
wealthy families as servants or where they are adopted by a family to
be hired out to houses of prostitution or bars.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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583 with which these adoptions occur, it is obvious that the *siaosiv* system
597 of marriage is not "despised," even though economic circumstances are
an important motivational factor. Nor does it seem to loosen the ties
T of affinal relationship; on the contrary, it seems in some ways to
[612] strengthen them. Since the *ch'in ch'i* relationship is accepted as a
consequence of either a marriage or an adoption, the *siaosiv* system
simply has the effect of establishing it earlier than a regular marriage
T would.

597 In the Hsin Hsing area I have found no evidence, either, of any real
dislike for the system by either set of parents. The girl's parents benefit
583 by saving the expense of rearing an extra girl child whom they are
182 unable or unwilling to support as well as by saving the cost of a
596 wedding or of providing a dowry. The boy's parents gain a household
worker, are spared the normal marriage expenses, and, in addition,
have the advantage of raising their future daughter-in-law under their
own roof. Since the villagers feel that the most common cause of family
division is a dissatisfied daughter-in-law, a son's wife who has grown
up since childhood as a member of the family is much less likely to
want or to try to force a division of the family. In effect, the *siaosiv*
system is felt to conduce to the attainment of the ideal joint family,
while not in the least impairing (in Hsin Hsing) the usual establishment of *ch'in ch'i* relationships.

T Despite all this, there are indications that the *siaosiv* system is be-
Tn coming less frequent in Hsin Hsing and other areas of Taiwan. Fur-
597 ther, even where such adoptions have taken place in recent years, it is
583 noticeable that more and more often the girl is married out when she
reaches normal marriageable age, rather than being married to the son
178 of her adoptive parents. The trend seems to be quite recent, and there
are a number of possible reasons for it.

T Keeping in mind Lang's (1946:127) and Fei's (1939:54–55) explana-
Tn tions for the *siaosiv* system of adoption and marriage, we can observe
114 resemblances in several important recent developments in rural Tai-
597 wan. First, there have been notable changes in demographic patterns
there, in recent decades especially, which have affected sex ratios (see
583 Chapter 2) for both Hsin Hsing village and area and for Taiwan
178 generally (Barclay, 1954b:212, Table 60). The ratio of women to men
[162] has gradually increased until there is by now almost an equal propor-
tion of each, which makes the problem of finding a suitable wife for a
T son much less serious than it used to be. This great increase in the
Tn proportion of females is closely related to the decline of infant mortal-
[165] ity rates as a result of better public health facilities and of the gener-
[744] ally better economic climate and consequent higher standard of living
[511] which has been notable mainly during the past decade. The economic
circumstances to which Lang and Fei attribute the persistence of the
siaosiv system are thus moderated. Both of these factors, the increased

Both of these factors, the increased 597
number of females and the improved financial conditions, mean that 583
brides are both easier to find and easier to afford. As a result, *siaosiv* 178
adoptions are less and less frequent, and girls originally adopted under [162]
the system tend more and more to be married out. Contributing to this [511]
latter tendency is the increasingly open opposition of young people to [584]
having their marriage partners imposed upon them arbitrarily by their [167]
parents. The opposition is likewise made possible by the improvement
in economic opportunity for young people, in this instance by the
growing ease of urban migration.

Probably some dislike for the system has always been present among 597
the young people for whom *siaosiv* marriages were arranged. From the 583
time of adoption the girl is treated as a member of the family—in 584
other words, like a daughter, not a daughter-in-law. In the Hsin Hsing 571
area, when the marriage is definitely decided upon the young couple
are apprised of it. The girl is usually in her early teens at this point. Suddenly, then, the young people are confronted by a change in their relationship; no longer are they brother and sister, but potentially man and wife, with a whole new set of behavior and attitude patterns to absorb. At the very best, the situation is awkward for them. Much like a normal engaged couple, they develop an avoidance relationship; they may no longer remain alone in the same room and show increasing embarrassment in each other's presence, especially when others are around. If they are seen together anywhere, they are usually subjected to a good deal of teasing by friends and neighbors as well as their relatives. And, living in the same household, the pressure of maintaining the avoidance pattern is much greater than anything ever experienced by the usual engaged couple, who may scarcely know each other by sight before the wedding day. The couple entrapped by the *siaosiv* system undergo constant embarrassment, and as a result they often develop a resentment against each other that culminates in a strong preference for marriage to someone else entirely.

Formerly, the young people could not easily or openly express their 597
opposition to the match, since they had almost no option but to do 583
exactly what their families and elders had planned for them. Further- 178
more, they knew that if a *siaosiv* marriage had been arranged for 584
them, this was usually because there was no other form of marriage
possible, given their circumstances.

The recent demographic and economic changes in Taiwan have radically changed things for such young people. Now, thanks to the decreased necessity for such adoption marriages and the concomitant increase in economic opportunity for the young, they are increasingly able to express their opposition to a system which is not consistent with the modern tendency for allowing young people a much greater say in the choice of their marriage partners.

In Hsin Hsing, for example, one current reason why *siaosiv* adop- [593]

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597 tions less often lead to marriage is that the girl objects to marrying the
583 family's son and insists on being allowed to marry outside her adoptive
584 family. The more equal balance of the sexes and the increased eco-
nomic opportunities for outside work, even in the rural towns beyond
178 the obvious opportunities of urban migration, have given the young
[464] people a mobility never possible before, in addition to loosening the
[167] family's economic hold on them. An unwilling young woman or man
can now threaten to go to the city to work if a projected marriage is
for any reason distasteful. And even if the family, by extreme coercion,
should attempt to force through a *siaosiu* system marriage, the young
people now have a further protection, since such forced marriage ar-
rangements are not upheld by law.

The changed economic situation with its concomitant effects on mobility and increased independence from the traditional authority of the family makes it possible for young people to resist prearranged marriages as they were never able to do before. It seems likely that these factors underlie the apparent decrease in the number of marriages between son and adopted daughter.

Adoption of a Son

597 The kind of family most likely to adopt a son is generally one
which has no sons of its own. The fears of such people that there will
be no one to take care of them in their old age or to worship them
after death, or to furnish descendants to carry on the family line, are
the basic reasons for such adoptions. This kind of adoption is still
[171] common on Taiwan, in urban as well as rural areas. For example,
[114] during our stay in Taipei, my own family had a servant from the main-
land. She was childless, divorced, and saw little chance that she would
be able to remarry. Thus, when she was about thirty years old she
adopted a three-year-old boy, boarding him with friends while she
worked. Her explanation was that she would need someone to take
care of her in later years and to worship her after she died.

A family willing to give up a son for adoption is usually under the pressure of financial necessity and has more than one son. The necessity must be serious, since a family "selling" its son for adoption gives up all claim to him. The adopting family gives the boy's family money for him, and the villagers say, "When a son is adopted out, it is like cutting off one's finger" and, further, "when one sells [adopts out] a son, one no longer has any relations with him" ("*Mai tzu wu yu tzu chiao*"). The family adopting the boy naturally wants his entire loyalty, the kind of familial closeness their own son would have had. For this reason, not only are his ties to his natal home supposed to be completely broken but the age of adoption of boys is as young as possible, at least below the age of four. In Hsin Hsing there were only

159 694 sation. On the basis of the information furnished in this statement, it is up to the investigator to get at all the facts in the case.

Unfortunately, on the basis of the Hsin Hsing side's letter of accusation, the court investigator's questions to the witnesses were such that the investigator felt that there was not enough evidence for an indictment to send the case to court, since each pair of men insisted that they had been beaten. Instead, he, like the police earlier, suggested that the two parties involved mediate their differences. Unfortunately, he did not know many facts in the case, including the fact that mediation had already failed and that the local police could be called upon to testify that the Ta Yu men had not been beaten.

Later, however, additional facts were made available to the examiner, and upon learning of these, another investigation was immediately held and an indictment was brought against the assailants. [695] Several weeks later the case came to court, and Li Fan and his father were awarded an amount of money large enough to cover doctor and hospital bills.

621 612 When village loyalty threatens *ch'in ch'i* loyalty, there is bound to be conflict in the minds of the villagers. Unlike the set institutionalized patterns for behavior regarding patrilineal relatives, there is no real institutionalization of behavior on the basis of village membership or *ch'in ch'i* relationship. This leaves ultimate behavior up to the individual, totally unstructured and influenced only according to situation. Although villagers do feel that one should not side with *ch'in ch'i* from elsewhere over one's own villagers, nevertheless, since one's village does not coincide with one's kinship group, villagers do not feel bound to support a fellow villager as they would if he were a patrilineal relative.

571 621 628 178 As a result, villagers realize that one's dependence on others must not be limited to certain people or groups simply because of the chance relationship of village membership or even, for that matter, by membership in kinship groups which may be either too small or economically too weak to be of real help. Instead, it is considered necessary to extend one's possible sources of support beyond village and patrilineal relations, by building one's network of reciprocal relationships to include people such as friends, neighbors, and *ch'in ch'i*. Then, the relationship can be based on good *kan-ch'ing*, and on such a basis people often show a greater willingness to become involved in each other's problems and to render full support.

[594] This attitude about the importance of extensive relationships outside the village, plus the expansion beyond the village that general economic change is forcing on so many villagers, tends to produce a more independent and less village-bound economic family group. It is

this increased independence which in turn both allows and at the same time forces the economic family to move further away from the village and even, although to a lesser extent, from the *tsu*. The process further weakens the actual unity and solidarity of the village and the *tsu* as organized bodies. But each *tsu* organization remains a competitive sociopolitical force in terms of most internal village affairs.

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As we will see in the next two chapters, although the life cycle of the villagers and their supernatural and ritualistic activities (like the family and kinship system) show the effects of change and extensions of relationships beyond the village, village solidarity, unity, and cooperation are still being reinforced by these same activities. Their manner of implementation, ritual especially, continue to crosscut the various kin lines (on all levels) and to offer one of the important remaining sources for the reinforcement of village ties.

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PREGNANCY AND BIRTH

843 The villagers believe that pregnancy lasts ten lunar months and
is signalled by the initial interruption of the menstrual cycle. It is rare
[759] for a village woman to see a doctor at all during her pregnancy. The
villagers consider it unnecessary and say that only the rich people go to
a doctor. Even though there is a government-run health center in the
[743] *hsiang* which offers some pre-natal care, modesty prevents village
women from visiting the clinic although the excuse they give is that
they do not have the time.

The expectant mother receives no special care during pregnancy;
she eats no special foods and goes about her household and field tasks
as usual. The women fear that if they eat special foods the baby may
get too big and that the delivery will be difficult and dangerous. They
[292] wear no special maternity clothes, but wear either larger and fuller
skirts or leave the top buttons of their regular skirts open. During the
last month of pregnancy and the first month and a half after the birth,
the parents abstain from sexual intercourse. This, the villagers explain, is for the protection of the mother's health.

844 Today, most village women employ a midwife at the birth of their
759 first child. Midwives first began to be used about twenty years ago, but
"then it was only rich people." The regular use of a midwife by
178 ordinary villagers has been common only since the postwar period or
the late 1940's. It is interesting that one of the important advantages
of having a midwife, according to a group of village women, is that "If
[217] we call a midwife, it is easier to register the baby in the Hsiang Public
Office since the midwife will then write out the certificate of birth.
Othewise a birth certificate must be obtained through the village
mayor."

Previously, the older women of the family delivered all babies. Today, these same women may be present to assist the midwife at the time a first child is born, and they usually assist in the delivery of subsequent children when a midwife has not been called. The husband is not present when his wife gives birth.

844 The midwife who works at the Pu Yen Hsiang Health Center is
759 usually called to Hsin Hsing village. She has been trained by attending several classes for midwives. "She charges NT $30–40 [about US
465 $1] for a normal delivery, or more if she has to give an injection to
stop excessive bleeding." The midwife makes two house visits, one at
the time of the birth and the second when she washes the baby on the
third day after the birth. When the child is born, the midwife applies
[757] a silver nitrate solution to the eyes only if it appears that there might
be something wrong.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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Taiwan AD6

T 873 an examination. Each year many graduates of area primary schools are denied entrance to the middle schools for lack of room. Students are eliminated on the basis of the examination system. Therefore, the choice of which middle school a student will attend frequently depends entirely upon which school admits him.

Regardless of the course of study, most parents hope that a middle school education will enable their son or daughter to secure some kind of minor white-collar job such as clerk in the local government agency. One Hsin Hsing villager struggled financially to send his son to middle school because he felt the boy was a weakling (he was extremely thin and small for his age and wore glasses) and therefore would never be able to farm. The father felt that the only hope for his son was to go on with his schooling so that later he might possibly obtain some kind of minor position with the government. In a few cases, the parents may aspire to a college education for their child.

T Tn 873 668 575 It is compulsory for all middle school students in Taiwan to join certain school organizations. Boys and girls in junior middle school are members of a youth organization somewhat similar to the American Scouts. Senior middle school students join the Youth Corps, an anti-Communist organization dedicated to retaking the mainland. Boys and girls in all the colleges in Taiwan must also belong to this organization.

By means of the centrally organized Youth Corps, the government is able to give young Taiwanese military, political, and physical preparation against Communist attack. The many after school meetings and outings which members must attend give the government the opportunity to propagandize the young members in anti-communist thought and inculcate in them patriotism towards President Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The government has had some success in this effort in the Hsin Hsing area, but elsewhere a great resentment has been built up. The resentment appears to be manifested more by the Taiwanese in the colleges and universities than by the middle school students.

T 873 178 571 621 [369] [573) A village middle school student rarely keeps up his earlier close associations with other village children unless they too attend middle school. By the time the students enter senior middle school their childhood contacts are almost forgotten as they join cliques of their classmates; the disruption of old patterns is so sharp that they almost snub their former friends in the village. Their new associates are almost always students from other villages and from the town or city in which the school is located. The association pattern in primary school is quite different. The children from one village tend to stay together, even though the school includes students from other villages.

Not only do these middle school students usually fail to maintain

associations with their fellow villagers but they seem also to divorce 873
themselves from the village itself. As they progress in their schooling, 178
they become more and more antagonistic toward many of the village
traditions, particularly those with a magical or religious basis. They 571
have learned to regard them as superstition, and feel they are un- 621
worthy of their participation. Often, at religious and magical rituals in
the village the middle school students, sometimes accompanied by
their classmates from other places, can be seen on the sidelines laugh-
ing at the "superstition and backwardness" of the participating
villagers. This attitude is in part fostered by what they are taught first
in the elementary schools, then in the middle schools, and reinforced
by their many new contacts with people and ideas from urban centers.

The village seldom has the opportunity to learn new ideas and ways of doing things from these students. Even if some of the students happen to be willing to share their knowledge, the other students' obvious snobbishness and lack of interest hinders the receptivity of the nonscholars to anything the students may propose. Consequently, the advanced education of some of their number produces few direct benefits for the village.

There are also educational offerings in the area which are nonofficial 874
and informal. Among these are sewing classes, either private or offered 474
by the local Farmers' Association for members' daughters. The private
schools charge tuition, but the Farmers' Association classes are free.
The Farmers' Association also holds classes in farming techniques
for village boys. Boys may also be apprenticed to a craftsman for 874
training. Since the practice is not too common in Hsin Hsing village,
the few apprentices in the village have been boys of poor and almost
landless families. One village boy was apprenticed by his father to a
carpenter in Lukang and another to a carpenter in Taipei. Sometimes,
village boys or girls are apprenticed to craft shops in Taipei.

ADOLESCENCE

When a boy reaches sixteen[8] an elaborate religious festival 881
marking his transition from child to adult may be held in his honor.
This may be done if the boy had been ill as a child and his family in [782]
asking the god for help had promised to perform such a ritual or if his
family can afford it or wishes to display their economic ability to do so.
If the boy had been sickly, thanks are given to the gods at the festival, [776]
especially to T'ien Kung (the highest of all gods) for bringing the boy [782]
to this stage of development, and requests are made for further help.
When such a festival is held, a *tao shih*—a Taoist priest—is called to [793]
the village to officiate. (The ritual is similar to the one held at the
time of a marriage, which is described in that section of this chapter.)

702 village orchestra plays amid banners wishing each man luck and a
527 speedy return or general congratulations on going into the army.
These banners are sent by *ch'in ch'i* and friends, and the number of
banners each man receives is often considered an indication of his
family's popularity. The villagers form a procession and accompany
the draftees for more than two miles to the *hsiang* Public Office where
young men from several villages meet to be taken away to the army
camp in government trucks. The departure of men to the army is thus
made into a rather grand and colorful occasion. The villagers report
[177] that this tradition began during Japanese times, and it bears many
[171] similarities to Embree's (1939:195–203) description of such celebrations in Suye Mura.

702 The two years or so of military service are full of new experiences
for many of the village boys, since it is their first opportunity to travel
to other parts of Taiwan and come in constant contact with men from
other areas of the island as well as mainlanders. But once his term of
[584] military service is over, a man usually returns to his earlier occupation
and, if he is single, he can expect to have a marriage arranged for him
soon after his discharge. The activities of these ex-service men in
[729] civilian life are not noticeably different from what they were before
military service.

MARRIAGE

582 Today, in Taiwan the average age for marriage is twenty-four
for men and twenty-two for women by Chinese reckoning. Before the
[178] 1950's the ages at marriage were two years younger: twenty-two and
[702] twenty. The obvious reason for this change is military conscription.
Usually, men enter the army when they are twenty-two, and although
this is still considered the proper age for a man to marry, families with
sons about to be called into service tend to postpone marriage arrangements.
582 In most cases they prefer not to have the son marry, enter the
593 army, and leave the new daughter-in-law behind, since the villagers
feel that the son should be present, especially early in a marriage, to
606 establish the wife in habits of good behavior and obedience. In general,
while the mother-in-law holds authority over her daughters-in-law,
in actuality it is the girl's husband who best enforces this authority.
In Hsin Hsing village, for example, there have been cases in which
a daughter-in-law disobeyed or was disrespectful to her mother-in-law.
In such instances it would be quite unusual for the mother-in-law to
attempt to impose her authority by physical means. Instead, she is
likely to speak with her son and demand that he force his wife into
line. The son uses whatever means he feels necessary—speaking firmly
to his wife or, sometimes, even beating her—to make her obey his
mother. Parents fear that their inability to control a daughter-in-law

when their son is absent may cause irreparable harm to family relationships. 582 593 606

There are a few cases in Hsin Hsing and other villages in the area where an early marriage was arranged because a boy was to be called into the army. These are usually small families which must replace the loss of a son's labor with that of his wife. While the girl may not be able to perform as well as the man, the family tries to choose a strong, capable, and obedient girl who knows farming and whom they feel they can control during her husband's absence. [184]

In recent years another factor which has played an important though not so direct a part in the postponement of marriage has been the increased economic value of girls. A daughter now can contribute substantially to the family income. She may earn money as a seamstress at home, as a field laborer during weeding operations or harvests, or even as a factory laborer in the city. Her marriage now means an economic loss to the family, and it is therefore not unusual for parents to postpone the event for some time. A pretty and capable daughter of one of the K'ang families was not married until she was almost twenty-three-years-old. When she was finally about to be married, her father said that he had held off arranging her marriage as long as possible because she had contributed much to the family income by sewing. 464 593 434 582 178

As noted earlier, the emphasis on the importance of family continuity requires that marriages be carefully arranged. However, the interpretation of what is a careful and good method of marriage arrangement has been changing through the years, and today, it is quite different from what it was early in the century. Forty to fifty years ago the arrangements were made solely on the word of a marriage broker, and not even the parents saw the prospective spouse of their son or daughter. Today, it is common for the couple to get a glimpse of each other and, in addition, to have some part in the decision as to the desirability of the marriage. 584 178

One of the first changes in the system was that the parents, instead of depending completely on the word of the matchmaker, began to insist on seeing the prospective bride or groom and the family in order to have a sounder basis for making a decision. The matchmaker was asked to effect a meeting of the two sets of parents, at which there were delicate and indirect discussions about their respective families and the possible marriage. Of course final decisions were not made until the matchmaker had discussed privately with each family the other's attributes and transmitted proposals and counter-proposals about the engagement gifts and dowry. At the same time both families took the opportunity to learn as much as possible about the other family from neighbors and friends. The young people had little to do with either discussion or decision.

In the past seven or eight years it has become possible for the young

584 people to get a glimpse of one another, and perhaps even to meet in a
178 very formal situation. This most recent development has been precipitated by the general changes in the economic and social life of the village as a result of the great increase in mobility and contacts with urban centers.

584 Two different factors are responsible for the increase in mobility;
men are conscripted and leave the village or go alone to urban centers
178 to seek employment. These men, whether single or married, tend to
167 become more independent of family discipline. They have opportunities to meet women, and perhaps to have an affair. The unmarried man may well become less willing to be ordered back to the village one day in order to marry a girl, sight unseen and chosen for him by others. But the situation is even worse when a village man, married to a girl he had never seen and had not chosen, whom he does not yet care for, finds himself suddenly in love with a girl in the city. In such a case it is not unusual for him to stay in the city and live with the
584 woman, refusing to go home to his legal wife. Today, this situation
586 could end in divorce, which creates additional problems because of
the need to return the engagement gifts and dowry. In addition, it is
178 likely to inflict serious guilt feelings on the parents. On the few occasions when a village marriage has been dissolved, the parents who arranged the marriage seem to be the most seriously affected, questioning whether or not they had made a poor marriage choice for their son or daughter. It is consequently considered very important to avoid such situations, and many parents have expressed the feeling that since things are now different it is better to share some of the responsibility for arranging a marriage with the young people themselves.

584 The young people who are allowed to share in the responsibility do
593 so in several ways. Frequently, once the arrangements for a marriage
178 are under way and the parents of the two families entertain favorable
feelings towards one another, a meeting is arrranged at which the young people can at least see each other. A favorite rendezvous is some large shop or theatre in Lukang. The two sets of parents arrive, each accompanied by the son or daughter. One family is escorted by the matchmaker who, from a distance, points out the girl to the boy and his family. Sometimes the boy and his family may visit the home of the girl. When they arrive, the girl may appear briefly and offer them tea and cigarettes.[3]

In each case, both the boy and, in turn, the girl are asked for an opinion about the tentatively chosen mate. The young people cannot really judge each other, except perhaps by looks, and if he or she is at all filial and respectful of the parents, can say little more than, "the girl looks all right," or "she is not too pretty, but if you [parents] think she is acceptable, then it is all right." In this way, the parents relieve

584 593 178 themselves of some of the responsibility in the ultimate choice, and if something goes wrong with the marriage, the parents can always remind the young people that they agreed to the match.

584 178 626 In actuality, even though many young people want some voice in choosing a mate, most attempt no further contact after the "initial meeting." The boy usually makes no effort to see the girl even if he knows she works in a field near the road, fearing that if anyone sees him they will laugh at him.

581 584 The parents of the boy make their choice on the basis of qualities which they feel will best benefit the family. Thus, they usually seek a healthy, strong, and capable girl who can do the necessary work in the house and the fields and seems able to bear children. They also want a girl who can get along with people well and who can thus adapt easily to the new household into which she comes as a stranger. The girl's family wants a son-in-law who is economically and emotionally stable and can therefore provide adequately for their daughter. Both families place equal importance on the economic condition of the bride's or groom's family and the kind of *ch'in ch'i* they are likely to make.

The choices available to a family trying to arrange a marriage are limited by their own socioeconomic standing, and the families of a newly married couple are usually as evenly matched in this regard as the bride and groom are matched both physically and intellectually. On occasion, hoping to arrange a better marriage, one family and the matchmaker may conspire to deceive the other family as to economic standing or the intelligence or ability of the son or daughter. One such marriage was arranged by a matchmaker from Hsin Hsing village between a local girl and a boy from another village. No mention was ever made to the groom's family that the girl was rather dull, not capable at housework, or even at work in the fields. The justification the matchmaker offered for her behavior was that "after all, if the couple is actually married, then it must mean that they were fated for each other, and therefore there is nothing wrong." This same attitude is occasionally adopted by people who feel they have been similarly cheated; it enables them to accept the *fait accompli* and make the best of it.

However, such attempts at deception are not at all common, and "usually a stupid person marries a stupid person; otherwise they can't get along." The villagers feel that a marriage between people who are too different is likely to lead to the girl's unhappiness. More important, they know it may wreck the relations between the two families. For example, it may end with the girl being sent back home. Another important deterrent to attempts at deception is the danger to the family's reputation and general status if they do something so generally considered improper. However, most village families hope that

585 493 required to transport the gifts, and fewer men are needed to pull them. Hired men must be paid wages and fed simple food, but since there are so few of them the over-all cost is much less. When a prosperous villager asks his *ch'in tsu* and fellow villagers to participate and help carry the gifts and dowry, the occasion becomes much gayer since so many members of the village are taking part.

In most marriages in the village area today, two sedan chairs are
used, each carried by two hired men. One transports the marriage
broker to and from the bride's village, and the other carries the bride
[178] to the groom's village. During the prewar Japanese period when gaso-
[494] line was plentiful and inexpensive, a taxi was more commonly used.
Today, labor is cheaper than gasoline, and therefore it is only the
wealthier or more modern villagers who use a taxi.

585 583 When the dowry is loaded on the carts in the girl's village, the villagers all turn out to watch the proceedings and scrutinize the articles. The dowry generally includes furniture, new clothing, and jewelry, as well as certain ordinary household cleaning items to symbolize the tasks the girl will perform in her new home. A portion of a dressed pig sent by the groom's family is cut up, and much of it goes back to the groom's family along with the dowry.

585 [769] While the carts are being loaded, the girl bids farewell to her family and the ancestors of her natal home. For the last time she goes with her parents and worships the ancestors. Then she is led into the waiting sedan chair by a "good-luck lady," who must be an old woman with a living husband and many descendants. It is she, therefore, who finally sends the bride off alone, in the hope that the girl will have a similar good fortune. The good-luck lady also gives the bride a red string and instructs her to hang it over her bed to insure the fidelity of her husband.

585 152 The departure is accompanied by a good deal of crying by the girl, her mother, and other women of the immediate family. These tears, of course, reflect sincere regret at parting as well as the girl's fear at leaving the familiarity of her home and family. There is no doubt, however, that much of the girl's weeping is a conventional display of filial piety to show that she regrets leaving the home where she has been brought up and treated so well all her life. To smile on this occasion or not to weep for all to see would be extremely disrespectful toward her parents.

585 The bridal procession, consisting of the two sedan chairs, the
[493] vehicles carrying the dowry, and the accompanying village orchestra,
then takes leave of the girl's village and begins its journey to her new
[782] home. The whole procession is preceded by a man carrying a bamboo
pole some twenty-five feet long with a piece of meat tied at its tip as an
offering to the mythical tiger which would otherwise devour the bride.

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of sugarcane or some flavored ice in the hot weather. Wherever they 462
may be, the men usually sit about smoking, talking about their crops [276]
or work, or telling stories and jokes. Some men play Chinese chess or [521]
listen to the radio at the village store. [524]

The women have less free time during the day regardless of the
agricultural season. During the slack seasons women are occupied [207]
steadily with ordinary household tasks. During the busy season they
are simply busier, taking on additional work in the fields, cooking food
at home for any hired laborers, or drying rice or vegetables after the
harvest. When women do not have pressing work, they often spend
their time in small groups working on fiber hats or mending clothing.
At times as they work they may listen to Taiwanese opera on a radio, [207]
but more often they simply talk or gossip. Women also spend some of [521]
their free time visiting with neighbors or *ch'in tsu* in the village. If
their own parents or brothers live in villages nearby, they may visit [574]
them on occasion for several hours.

OLD AGE

As old age approaches—and a person is considered old after 887
fifty—both men and women gradually retire from farm work and 178
household tasks if they have children who are able to take over the
work and care for them. While this is usually the case, in these days 461
there are also times when married sons go off to work in Taipei, and it [886]
then becomes necessary for the old man and the daughters-in-law to
work the land. In such cases even the old mother has to do a great deal
of work in the household.

In general, however, old age is a time of great freedom and leisure 887
for men and women. Since they have few pressing responsibilities, they
are free to wander about the village and visit each other. At most, old [855]
people of either sex may help watch their young grandchildren during
the day. Some of the older people, especially one or two grandmothers [538]
in Hsin Hsing, are known for their ability to tell wonderful stories
based on Taiwan opera or puppet shows which they have seen in the
surrounding villages or in Lukang.

Unlike younger people, the old are not under pressure to adhere to 888
the proprieties of life. Old women smoke in public, appear at public [276]
dinners normally attended by men only, and are generally outspoken.
Old men frequent banquets and festivals held in Hsin Hsing and even [574]
surrounding villages. On such occasions they care little how much they [261]
eat and frequently gorge themselves with the good food. Their juniors
watch and say nothing, and in fact seem to enjoy watching the old
men behaving in ways that they cannot. At most they may laugh and
make good-natured jokes at how much the old man is still capable of

T Tn 743 369 realize the limitations of his own medical knowledge and so recommend that his patient seek medical care in the hospital.

759 Besides these hospitals, the government has established a clinic or public health center in each district. T 759 743 744 The center in Pu Yen Hsiang has usually been understaffed or lacking a doctor entirely for long periods of time thus making it impossible for villagers to be sure they can obtain treatment at the center. The result has been that since some villagers wasted time going to the center without receiving treatment, most have come to ignore it completely.

Tn 278 177 • 178 [759] The advent of modern drugs has also helped improve health conditions in the local area. Western-style doctors practicing in the area utilize a great many drugs in treating illness. Penicillin is now so plentiful and inexpensive that most of them are almost automatically expected to administer the drug to their patients. Indeed, the drug has become so well known in recent years and is so readily obtainable in Tn [444] Lukang drug stores that it is not unusual for ordinary villagers to buy it and administer it with a hypodermic needle to their own family members or, more often, to a sick pig. The drug stores in Lukang and other towns and cities which sell penicillin and other Western drugs also usually have a counter in the shop which features Chinese herbal and root medicines. These are still used by many Taiwanese as well as mainlanders.

T 278 443 In addition to the drugs or antibiotics, village families keep various kinds of Western-style patent medicines in the house for treating stomach upsets, headaches, colds, backaches, and so on. These are left with them on consignment by traveling medicine merchants. The medicines are separately wrapped and placed in a kit or bag, and every few months the peddler comes through the village, examines the contents of each bag, collects for what medicine has been used, and replenishes the supply. Many village families have several medicine bags on hand, each supplied by a different company.

T 278 443 541 A few times a year medicine shows featuring music, comedians, and even snake charmers, also visit the villages in the area. The companies which sponsor these shows sell two or three medicines for special illnesses. Such groups usually draw great village crowds, and their sales are large.

T 164 However, in spite of all the improved medical facilities available and the somewhat better sanitation practiced in the local area, there is a high prevalence of disease. Skin diseases are common, especially among children, and intestinal parasites plague both young and old. Trachoma is not uncommon, but the villagers do little to counter it. The disease usually strikes older villagers who are unwilling to spend T [757] the time and money necessary to obtain proper treatment. One trachoma victim, a woman of about forty, stated that although she

the deceased and their friends who participate in the funeral wear 764
mourning clothes or armbands. The type of clothing worn by the 292
relatives is determined by the nature of their relationship to the deceased. When a parent dies, sons and their wives clothe themselves completely in coarse white sackcloth, belting the garment with a hempen rope. They also wear a white cloth hat banded with hemp. The daughters and grandchildren of the deceased also wear garments of white cloth. The daughters and the female grandchildren wear hoods, and the male grandchilren wear white headbands. More distant relatives and friends who participate in the funeral usually wear an armband made of the same coarse white cloth.

Narrow strings of colored yarn several inches long worn on the 764
mourner's arm band, headband, or hood are an additional way of 301
indicating the mourner's relationship to the deceased. The color of the 822
yarn or combination of colors worn indicates whether the mourner is
related through the same patrilineal line, through the matrilateral or
affinal side, or whether he is simply a friend. In these days most of the (178)
villagers are no longer clear which color indicates which relationship
and have to ask the older people who should wear what color. However, frequently at different funerals in the village and area there appears to be no uniformity in the wearing of the colored yarn as a means for identifying the wearers' relationship to the deceased. These strings of yarn are worn by all relatives of the deceased throughout the mourning period.

Funeral Ritual

The funeral usually takes place within one or two days of the 764
death. Most people prefer to complete the funeral as soon as possible [556]
to avoid undue expense and to enable things to return to normal, but
some wealthy families prolong the funeral ceremony and delay the burial as a means of conspicuous display.

Prior to the arrival of the *tao shih*, a roofed three-walled shelter of 764
bamboo and canvas is constructed to house their paraphernalia and an 346
altar. When they arrive, they hang on its walls paper streamers let- 353
tered with moral sayings and a number of scrolls. These scrolls, often 532
numbering thirteen or fifteen, depict the main Taoist and heavenly
gods, the twenty-four filial acts (*erh shih sze hsiao*), and scenes of the underworld showing the courts of justice for the dead. The latter depict the punishments and tortures inflicted on the immoral and the various forms of reincarnation possible depending on the kind of life the deceased has lived.

Throughout the funeral ceremony, small children are led from scroll 764
to scroll by their elders, usually their grandparents, while each scroll is 532
explained to them. Great care is taken to explain the nature of the 869

outside in the family's or *tsu* compound's courtyard. A table is set up 764
and a paper ancestral tablet for the deceased is placed on it. Usually, 775
this paper tablet is used by the family for the first year after the death, 524
after which the deceased person's name is transferred to the family 526
line's main wooden ancestral tablet. Today, in addition to the paper
tablet a photograph of the deceased is also placed on the table. Then, [769]
in order not to expose the spirit of the deceased to the heavens, an [178]
open, large black umbrella is tied to the table. The mourners gather at the sides of the table, joined by most of the villagers, who sit or stand in the courtyard to watch the entertainment. Even passersby from other villages join the large audience, and the cheerful reception given the entertainer by the outsiders and even sometimes by the mourners makes it apparent that the spirit of the deceased is not the only one being entertained.

With the completion of this part of the ritual, the members of the 764
tao shih group and the several mourners resume chants and prayers in behalf of the deceased which continue long into the night and through to dawn of the next day. This is done in shifts so that the various participants can take time off to eat food furnished by the family and to nap.

During the course of the night a series of ceremonials takes place outside the house and in the *kung t'ing* of the house in preparation for sending off the spirit of the deceased. One ceremony, held outside, simulates the transmission of a letter from the family of the deceased
to the underworld. The letter, prepared by the *tao shih,* describes the 764
dead man's life, speaks of his good as well as bad points, and ends with 793
a plea for clemency and forgiveness toward him. All five *tao shih,*
carrying flaming torches, conduct the ceremony. One *tao shih* acts as 522
the "forgiveness governor" and carries a paper symbol of the forgiveness governor and the "forgiveness letter." He is followed by three "aides"; together these four men actually run and try to catch the fifth man who is supposed to represent a horse and who carries a *papier-mâché* horse on a pole. The forgiveness governor wants to catch the horse in order to ride it to the underworld to present the forgiveness letter to the gods.

The colorful and exciting ceremony usually attracts a large number of villagers, both adults and children. During the whole spectacle the *tao shih* joke and laugh, which suggests that the ceremony is designed to entertain the audience and the mourners. Some villagers observed that "This ceremony in this very form was passed down from our ancestors, and it is natural and interesting to be so playful since the sad mourners then won't worry so much." When the *tao shih* chase each other and weave in and out they often get tangled up, and each time this happens the horns in the small orchestra are purposely blown

ceremony and, especially, to obtain the god of the earth's permission to 764
break the earth and to ask him to accept the body. Once the burial is 791
completed, all return to the village where an elaborate dinner is held 756
for all those who participated in any stage of the funeral. [264]

Several weeks after the burial, on a date set by a geomancer, the members of the mourning family reconvene at the cemetery to dedicate the tombstone. They again wear white mourning clothes, and a ritual is conducted by the same geomancer-shaman.

Mourning

After a death, the descendants usually observe heavy mourning 765
for forty-nine days (seven weeks). During this period they worship the spirit of the deceased twice each day, at sunrise and sunset, coming together to wail and chant as they did on the day of the funeral.

On the hundredth day after the death, or sometimes after one year,
another mourning ritual is held. On this day it is common to burn the
temporary paper ancestral tablet and transfer the dead person's name
and death day to the family's permanent wooden ancestral tablet.
Until very recently, the name was placed on a small permanent [178]
wooden tablet instead of on the temporary paper one, which made it [769]
unnecessary to transfer the name to the main family tablet. It is also [262]
on the hundredth day that the mourning family sends sweet cakes to [431]
everyone who sent money or gifts at the time of the death. The sweet
cakes are a symbolic message "that things are now better."

For three years after the death, patrilineal descendants of the de- [301]
ceased are supposed to wear the lengths of colored yarn to show they are mourning. At the end of this period, they usually wear red yarn for a few days just to show that things are now good again. Actually, in the village the colored mourning yarn is most frequently worn for only a
year. It is also customary during this three-year mourning period for
the women to wail at the grave when the family goes to the cemetery [769]
each Ch'ing Ming Chieh (a holiday early in April) to clean the graves [796]
and offer sacrifices.

If in the years following a death the family has not been able to [787]
produce a boy child or has been in financial difficulties or poor health,
they may have the grave dug up and the coffin moved to a new and
more propitious spot determined by a geomancer. This takes place at
least three years, but usually more than ten years, after the death.
Specialists from Lukang or from some other village are hired for such 765
an occasion. These men, in the presence of the closest relatives of the 767
deceased, pick out each bone, clean it, and attach it in a special order
to a short charcoal pole which is placed in a tall ceramic pot. The pot
is then reburied in the new grave and a new tombstone, engraved with
the date of reburial, is set up.

769 this one, they must be fed, cared for, and propitiated. "If these things are not done, the ancestors will be hungry and dissatisfied and in a sense themselves turn into negative spirits, known as Good Brothers (*hao hsiung-ti*). They then wander about causing trouble for any humans with whom they happen to come into contact."

797 769 177 178 The firm belief in the dangers of neglecting the ancestral spirits seems, in itself, to be an important contributing factor to the failure of Christianity to establish itself in the area. While there are no Christians in Hsin Hsing or in surrounding villages of the immediate area (which has prompted missionaries to label the area "the infidel strip"), certain residents express anxiety over the proximity of several Christians in villages not more than three miles away. They particularly fear danger from the Christians' ancestors. When people are converted to Christianity, they destroy their ancestral tablets and cease to worship and care for their ancestors. Naturally, these neglected ancestors are expected to wander around the area, causing trouble for anyone they come upon and stealing the food and other things people offer to their own ancestors. Since there are few pressures the community can exert to make these Christians continue their ancestor worship, they are a source of constant danger and apprehension to their neighbors.

They are also a source of bewilderment. Villagers find it difficult to understand why anyone would want to assume such an "uninteresting" and unfilial religion and consequently miss the great interest and excitement of the *pai-pai* and the thrills of shamanistic rituals. One [829] village woman remarked that "It must be very dull to be a Christian: all they do is go to church and sing songs." In fact, this same woman advised me "to practice the religion of the people of America when you are in America, and to practice the religion of the people of Taiwan when you are in Taiwan. That is the only way to get fun out of life."

769 597 Since the belief in the potential influence of ancestral spirits for good and evil is so strong, the relatives of a dead person who has left no descendants will often adopt a child to worship the deceased. An example of such a case was cited by a villager: "There were three brothers and one died before he could have any children. The second brother gave one of his own children to worship that dead brother, as a descendant worships an ancestor. This child then also inherited the brother's property. There are very few cases in this village or anywhere where a strange child is adopted for this purpose. Thus, after a person has died it is common to give the dead person a relative as an adopted child for the purpose of worship and inheritance." However, if a family lacks the forethought to adopt a child, they may find it necessary to do so at a later date. If they are unfortunate in their

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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769 [778]

these unknown dead. At night many villagers consciously avoid the devil temple for fear that they may be harmed by its spirits.

In addition, the villagers also worship spirits of the unknown dead which have been confined for long periods of time or even permanently to the underworld for having led immoral lives. During the seventh lunar month these spirits are released and permitted to journey to the surface, where they roam about for the entire month. At this time they must be offered sustenance. The villagers refer to them as good brothers also, but, unlike the good brothers worshipped on the second and sixteenth of each lunar month, these good brothers are "criminal" good brothers.

796 769 178 574 [656]

Until a few years ago each community in the Hsin Hsing area and the city of Lukang worshipped them with large *pai-pai* on different days of the seventh lunar month. The many *pai-pai* held throughout the month made it possible for the people in one place to invite people from elsewhere to share in their feast. While this was very exciting, it involved a great deal of "waste," and so in the early 1950's, in the interests of austerity, the government decreed that the seventh month *pai-pai* must all be held on the same day, the fifteenth day of the seventh month. Today, therefore, since there cannot be outside visitors, each *pai-pai* is quite modest, with only pork, vegetable dishes, fruit, incense, and paper money being sacrificed. These are offered not only to the good brothers but also to an underworld god known as P'u Tu Kung who watches over the good brothers. The villagers call this occasion, the fifteenth of the seventh month, Chung Yuan.

796 769

The most frequent *pai-pai* which villagers define as calendrical are the four which are held independently by all village families on the same days of each lunar month. On the first and fifteenth all the gods and their soldiers and horses are worshipped. On the second and sixteenth days of each month, as mentioned above, offerings are made to the good brothers. These *pai-pai* are simple, and the villagers call the food sacrifices "rice and vegetables," meaning soups and cut-up pieces of pork or fish. No fowl, whole fish, or large slabs of pork are sacrificed on these occasions. Since all the families worship individually at the same time, there are no outsiders present to share in the food sacrifices.

796 484 178 [434]

One of the most important family holidays of the year is celebrated in winter in the first lunar month—the Chinese New Year. Although each family tries to have all its members together for this occasion, in the last several years a number of villagers who work outside have not returned home to celebrate this holiday on the excuse that the transportation facilities are too crowded and that it is difficult to travel. As a matter of fact, by remaining in Taipei during the holiday and continuing their work as pedicab drivers, these men are usually able to double their earnings because of the increased business. Nevertheless, 796 484 178 many of the older people are quite unhappy about this situation. It is interesting that these same village men do come home in April to celebrate the birthday of the village god Ta Shih Kung, which they consider a much more exciting and gay (*je nao*) time to come home than the New Year.

796 The New Year's celebration actually begins on the twenty-fourth day of the twelfth month, when the villagers send the gods off to heaven. They burn incense and a special paper money called *chia ma* and shoot off firecrackers. The paper money bears a picture of a horse which symbolizes the horse on which the gods ride to heaven. The families sacrifice fruit and cake at a very simple ceremony.

796 769 On New Year's Eve the villagers worship their ancestors in the *kung t'ing*. "Since this is the last time of the year that the ancestors are worshipped, many sacrifices are offered." The next day the worship of the ancestors begins anew and is repeated daily until the third day of [525] the first month. On these three days the villagers also worship the three brother gods (San Chieh Kung), and many of them, including men, young women, and children, spend their time gambling during the period of rest from work.

796 782 The fourth day of the first month is called Chieh Shen or "welcome the gods." On this day the gods who went to heaven come back to earth. The villagers offer sacrifices and burn incense and paper money to welcome them back.

[776] The ninth day of the first month is the birthday of T'ien Kung, the highest of the gods. Although the villagers consider him a vegetarian, they nevertheless sacrifice pork, duck, and chicken in addition to vegetable dishes and cakes, explaining that T'ien Kung eats only the vegetables, but his friends and the other gods eat the meats.

796 769 [776] The fifteenth day of the first month, called Shang Yuan or "the first full moon of the New Year," is the occasion for worship of all the gods and ancestors with sacrifices of meat, vegetables, incense, and paper money by each individual family.

Late in the second month or early in the third is Ch'ing Ming Chieh, "one hundred days after Tung Chieh" (the winter solstice). On this day, village families go to the cemetery to clean and sweep the graves and worship their ancestors. If a family has built a new house, married a son, or produced a baby boy during the year, they will hold a special ceremonial and offer many sacrifices at the grave site. In addition, for three years following the death of a member of the family, a special ceremonial takes place at which the female members of the family wail as they did at the funeral. Only the families which hold the special ceremonial invite guests to eat with them; this feast is held afterwards, at home.

796 776 The twenty-third day of the third month is the birthday of the goddess Matsu, who is said to have been a very good Fukienese woman

deified because of her commendable deeds. Originally, she was the 796
protectress of seafarers, and her statue was brought from the mainland 776
by the earliest Chinese immigrants to Taiwan. However, over the years
the residents of the Hsin Hsing area have endowed Matsu with considerably
greater talents, and today she is considered capable of doing
many things—curing the sick, aiding in the production of a boy child,
bringing rain when it is needed, and even helping someone win the
National Lottery. The villagers tell a story about a man from a village [539]
in the area who went to the Lukang Matsu temple and prayed for
success in the lottery. When he did not win, he returned to the temple
and with a sword lopped off one of Matsu's ears.

Middle-aged village woman often discuss seriously Matsu's magnificent 776
feats. One day several women told "how, several years earlier, 539
Matsu had saved some boys from drowning in the Strait of Formosa
just off Lukang. When a sudden storm came up, the boys' boat sank
and they were about to drown when Matsu came and saved them."
The women debated the question of just how Matsu had accomplished
this, one saying that the goddess had provided a bridge for them to get
back to shore and another that the goddess had furnished another boat
and pulled them ashore.

Numerous other Taiwanese also credit Matsu with enormous 796
powers,[2] and each year many people from far-off villages and even 776
cities travel to Lukang in long processions by hired trucks, bicycles,
pedicabs, sedan chairs, and on foot to worship Matsu on her birthday.
Some Hsin Hsing villagers also go to Lukang to worship Matsu on this
day, but most worship her at home because they are too busy to travel
to Lukang. However, Lukang is considered a very exciting place when
it is filled with the tens of thousands of people who have come to
worship Matsu, and many villagers, especially young people and
women, go there in the evening to watch the festivities.

In addition to the recognition which is accorded Matsu on her 796
birthday, for at least the last forty years Hsin Hsing and eleven other 776
villages in the area have held a joint procession each year to worship 788
Matsu some weeks after her birthday. About this time of the year,
when the irrigation water is running low in the fields of Hsin Hsing
and two neighboring villages of the other eleven, the occasion is taken
to ask Matsu to bring much-needed rains for the rice crop. As far back [175]
as the late 1800's, these same twelve villages were allied together to
provide mutual defense against the many bandits who then ravaged [628]
the area. While the necessity for such defense was eliminated soon [177]
after the arrival of the Japanese, the cooperative relationship between [648]
these villages has been continued through the annual Matsu procession. [579]
The Matsu procession, then, still provides an occasion which
brings the people together, not only the residents of a single village, [628]
but those of many villages. In the Hsin Hsing area it is the only time [178]

796 in the year when the twelve former allies come together and reaffirm
788 their traditional unity, even though some of them may have been at
776 odds with one another.

628 Each year a different village of the twelve declares its willingness to
[178] be host and takes the lead in organizing and arranging the procession.
Leaders of the twelve meet there and decide which villages will furnish the entertainment which is provided along the route to and from the large Matsu temple in Lukang. The individual villages then organize, assigning by lot the various duties among their families. Some villagers are called upon to carry the large sedan chairs which bear the statues of the village gods, and others prepare and transport refreshments to the prearranged places where the procession stops for rest and food. When the lots are drawn to determine which family will assume which task, the names of the village's large landholders are always included
[554] in the drawing. While they often willingly donate refreshments, they
are loath to carry a sedan chair; now, as in the past, if selected to carry one, they usually pay another villager to replace them.

On the day of the procession, the villagers assigned to carry the sedan chairs assemble at a prearranged spot to begin the circuit
[778] through the twelve villages. A large statue of Matsu, borrowed for the
occasion from her temple in Lukang, is carried in a big sedan chair by several villagers. As the procession passes through the village, the residents worship the goddess, and a local shaman invites her to eat. Village teams of performers accompany the procession. They dance, give exhibitions of traditional boxing and sword play, act out little incidents or excerpts from traditional Taiwanese operas or stories, or do a dragon dance in which a large, green paper dragon is carried over the heads of many men who weave in and out to simulate his sinuous movements. The whole occasion is extremely gay and entertaining
[782] and, it is felt, most rewarding. Many food offerings to the goddess are
displayed in each village along the route. They are provided by each village family and are eaten at dinner in the evening, after the Matsu procession has passed. However, only the host village, where the Matsu statue remains overnight, or members of the wealthier or large villages invite guests from outside to share in the feast.

796 In the spring of 1958 the area was in dire need of water, since it had
788 not rained for several months. Several hours after that year's Matsu
776 procession began, the sky became overcast and by mid-afternoon a
821 drenching rain was falling on the procession as it moved through the
731 area. By the time the circuit was completed the rain had stopped, having flooded the rice paddies and saved the crop. It did not rain again for over a month. The villagers who do not believe in the power of Matsu were surprised. A few of the young men, some of whom are well educated, have told me that despite their skepticism they did feel that "Perhaps the rain on that day was more than just a coincidence."

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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MAGICAL RITUALISM

As indicated earlier in this chapter, magic requires a distinctive type 755
of ritual in Hsin Hsing village supernaturalism. Perhaps the most 757
important single use for magical ritual in the Hsin Hsing area is the 178
curing of illness. As we noted above, the increased availability of
Western medicine, especially since the early 1950's, the accessibility of 177
practitioners trained in these ways, and the evidences of their success have turned the villagers more and more away from traditional practices, at least as the major and usually the initial source of help. Thus, the villager now tends to turn to the magical ritual only when he feels that modern science has failed him. However, it remains true that the traditional ritualistic patterns fulfill social, psychological, and even therapeutic functions beyond what is possible for the scientific.

The Diagnosis of Illness

Nowadays, when illness strikes, the villagers observe its symptoms 753
and try to determine its nature. From experience with certain basic 177
sets of symptoms, illnesses are distinguished as being either in the realm of the physiological or supernatural, and therefore requiring a cure within that particular realm. Thanks to the villagers' new awareness of the germ theory of disease, most illnesses are immediately classified as physiological and, therefore, within the domain of science and medicine—primarily modern, Western-style medicine rather than Chinese herbal medicine. Such illnesses as measles, rashes and skin diseases, trachoma, colds, stomach disorders supposedly resulting from
bad food or water, and the like, all fall clearly into this category. To [757]
treat these illnesses, it is now customary for the villagers either to call in a Western-style practitioner or to choose their own drugs or patent medicines.

There are still a few illnesses or symptoms, however, which are likely 753
to be considered of supernatural origin—caused by a demon or one of the many spirits which are believed to inhabit numerous natural places and objects. These supernaturally caused ailments are best treated by supernatural means. Some forms of insanity, and the frequently unexplained crankiness in children—especially in cases where the child's spirit is believed to have been affected by a "frightening" incident—fall within this area.

It is a commonplace among villagers that "No medicine can help if a person runs into something evil," for example, one of the demons known as *kuei* or *mo shen*. Consequently, when the practitioner of
Western medicine is unsuccessful in curing an ailment, the illness is [755]

753 clearly of supernatural origin and must be attacked by someone versed
755 in supernatural methods—the shaman.

There is no particular problem with illnesses which can be clearly
755 diagnosed as natural or supernatural. But there are many cases in
757 which the diagnosis is not so easy or clear-cut. Mainly, the villagers
177 rely on past experience to tell them which set of symptoms indicates
which category of illness, and thus which kind of practitioner to call
178 in. Naturally, there are considerable variations among the villagers themselves which may predispose a decision in one direction or the other—level of education, amount of experience, financial ability, and even types of social pressure. As one would expect, the actual availability of drugs and doctors affects choice. In recent years the dependence upon Western medicines and Western-oriented doctors has increased as a result of the increased supply of both at relatively low cost. The ease of access to antibiotics and patent medicines, their effectiveness, and the doctors' record of successes have given confidence in Western science, with the result that it is common today for the villagers to turn to Western methods first for most illnesses.

Many villagers now also feel that it is simpler to call in a Western-style doctor. A shaman often requires the assistance of two or three other people who must be asked in to help in the ritual, at their convenience. Further, when the Western doctor is called in, he charges a fee, and with its payment the transaction is completed. There is no residual feeling of obligation which must be discharged. The shaman, if he is a local one, usually charges nothing at all for his services, and often it is more comfortable not to incur such a feeling of obligation. Then, there are a number of incidental expenses connected with his visit—the cost of sacrifices and the food for all the participants and observers at the ritual.

Having two types of medical practice at one's disposal is not always an unmixed blessing, however, since the decision that an illness is natural or supernatural may be, or may be held to be, influenced by external circumstances. A case in point is the following which happened to a very poor family in Hsin Hsing. The parents were no
longer young and already had three daughters and a small son when
553 another daughter was born. Before the infant was named (naming
852 takes place on the ninth day and is, in effect, when an infant becomes
human) she became quite ill. Instead of calling in a practitioner of
Western medicine, which many villagers insisted they would have
done first, the family chose to consider the illness supernatural because
the baby was not yet nine-days-old. They called in one shaman, and
761 then another. Despite their efforts, the infant died. Under the traditional ideas the death was attributable to the will of the gods, and the family had done all it could do. The villagers gossiped busily about

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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the event, however, noting that the family was poor and had too many girls already; implicit in their gossip was a recognition that the family may have preferred to have the female infant die. 755 757 177

The attitude of the villagers toward the old and new medicine is a useful example of the way in which practical, external factors can affect "folk" beliefs and values. Here availability, finances, and family circumstances have combined to promote the acceptance of a new body of knowledge. The rural community of the Hsin Hsing area has accepted Western medicine without damage to its value structure or to its beliefs, incorporating the new quite comfortably into the old framework. Thus, when the villager calls upon a Western-style medical practitioner first of all, and the illness is not cured, he can still reinterpret the symptoms and assume that the cause was supernatural after all—perhaps possession by a demon. Then, to cope with the supernatural, he calls in a shaman. 178 [761]

Shamanistic Curing

Probably the most common form of illness treated in this manner is that which the villagers call a "fright" (*ching*). In this "illness" a child or infant does not eat or sleep properly and cries a great deal. The mother may decide that the child "has hit into a bad thing" (*ch'ung*) and that some kind of malevolent demon is causing the trouble. Although she may call in a Western-style doctor, most villagers assume that such symptoms result from supernatural causes and therefore require supernatural treatment. 753 755

The many different kinds of charms and instruments at the disposal of the *fa shih* are designed to enable him to bring about the release of the child's soul or spirit. If the patient does not respond at once to treatment, it may be repeated in a day or two or a more powerful *fa shih* may be called in. For the most part, whatever was causing the symptoms, they usually disappear after a few days, and the villagers consider that the *fa shih's* powers have cured the child. 755 756

Sometimes in the case of a fright a parent will attempt to effect a cure without the aid of a formally recognized shaman, especially when it appears that the child has been frightened by a definite agent which has caused his spirit to leave his body. If, for example, a dog is believed responsible, the parent will secure some of the dog's hair, wave it over the child's chest, and repeat over and over, "child's spirit return to the child." Or, the parent may feel that the child was frightened by some person. This was the case when a bearded American friend of ours visited the village and frightened a child. The American was then asked to spit into a cup brought by the child's mother. The saliva was brewed with some soup, fed to the child, and incantations were repeated to help the child's spirit return. 755 753

755 shaman's magic. The awe and shock which he inspires in the patient
154 could have actual therapeutic value, at least to the extent of bringing
about temporary relief if not recovery, and may not be too dissimilar
to the effect of electric shock. And fear of the "shock treatment," in
either case, may provide as beneficial a result as actual recourse to the
treatment.

796 A social function of ritual, and especially of shamanistic types of
ritual, might be briefly considered here. This is its "entertainment"
755 value in rural areas. Frequently, large numbers of people turn out to
789 witness curing or fire rituals, which may last long into the night. They
182 almost always regard the shaman's performance as an exciting event.
Many attempt to become participants, and some in their enthusiasm
[787] and excitement may even become possessed. Most participate by
merely presenting sacrifices. Frequently, large crowds come from sur-
rounding villages to watch the often "amazing feats" carried out in the
[621] course of some shamanistic rites. In this process of drawing together for
an exciting ritual event, the people gain a strong—if temporary—
[521] feeling of social cohesion. Even later, the rituals give the villagers an
interesting topic to discuss and gossip about for many days. Thus,
although there is little formal entertainment in rural Taiwan, the
ritual act often serves to fill its place.

771 Even though these rituals are performed by so many villagers, it
does not particularly indicate absolute faith in the supernatural.
178 While a great number of old people still hold these beliefs without
reservations, today most of the villagers express some degree of uncertainty. Generally, villagers say that "many *t'iao t'ung* are not as powerful as they used to be, and also there are some who are probably fakes, but who can really tell?" (This is a point frequently made in the past by the Japanese when they ruled Taiwan and again today by the present government through the school system.) In addition, the villagers ask, "Who can really know if the *t'iao t'ung* is possessed by a god and speaking the god's words?" But all the villagers "know from experience that life is hard," and they constantly seek ways to temper this harshness. Although their faith may not be absolute, they "would not dare merely to sit and do nothing" when a sick member of the family showed no improvement, or a child neither ate nor slept for days, or a fire destroyed someone's house. They are anxious, and their continued recourse to magical or religious rituals represents their attempt to do everything possible to allay their apprehension of the unknown.

755 Thus, even the most skeptical of the villagers will call on a shaman
177 in an emergency. Though the importance of Western medicine has
178 reduced the old primary reliance on ritual curing, social pressure as
626 well as the desire to do everything possible if one method fails forces

755

them to resort to ritual means. Neither their own nor their neighbor's 177
consciences would allow them to let a member of the family die with- 178
out the attempt to benefit from supernatural intervention. 626

It was probably these two factors, social pressure and fear of leaving 755
any method untried, which opened the way for the very notable ac-
ceptance of Western medicine in Taiwan. While the skeptic is thus 767
forced by them to call upon the shaman, the traditionalists are likewise 177
forced to call upon Western medicine when traditional methods have 178
failed. As we saw in the case of the baby girl who died, the village did 181
not feel that calling even upon two shamans was a clear indication
that the family wanted the child to live; it was strongly felt that a
Western doctor should have been called in as well. The general dis-
approval is not simply an example of the increased faith in Western
medicine, but a reflection of a total attitude toward the control of
unknown and powerful forces. After all, the microbe theory of illness [753]
is often, even in the enlightened West, only another species of
demonology.

Many of the functions of the magical rituals we have just dis- 755
cussed are also similar for the religious (*pai-pai*) rites. People look 796
forward to the many *pai-pai* held in the village area. At the very least
they offer a change in the daily routine of life. Many of them are 182
occasions filled with thrills and excitement (*je nao*). This is particu-
larly true of shamanistic rituals, and scores of villagers may flock to the
scene of the performance. Young boys and men who have worked in
Taipei and who, for various reasons, have been forced to return to the
village almost always attend such events. These men seem to yearn for
something to replace the excitement of the city.

Since community pressures for thrift also have tended to standardize 796
the villagers' diet, even the most insignificant *pai-pai* represents an 262
opportunity to eat better than ordinary food. A village family, unless
wealthy, is criticized for eating any but the simplest food on ordinary 626
days. People gossip behind their backs about their extravagance and 183
general lack of thrift. Then, if the family should have to borrow
money or need village aid at a future date, people may cite their
extravagance and irresponsibility as a reason for refusing them. Thus,
even the simplest *pai-pai*, like those held on the first, second, fifteenth,
and sixteenth of each month, offer people a welcome justification for
eating good food, and the bigger the *pai-pai*, the better the food.

The most obvious functions of the *pai-pai* are often recognized by 796
the villagers themselves. There are several other important functions 476
that the villagers may not talk about unless they are questioned about 182
them.

Although in the process of organizing and administering *pai-pai* [621]

182 796 476 62 [593] [596] [618] there may be certain devisive influences (usually along family or *tsu* lines), many Hsin Hsing villagers realize that the *pai-pai*, and to a lesser extent the magical ritual, are the main occasions for show of cooperation and unity within and between families and *tsu* groups in the village. Many independent, kin-related economic family units, which are more than ever before assuming greater economic independence, still come together for ancestor worship. Also, the whole village acts as a single unit when preparations are made for worship at large village *pai-pai* or a few shamanistic rites. Such widespread cooperation among the villagers of Hsin Hsing, and apparently among those in the other villages of the area, is not at all common on day-to-day occasions.

182 796 628 574 These *pai-pai*, as we have seen, also provide an opportunity for the extension of relationships beyond the boundaries of the village itself. Except for the occasional marriage, funeral, or boy's sixteenth-birthday celebration, the large *pai-pai* ceremonials are the only chances the villagers have to invite outside guests formally and to be invited in turn. Since all of these occasions stimulate reciprocal invitations and visiting, they therefore tend to facilitate contact and thus closer ties with *ch'in ch'i* in other places, which seems to be more and more emphasized in recent years. As we have already seen, the Matsu procession and *pai-pai* tends to foster cooperation and closer relations across village lines.

796 795 184 574 626 Even Christian families living in other villages in the area serve a large dinner and invite guests when their village holds an elaborate *pai-pai*. Although they themselves do not worship, these Christians realize that they have few opportunities to have guests and receive return invitations from relatives and friends. On such occasions they also feel obliged to do as the others do in order to avoid the laughter and criticism of their neighbors. People would say that they are either "too tight to spend the money" or perhaps just too poor. Such criticism tends to lower the reputation and general status of the family, and thus even Christians, on occasion, succumb to community pressures.

778 771 177 178 796 [369] [769] Religious and magical rituals in the Hsin Hsing area seem in general to be holding their own in face of the socioeconomic changes we have noted—changes brought about by increased economic security, higher standards of living and health, improved communications, and increased mobility. It is clear, though, that some practices of religion and magic have been weakened both in intensity and frequency. For example, many curative magical practices have been supplanted by Western medical practices as a primary means of curing. The significance attached to religious holidays such as the New Year and even some ancestral-worship ceremonies has actually de-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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creased as urbanization and mobility to and from the city have 777
affected village life; the urban-based villagers less frequently find it 177
necessary or particularly desirable to return home for these occasions. 178

This is far from indicating, however, that all religious and magical 796
practice is on the wane. While the traditional significance attached to 369
some rituals has lessened, that of others has remained the same, and [769])
some have even, perhaps, increased in popularity. For example, the large shamanistic (sometimes almost orgiastic) rituals, and certain religious calendrical rituals such as the village god's birthday *pai-pai*, that draw the active participation of virtually the entire village population show no signs of weakening. Their continued and possibly even increased popularity, in fact, seems to go hand in hand with other changes in the society, including the growing influence of city life on the villagers. The same urban-dwelling villagers who can hardly be bothered to return for the more sedate New Year and ancestral-worship rituals continue to pay attention to these more dynamic rituals, as do villagers who have developed important urban ties by past residence or prolonged visits to the city. Perhaps these rites better satisfy the intensified need for excitement and entertainment stimulated by urban experiences.

But there are also other reasons for the continued importance of 78
ritual activities in the life of the village. While the villagers are natu- 829
rally unaware of the more subtle functions of ritual discussed earlier, they do recognize the part rituals can play in strengthening moral attitudes like filial piety and concepts like community cooperation. The *tao shih* priests, as we saw for example in Chapter 7, are quite open and willing at the least enquiry to tell people of the funeral ritual's multiple purposes, including those of reinforcing the moral system and relieving the anxiety which accompanies both life and death.

Other forms of religious and magical rituals serve to furnish a 78
framework for unity and cooperation in village life whose economic 769
and social bases have been deteriorating. The gradual breakdown of 182
some traditional patterns, formerly based on village community life and socioeconomic necessity, has left an urgent need for some firm means to instill a sense of cohesion in the people who remain in a geographic unit. For this purpose even ancestor worship continues to play its integrative role at the family or *tsu* level.

Thus, with all the socioeconomic developments, despite some 78
changes in form and emphasis, ritual generally is still a vital means of 182
maintaining some semblance of communal life, even if these integra- 621
tive ritual occasions are manifest only intermittently. It therefore seems reasonable to expect the performance of ritual to continue to have real importance in the lives of Hsin Hsing area villagers, although changes in emphasis are also likely to continue to occur.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
Taiwan AD6
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Hsin Hsing, Village in Change

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In the preceding chapters we have seen how the Hsin Hsing villager, a peasant who was tied to the land and the village community and primarily involved in a basically subsistence type of agriculture, is being transformed to one who is becoming more and more involved in the market economy of the country and who has widespread contacts with an urban way of life. We have seen how such developments are affecting village social organization, community and kinship solidarity, and some of the general patterns of village life. We have also seen that although many features of traditional Chinese culture are still evident in the Hsin Hsing village area (especially in the realm of religion, which continues to be a source of community unity), the impact of increased urbanization in Taiwan in recent decades has brought about important and rather rapid socioeconomic and cultural changes. This has been especially marked in the roles of the village and kinship organizations that were previously the peasants' chief sources of identification and security. We now turn to a description of modifications and changes in traditional values and behavior that further indicate the inexorable direction of change in Hsin Hsing.

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Social change is not new to Chinese society. It has been going on for a long time in Taiwan, as well as on the mainland of China, as a consequence of the continuing process of urbanization. However, the process in Taiwan has been accelerated as a direct result of Japanese rule followed by the present rule of the Nationalist Chinese government.

F 175 369 621 618 [161] [423] [579]

Until the early part of this century, rural society in Taiwan had been relatively stable for many years. Population growth was slow, and there was enough land for the people. Members of the economic families had close relationships with the village as a community as well as with their localized kinship groups. As long as communications were poor, banditry a constant danger, and mobility limited, village unity was essential to security and even survival. Cohesive, tightly knit single *tsu* villages were quite powerful and frequently the de facto govern-

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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ment of the local area. In such villages, composed of a single large *tsu* 175
organization, the *tsu* could virtually control the lives of its member 369
families, unite the entire village population on the basis of common 621
kinship, and thus furnish security to all its members. But even villages 618
like Hsin Hsing, fragmented into many small kinship groups, found
their security in complete identity with the village, which made it
possible for them to band together and cooperate for mutual security
against the everday dangers and problems.

The coming of the Japanese at the end of the nineteenth century F
saw the introduction of a strong central government which led to an 175
increased orderliness of life. The Japanese also introduced an expanded 177
and efficient system of communications and public health and 648
sanitation measures. These measures, coupled with a stable and secure [744]
life, made possible a radical increase in population which became even [20]
more pronounced in the late 1940's and 1950's under the Nationalist [617]
Chinese government. As all of these developments took place, particularly
the maintenance of local order, the ties of the village began to [621]
loosen with the loss of its protective function and ability to initiate [628]
control beyond its own village boundaries.

In Hsin Hsing (and probably other villages like it), some of the T
numerous kinship groups began to increase in size and develop into 178
tsu organizations as described in Chapter 5. With growth, each group 618
became increasingly concerned with its own sociopolitical influence
within the village and even in the nearby area, especially as the former 621
imperative necessity for village unity declined. Thus, Hsin Hsing [628]
began to develop into a village with several significant competing *tsu*
organizations which started, to some degree, to undercut the formerly
necessary coalition of the different village kinship groups. So began the
weakening of Hsin Hsing village as a unified community.

As the population increase continued in recent decades, and an T
already developing problem of land scarcity became even more extreme, 178
it gradually became both necessary and possible for increasing 16
numbers of rural villagers to migrate to the growing cities to find work 423
to supplement their insufficient income from the land. This migration
has broadened the villagers' urban contacts and relationships beyond 369
the village. At about the same time, as we have seen in earlier chapters, 433
the villagers have become increasingly more dependent upon and 464
involved with the greater market economy. This has become especially
true as patterns of land use have changed in response to all of the
changing conditions, so that many villagers are increasingly shifting
from what was primarily a subsistence form of agriculture to what is
now participation in the market economy of the country. Therefore, T
there has been an acceleration of the impingement on the village by [177]
the outside world.

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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As the villagers have begun to extend their activities and interests beyond Hsin Hsing, the village's influence on the lives of its members has deteriorated even further. The increase in activities beyond the village means that the proportion of their total activites and hence their involvement within Hsin Hsing is decreased. While the *tsu* continues to perform many of its functions within the context of the village, when its members—by necessity—become more involved beyond the village, even the *tsu*'s role must be affected. The still relatively small and rather localized Hsin Hsing village *tsu* have very limited influence or means to support their members in their needs and relationships beyond the village. And as the villagers seek to establish outside sources of solidarity and security, the *tsu* is even further affected.

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The most significant consequence of these socioeconomic developments in the Hsin Hsing area recently has therefore been an even more rapid functional deterioration in the internal village social organization. This is reflected in the decline of the village as a community and source of solidarity for its members. Along with this there has also developed a growing independence of the economic (usually conjugal) family unit from the village and even from the larger kinship group or *tsu* as well as a relatively increased independence of the individual from the family. The Hsin Hsing villagers have thus found it necessary to replace the supportive socioeconomic relations formerly based almost exclusively on village community life and kinship relationships (*tsu*) with relationships beyond the village.

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The progress of such cultural changes has been suggested throughout the book. Now I will particularize, and indicate their existence in the context of modern-day attitudes, values, and behavioral patterns towards the family unit, the *tsu* organization, the village, the land, education, and conflict resolution.

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Traditionally, the joint family was idealized. Although it often could not be realized in practice, as an ideal it was very highly valued. Division of joint families into individual small conjugal families was frowned upon, and when it did occur—as a result of internal family conflicts born of economically based problems and general poverty—it was quite common to attempt to disguise the split. Often, only the smallest degrees of division were permitted as a means of alleviating the sources of strain between the conjugal units, and when eventually a complete division had to be made, it was usually only after attempts had been made to mitigate the causes prompting it.

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Thus, although the small family was most common and the rate of family division was high, great theoretical importance was attached to the large joint family and was reflected in the villagers' behavior. In present-day rural Taiwan the rate of family division has not actually

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changed significantly, but the villagers' attitude toward it certainly has. Today, the individual small family is becoming the most significant unit in terms of actual behavior and values.

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In Hsin Hsing, internal family conflict remains a primary cause of family division, but new forces place an added strain between conjugal units. The increased pressure of population on an insufficient land base leads sons to migrate to the city to work, and the increased economic value this gives the sons weakens the father-son tie and generally speeds up the undermining of the father's authority. Women have greater economic importance now; this frequently leads to delayed marriage. A girl upon marriage is thus older and more mature, which tends to weaken her mother-in-law's authority over her. And as the authority of the elders weakens, the tie between husband and wife is strengthened. Add to this a growing demand for widely available material goods, and we can easily see the potential these factors contain for independence of the conjugal unit, a potential which has undoubtedly had an important bearing on family division.

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At the same time, the increasingly greater impingement by the government on the local area has created forces which further family division. The conscription of men, land reform, and taxation, all noted in Chapters 4 and 5, have made it beneficial for families to divide. While it is true that family division has not increased significantly, it is noteworthy that all these new factors added to the balance already weighed down by internal conflict have tipped the scales so that family division now takes place openly. There is little attempt to disguise division, and where the pressures of government impingement make it seem advantageous, divsion is almost advertised. The openness with which division now takes place might in itself yet become a new force of strain within the joint family leading to division; a habitual example can become a weighty model on which to base a demand.

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The significance of such demands by the small family unit for independence from the restraints of the larger joint family does not, however, imply an analogous call for independence from their more loosely organized and less demanding large kinship group or *tsu*. This has never been the case in Hsin Hsing nor, for that matter, in mainland China generally, according to most of the ethnographies. The villagers continue to lean on their *tsu* or other smaller and less organized patrilineal kin groups for many activities and functions, since they are the only basic groupings with which villagers maintain continuous, uniform, stable relations. This larger group is the sociopolitical organization most likely to work in their and their entire family's behalf over the years.

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However, the villagers also feel a certain amount of socioeconomic need and desire for relations with non-kin villagers and outsiders,

621 since most often neither their own *tsu* nor family groupings are large
628 enough in numbers to offer sufficient possibilities for relationships. As
609 I have indicated throughout the book, although *tsu* and kinship is the
178 most important single basis for relationships with others, Hsin Hsing
villagers are far from being tied to one another exclusively on the basis
of kinship or *tsu* relationship.

621 Hsin Hsing has many formal and informal "social associations,"
activities and relationship groupings whose membership roles cross
571 kinship lines. We have seen this in groups of villagers based on membership
575 in a particular irrigation system or pumping station association,
474 exchange labor groups, cooperating groups in vegetable marketing,
loan associations, father-mother burial associations, sworn-brother
618 age groups, and so on. Each non-kinship based formal or informal
activity and association that a villager participates in and depends on
performs an important function and fulfills a need. By doing this, such
diversified non-kin relationships also tend somewhat to interfere with
and weaken *tsu* organization by impairing its solidarity and therefore
its ability to achieve security for its members. By doing what the
kinship organizations cannot do, such associations expose the inherent
weakness of the kinship-based organizations.

At the same time, the non-kinship based organizations have inherent weaknesses of which the villagers are aware. Each has a different composition of members, and the villager does not share membership in all the different associations with a single uniform grouping of fellow villagers. The *tsu* or smaller patrilineal kin group thus remains the primary basis for the most continuous and stable long-term relationships; such relationships are institutionalized and, unlike relationships with fellow villagers or outsiders, do not change from time to time. The villager therefore appreciates the importance of his kinship group and is desirous of maintaining his close relationship to it. But
[178] he also appreciates the necessity of establishing supportive socioeconomic relationships beyond the *tsu* and village, and it is these kinds of relationships which appear to be increasing in both frequency and importance and to be fostering a decline in identification with the village as a community.

178 Such a decline means that villagers today find it increasingly difficult
476 to cooperate for mutual aid, even when it is still necessary. It is
even questioned whether aid should be offered to a non-*tsu* fellow
621 villager in times of emergency, such as when problems arise with other
628 villages. The case of Li Fan discussed in Chapter 6 shows that the
villagers now often have little basis for cooperation and mutual aid
612 and, in addition, are today faced with a conflict of loyalties—a waning
571 loyalty to their fellow villagers and, at the same time, at least a
continuing and perhaps even growing loyalty to people in other vil-

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lages with whom they have developed strong relationships on the basis 472
of being *ch'in ch'i* or friends. 621

The apparently recent relative importance of these latter connections 628
stems from the individual family's increased need to solidify 612
matrilateral and affinal relationships as well as friendship ties outside 571
the village for purposes of status and socioeconomic security. The
intensity of these relationships beyond the village in many cases surpasses
those with non-kin fellow villagers. These relationships, however, [618]
must not and do not supercede loyalty to *ch'in tsu*.

Villagers today, therefore, continue to prefer marriage with nonrelatives 178
or strangers with whom they can establish outside *ch'in ch'i* relationships 582
which will lead to added security. Such connections better fit 621
the present socioeconomic and political needs of villagers who no 628
longer necessarily find it advantageous to focus their relationships 612
within the village or even to continue to live in the village. In turn 571
extra-village contacts, once developed, tend to reinforce the growing
socioeconomic self-reliance of the economic family unit already heightened
by mobility and nonvillage-based relationships.

We have already seen how these factors have weakened the villagers' 177
traditional ties to their home village and *tsu*. But at the same time, the 178
impingement of the government, through its Land Reform Program, 423
has played a part in this process. In Chapter 4 we saw how the land [621]
reform, by placing limitations on the accumulation of land, affected [618]
the traditional means by which social status and leadership can be [554]
achieved. Thus, stimulated by such a complex of developments, we
find that more and more villagers are far from averse to the sale of
their land for immediate financial advantage.

Often the family, *tsu*, or village cannot exert the necessary pressure 178
to keep the land in the hands of the family or at least among members 423
of the larger kinship group. This is partly because of the relatively 618
small and weakened state of *tsu* organization in the Hsin Hsing village 621
area and partly because of the weakening of the organization of the 171
village itself. Where either *tsu* or village organization was strong, the situation could be quite different. Fei and Chang (1948:126) noted in their 1939–1943 study in Yunnan province that it was a duty of "clansmen" to retain land inherited from ancestors and that custom decreed that such land be sold only to "clan" members. Only if "clan" members were unable to buy the land or to assist their kinsman in "extricating himself from his financial difficulties" could the land be sold to an outsider. In such case, all the "near members of the seller's clan" would have to consent to the sale in writing, and if this were not done the sale was "both customarily and legally invalid."

However, for many village families in the Hsin Hsing village area, 178
whatever feeling of intimacy or even reverence they may retain for the 423
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1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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178 native soil, it usually becomes unimportant in the face of better eco-
423 nomic opportunities off the land. As we saw in Chapter 4 especially, it
432 is not only peasants who will willingly sell their land once other forms
823 of economic security are firmly established elsewhere, but even the
wealthy landlord of long-standing tradition on the land in the area.
Such a man who, if anyone, is well indoctrinated with the concept of
the Great (Confucian) Tradition and the value placed on ancestral
land has willingly sold off not only sections of land since the land
reform but even his total family landholdings when outside commercial
[167] investment seemed more feasible. When a peasant family establishes
itself in Taipei or another urban center and retains its land, it
apparently does so for economic security only, not for the land's "symbolic
114 value." Also, migration to a city by Hsin Hsing area villagers if
171 economically successful, is very frequently conceived as a permanent
rather than a temporary family move. This seems to be quite different
167 from numerous observations in various areas of the mainland by Kulp
(1925:42–45), M. Yang (1945:229), and C. K. Yang (1959:71–75),
where migration was almost always undertaken as a temporary
measure.

178 Families who remain in the village regardless of their inability to
464 reap an adequate living from insufficient landholdings do so because
they consider village life a more desirable way to live. Since there is
433 little industry and few steady work opportunities in the local area,
434 some find low paying and seasonal jobs as local laborers or establish
369 some kind of itinerant business operation to supplement their meager
[241] income. Others are switching from the traditional rice crops to cash
crops such as vegetables for market. This development has occurred
despite the obstacles which the government, perhaps inadvertently,
[656] places in the way of farmers who wish to grow almost anything other
than rice as their main crop.

369 Apparently, these people care more for the continued enjoyment of
178 a rural mode of life than for the land itself. Many, having tried city
life and work, come back to live and work in the village primarily
181 because they did not like the urban conditions. These people do not
177 remain in the village and on the land for conservative reasons or as a
621 reaction to change. In Hsin Hsing, it is this group of people which is
241 most active in the community. They bring about internal economic
and social changes in the village through their attempt to improve
423 agricultural methods, which brings them into contact with government
and JCRR agriculture agents as well as with farmers in the
surrounding rural area. This group stands in contrast to a larger
group of conservative villagers who have continued to cultivate their
diminishing land base in the traditional manner.

It becomes evident then that there has been significant change in 178
the traditional Chinese value toward the land held earlier. Were it not 423
for fellow villagers and *ch'in tsu* who still are critical of those who sell 823
off their land in the indiscriminate manner in which it is so often done
today, and for those villagers who still prefer the village and the
agricultural way of life, it would be tempting to deny almost completely
any residue of the feeling of "reverence or intimacy" toward
the land which the peasant may have held in the past.

The villagers' attitude toward education is another evidence of the 178
lack of real attachment to the land and village. Education to them 871
means a way to rise above the life of a farmer or farm worker, although
they do not necessarily expect it to raise them to civil service or 511
elite status. Their primary interest in education is the attainment of
an easier life, financial betterment, and power for the individual family.
Thus, typically, village farmers want their daughters to marry [183]
businessmen. Education has far less inherent value of its own per se
than it had in the Confucian tradition, and the materialistic ambitions
are against the tradition as well.

Today there are few well-educated villagers who remain active in 178
village affairs in the Hsin Hsing area. Usually, they go into business 871
outside the village or accept employment in local government, such as 571
in the district Public Office. When a man establishes a business outside 621
the village area, as we saw happening after the land reform, he usually
shifts his social as well as his economic interests. Once he accepts a 464
position in local government, the educated villager tends to become 554
cliquish and spend most of his time with high-status fellow government
employees. Because of his position, he may be called upon by his
village to help in certain problem situations, but generally, he takes
little interest in most of his village's affairs and does little to furnish
leadership. To a great degree nowadays in rural Taiwan, as a result of
the new paths to status, education has come to have consequences
contrary to the traditional function of education in the society. It now
tends to foster greater individualism and detachment from the village
and the local larger kinship group, and at times even from one's
family.

This attitude held toward the village by the educated man who, 871
usually, is financially well off, begins during earlier student days. Almost 554
immediately upon entering middle school, the bond between the 178
student and his fellow villagers weakens—that is except for those who 621
happen to be school chums. Thus, only in a limited number of cases
do middle school graduates serve as leaders or innovators in their
village. The relatively better educated village members rarely enrich
any of the village community functions, nor do they by their own

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
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871 554 example bolster the declining role of the village as a source of security
178 and identification. Considering their potential, such men contribute
relatively little to their villages.

621 Coupled with this has been the more recent decline of the traditional
178 landlord leadership as an effect of the Land Reform Program
621 and an ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership which has
developed in the village. When leadership was sorely needed, as in the
622 Li Fan case for example, the villagers actually turned to me, the alien
[423] anthropologist, as a potential source of leadership and help. Many
[123] former leaders, now prefer not to become too involved in other people's
problems or those of the village. In fact, it is now often difficult
for villages to find qualified and respected men even to run for the
office of mayor or to assume the responsibilities of a leadership role.

178 The ever-increasing vacuum of qualified leadership affects not only
622 the operation of the village but that of the *tsu* organizations. One
important area of village life adversely affected by the lack of leadership
627 is the apparently increasing inability to resolve local conflict by
618 the traditional method of mediation which was usually carried on by
respected *tsu*, village, or area leaders. A particular mediator was selected
according to the relationship of the disputants and the nature
of the conflict, which might involve intravillage or intervillage disputes
over water for irrigation; disputes over landownership and property
boundaries; or power struggles between families, especially
between *tsu* organizations, over such questions as village administration
or the expenditure of funds by village or *tsu* for religious or
festive activities; and so on.

178 Almost always, regardless of the nature of the dispute or the level on
621 which it occurred, mediation had been sought and applied with these
aims: first, that the scope and resolution of the conflict be kept localized
627 so as not to invite possible government interference into
village affairs, and, second, that the resolution permit the diputants to
continue to live harmoniously together. Villagers felt a great degree of
permanency since most, tied as they were to the land and to their
village, were likewise tied by the particular kinds of relationships developed
over the years with local people, both kin and non-kin. There
were few opportunities to leave the area, land, or kinship group and
go elsewhere so as to avoid the repercussions of an ill-settled dispute.

178 In recent years, however, it has been becoming increasingly difficult
to resolve conflict through mediation and to achieve these aims. In
621 part this is a result of the deterioration of the accepted hierarchal
627 relationship system on both the kin and non-kin levels. On the non-kin
571 level the concept or code of *kan-ch'ing* (as discussed in Chapter 6)
602 and the quality of interpersonal relations governed by it have been
weakened. The situation developed largely when the traditional land

The situation developed largely when the traditional land 178
tenure system was modified by Taiwan's Land Reform Program be- 621
tween 1949–1953. An important aspect of the reform was the initiation 627
of a rent reduction and limitation law, but even more important was 423
the introduction of an official contract between landlord and tenant 427
which secured the tenant's rights on the land whatever the relation-
ship, good or bad *kan-ch'ing*, he had with the landlord. The contract 571
for the first time made it clear that the relationship between landlord 602
and tenant and their mutual responsibilities were economic. Once their
interaction was limited to an economic relationship as circumscribed
by an official contract, it was no longer as important whether either
party concerned himself with the traditional maintenance of good *kan-ch'ing*.

Thus, in addition to the already discussed decline of some landlords' 621
socioeconomic and even political interests in the village as a result of 622
the land reform, the deterioration in the basis of *kan-ch'ing*, and with 423
it the prestige of many in the landlord class, has frequently meant that
unless landlords who remained in the village had other ways of main- 556
taining their high positions in the community, they lost their useful- 178
ness as mediators, being no longer capable of exerting influence and 571
leadership in the community.

On the kinship level, the code which regulated relationships be- 178
tween hierarchal unequals has likewise been affected by change, thus
worsening the community's ability to resolve local social conflict. This 618
has occurred on the levels of the *tsu* and even, to some degree, the 627
family. In conflict within the *tsu* or village, as well as beyond the village, the *tsu* organizations through their leaders have always played a role in settling all conflict by mediation. While the several Hsin Hsing *tsu* have never been powerful organizations backed by extremely wealthy members and wealth in corporate land usually necessary to give them extensive local sociopolitical influence, *tsu* authority has recently been further weakened, as we have seen above, by the extension of the villagers' socioeconomic interests beyond the home area. As a result, *even the tsu have apparently lost much of their* ability to exert sanctions against their own members or their op-
ponents. Thus, as a result of the weakening of the social hierarchy, (554)
there has developed a more general inability to use the former traditional respect for particular leaders of the landlord class or *tsu* as a force with which to settle disagreements.

It is not purely a matter of the weakening of the traditional hier- 178
archical relationships between people, however, which has diminished 184
the respect for traditional mediators. This has been intensified by the 621
tendency toward a growing equalitarianism on both the social and 627
economic levels of life among the villagers. The tendency was born of
greater educational opportunities, increased election of officials, land 558

1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966

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redistribution, and land contracts, all of which have helped to equalize economic means and social relations. While this has not stopped the peasants from recognizing the former landlords' higher status and power, their willingness to accept them as mediators has clearly diminished, as has this formerly powerful group's interests in such community service.

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The loss of prestige and authority of the traditional mediators, and thus the decline of success of mediation, has also been accompanied by a questioning of a principle aim of mediation—that the goal of the conflict resolution is to enable the people concerned to continue to live harmoniously together.

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Many local villagers are no longer so strongly wedded to the village as a result of their newly developing relations with the greater market economy and the increased economic opportunities for migration to cities. For example, one consequence is that they are no longer concerned with settling disputes with the idea of solely preserving harmonious relations locally. While this is still very important for many people, it is no longer practically universal.

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Thus, as a result of the greater society's impingement on village life and, at the same time, the villagers' economic need for involvement beyond the village area, the village and even the kinship groups now have difficulty in maintaining themselves as the villagers' source of solidarity and identification. The villagers' response is actively and consciously to reach out beyond the village and even the *tsu*, not particularly for political power as the gentry always did, but primarily for the socioeconomic reinforcement of their security. As the villager is more and more forced to reach beyond the village, the effect is to further weaken his identification with his village and to a lesser extent with his local kinship group, thus necessitating his even further dependency on and need of the outside.

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It appears that such a breakdown of traditional village and kinship relationships has long been going on in much of rural China as a result of some form of urban contacts. Such social change has been accelerated even more markedly in mainland China under the Communists during this last decade and a half. The more extreme breakdown of such traditional village, kinship, and family relationships now apparently taking place on the mainland of China has been attributed to the introduction of communism and its ideological attack on such traditional Chinese concepts as the large family and kinship group. However, taking the situation in Taiwan as an analogy it appears likely that such developments are equally attributable to the urbanization and socioeconomic changes of the twentieth century, speeded up through the methods employed by the Chinese Communists rather

CHAPTER 2

THE SETTING

101 The village of Hsiachichou is a small Hokkien community located
near the market town of Hsulin on the southwestern edge of the Taipei
101 basin. Seventy years ago when the Keelung and Tamsui Rivers were the
133 only convenient avenues of transportation within the basin, Hsiachichou
178 487 was commonly described as being situated on the west bank of the Tamsui
River two hours upstream from the city of Taipei. The village's loca-
tion on the river was then one of its most important characteristics,
a fact still reflected in the name Hsiachichou, "The Place Down on the
178 River." After 1923, however, the river began to lose its central place
487 in the life of the village, this being the year in which the Formosan
496 Development Company completed a rail line through the southern half
[829] of the Taipei basin. At first many of the villagers refused to make
use of the railroad, apparently afraid of becoming contaminated by coal
dug in inauspicious locations, but the advantages of convenient trans-
portation overcame their qualms. Where it had formerly taken hours of
hard poling to make a round trip to Taipei, the railroad made it possi-
ble to travel to the city and back in little more than an hour and in
relative comfort. The village of Hsiachichou is today thought of as
being "fifteen minutes from the Hsulin Station" or "three stops down
823 track from Taipei." So completely has the river lost its central place
775 in the life of the village that it is only in the seventh lunar month

*592 independent units. Rather than a great extended family living under
596 one authority and one roof, what one typically finds in a large compound
[778] is a number of related but independent households. They will usually
[351] share the use of the kōng-thiâ:, the yard between the two wings of the
[312] house, the well if there is one, and the toilet, but each family will
[514] have its own bedroom and its own stove, even if this requires the
[354] building of two stoves in one kitchen.

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778 structure to a large complex compound are clearly marked in the use and
356 care of the kōng-thiâ:. When a house is new and inhabited by a single
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596 kê, the kōng-thiâ: will be always the best kept room in the building.
[353] The interior walls will be freshly white-washed; the floors will have
been swept daily; and the furniture will be as expensive as the family
can possibly afford. After the sons of the original family divide
their parental kê, the kōng-thiâ: and its furniture will begin to deteriorate,
for their wives will be unwilling to devote their time or money
to what they regard as "public property." So long as their mother is
still alive, however, the room will never be in marked disrepair. What
work she cannot do herself, she will badger her daughters-in-law into
doing. The real decline of the kōng-thiâ: begins when she and her
husband die. There is then no one among the residents of the house who
has a responsibility towards the settlement as a whole, and as a
result no one is willing to give up the time or money to the upkeep
[539] of the kōng-thiâ:. As one of the most accurate of Chinese proverbs
states, "What is public is for everyone's use and is no one's responsibility."
000 The inevitable result is that the kōng-thiâ: and its

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furnishings decline and fall apart, their deterioration reflecting the decline and fall of the original family.

In the third or fourth generation after its construction, the typical village house is abandoned for better quarters. By that time the roof and even the walls will have begun to deteriorate rapidly, and it is usually simpler for the residents to separate and build new homes than it is for them to make a joint effort to repair the older building. We can thus trace in the history of the village a cycle of rise and decline which is closely related to the cycle of the typical village family. Beginning as a small rectangular building housing a single kê, the house grows with the growth of the family into a large compound, and then gradually deteriorates with the division of the family into independent units each of which eventually leaves to build [621] a new house. This process repeated again and again is the history of the formation of Hsiachichou, and is clearly evident in a correlation of degree of kinship with proximity of residence. If a number of persons live in the same house and share the same stove they are almost certainly related in the first or second degree; if they live in the same house but do not share the same stove they are most likely related in the second or third degree; living in adjacent houses they are more likely to be related than unrelated but often only distantly; while if they live in different sections of the village they are likely to be unrelated or only very distantly related.

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178 Despite the far reaching changes which have taken place in Taiwan in the past fifty years, life in the village of Hsiachichou has in

178 many respects remained surprisingly unchanged. Brides today wear white
[585] western style wedding dresses, but otherwise the ritual of the nuptial
ceremonies is much the same as it was at the turn of the century. The
[769] head of one household destroyed his ancestral tablets several years ago
in a fit of anger, the ancestors having "let his mother and his wife
die," but with this one exception every family in the village continues
[756] to make regular sacrifices to the deceased. Western medicine and
relatively modern medical facilities are readily available, and yet two
[302] men are able to make a living in the Hsulin area as shamans. Many
[786] of the young village men wear their hair long in imitation of the
Japanese imitation of Elvis Presley, but they are still willing to serve
as bearers every year when the god Shang Ti Kung is carried in a heavy
sedan chair across a bed of hot coals. Nor are these simply empty observances carried on out of the inertia of the young and nostalgia of the
[771] old. Particularly in respect to religion, the traditional life of
[779] the village displays real vitality. As late as 1925 a group of
[776] villagers established a new committee to organize worship for the god
[778] Tai Tzu Yeh, and in the year immediately before the war the people of
Chichou contributed both time and money to rebuild the Shang Ti Kung
temple. Even as late as 1960 it was possible for the committee in
charge of the temple to collect several thousand dollars to hire two
Taoist nuns to care for the building.

In one very important respect, however, there has been a real and irreversible change in the life of Hsiachichou, a change which has begun to have a substantial effect upon marriage forms and family life.

178 In 1895 when the island was ceded to Japan the village of Hsiachichou
433 was almost exclusively an agricultural community. Of the thirty or
463 forty families living in the village at that time there were apparently
only five who did not derive all of their income from agriculture, these
being the village storekeeper, a highly successful shaman whose services
were in demand for miles around, and three families who made their livings
464 as boatmen on the Tamsui. If a villager of that day did not want
178 to work as a farmer, or if he did not inherit enough farm land to make
his living this way, there was no choice for him but to leave the
community to find a livelihood elsewhere. There was no industry in the
area which could give him employment, and Taipei was too far away for
a person to live in Hsiachichou and work in the city.

178 In the course of the next thirty to forty years changes took place
464 which drastically altered this situation, the precipitating factor
496 being the construction of the Taipei-Hsinchu railroad in 1923. The
433 railroad itself created a number of jobs for coolies and clerks in the
Hsulin station, and made it possible for a few men to live in the
village and work in Taipei. More important in terms of its eventual
effect upon village life, the construction of the railroad stimulated
the development of local industry in Hsulin, Panchiao, and other
178 neighboring market towns. In the 1920's and 1930's Japanese develop-
433 ment companies opened large scale coal mines in the foothills to the
[316] west and east of Hsulin; in the early 1920's a winery was built in
[274] Hsulin which by 1930 had grown to be the largest winery on the island;
[256] the winery stimulated development of several smaller industries

178 433 including a bottle works and a packing plant; and at about the same
[274] time a flour mill was built in nearby Shantzuchiao. More recently,
[346] a drug factory employing nearly a hundred people was built in Hsulin,
[256] and since the war a textile industry has developed in the market town
[278] of Panchiao. Although there are still not enough positions for all
[288] those seeking employment, these developments have at least created for
[464] some village men the possibility for something other than an agricultural income.

At about the same time as these new resources were developing, the need for something other than an income from agriculture was becoming
178 pressing in Hsiachichou. Within thirty years of their occupation of
[177] Taiwan, the Japanese colonial government introduced a broad and highly
[648] effective medical program with the inevitable result that the infant
[744] mortality rate over the succeeding twenty years fell dramatically.
[165] Thus while new opportunities for employment were being created the
[161] [464] future work force was increasing at a rapid rate. Even then, however, these developments would not have had a substantial effect upon the
178 village had it not been for one further change. To work in the drug
464 871 factories or the textile mill at least a minimum of education is required, and without such education the villagers might never have been able to compete with more urban dwellers for employment opportunities.
[212] Fortunately an elementary school was established in Chichou in the first decade of this century, so that by the time the shift in economy took place the majority of the male villagers were at least literate.

178 The result of these three concomitant changes has been that
463 Hsiachichou has more and more turned away from agriculture as the basis
621 of its economy. By 1960 when most of the data for the present study
[433] were collected only 27 of the 72 families then living in the village
[114] obtained a substantial portion of their income from agriculture, and of
these 27 families only 4 were entirely dependent upon farming or animal husbandry for their livelihood. The occupations of the villagers were by then so diverse as to make a simple descriptive classification impossible. Those 23 families supplementing a farm income with some other source of income included two families who owned a small dry goods store in Taipei; one family in which the head of the household worked part time as a cook while his son-in-law was employed as a coal miner; a family in which the head of the household was employed as a car inspector for the railroad and his daughter as a bank cashier; one family in which the wife did most of the farming so that her husband could hold a job as janitor in a middle school; three families in which the head of the household farmed while his sons worked as coal miners or in the Hsulin winery; one case in which an elderly farmer was supported primarily by the earnings of a daughter who worked as a prostitute; one family whose head worked in the mornings as a butcher and farmed in the afternoon; and one in which the head of the family managed a small factory while his older brother's son farmed the family's land. In the case of those 46 families who depended entirely upon something other than agriculture the occupations followed were even more diverse. They included a family whose sole income was gambling receipts; three families

178 in which the head of the household earned a meager living as a cart
463 puller; two families who were supported by one or more sons employed as
621 pedicab drivers; two families who owned and operated fish stalls in the Hsulin market; one family in which the husband and wife earned a living by peddling rice cakes; two families whose income consisted primarily of the earnings of teenage boys who worked shining shoes in the Taipei station; one family the head of which was employed making tatami for the railroad while his sons worked as carpenters; one family supported primarily by the earnings of a goldsmith; three families in which all of the adult males were employed as coal miners; one family in which a father and his three sons made a living manufacturing noodles; and at least five cases in which the family was almost entirely dependent upon the earnings of daughters working as prostitutes.

121 We will thus be looking at the village of Hsiachichou during a
178 period of considerable change in its economy. What was a traditional
433 Chinese agricultural community at the beginning of the period with which we will be concerned, was primarily a wage earning community by 1960. As we shall see later, these developments in the economy have had substantial effects upon the traditional institutions, but by 1960 at least they had not yet destroyed these institutions. The changes which had taken place by then were more a matter of degree than a matter of kind. It is by degrees that institutions die, however, and not too many years will have passed before the institutional structure itself will
121 have given way. By 1960 even the long cherished ideal of the extended
178 family was beginning to show signs of weakening. Of the six houses
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# 121 Of the six houses constructed in the village during the past five years four were simply
178 box like structures built side by side to save the expense of a wall.
596 Since such construction precluded the possibility of later expansion,
342 the builders of these houses had evidently given up the vision of a "great house of many generations and many branches."

*121 in order to understand why village families acted in the way they did.
*597 What are the various forms of marriage? How are they arranged? By
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58 whom are they arranged? What obligations and expectations do they
create? What rituals are associated with each form of marriage?
What is the meaning of these rituals? The answers to these questions
naturally depend in part upon whether we are talking about 1870 or
• [178] 1960. The bride of 1870 traveled to her husband's home in a sedan chair
carried by several strong men; the bride of 1960 made the trip in a
hired car at the head of a caravan of taxis. There have also been
some adjustments in the rituals of marriage and adoption, but by and
large the rules which governed these social transfers were still recognized and accepted in Hsiachichou in 1960. We will therefore describe
these institutions as though we were dealing with a single point in
time rather than with a period of ninety years.

*583 Although we are not prepared here to argue why it should be so,
183 it is clear that what we have called the preferred patrilocal marriage
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582 is the more socially desirable form of marriage in Hsiachichou. It is
the preferred form in the sense that it is the form of marriage which
everyone would choose if form were the only consideration. When the
villagers speak of marriage in general, they always mean the preferred
patrilocal form of marriage, and the assumption that it is the form of
marriage is clearly not new. The ritual procedures for enacting the
preferred form of marriage are much more elaborate than for any of the
other forms of marriage, and the villagers themselves regard the ritual
associated with these other forms of marriage as having been modeled

*583 upon the preferred form of marriage. It is therefore both convenient
183 and appropriate for us to begin our description of marriage practices
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582 in Hsiachichou with the preferred patrilocal marriage.

582 Theoretically at least, a preferred marriage may involve any
• 178 man and woman previously unmarried who are not of the same surname,
[183] marriage between people of the same surname being considered incestuous.
In fact, however, the selection of a bride in Hsiachichou has always
been guided by other equally important though somewhat less formal considerations. At the beginning of the period with which we will be concerned marriage between persons of different mainland origins was unthinkable even when both parties were speakers of Hokkien. Frequent armed conflicts between the Changchou and Chuanchou sectors of the society created a strong sense of antagonism and mutual suspicion, and as a result ethnic lines were sharply drawn and seldom violated. As we have mentioned in discussing the general character of the village, it was not until the early 1920's that the first Changchou woman married into Hsiachichou, a Chuanchou village. More recently, this particular distinction has lost some of its former significance. One elderly villager told us that "Changchou people still tell their children to marry a person from Changchou, and Chuanchou people still tell their sons to marry a Chuanchou girl, " but despite such attitudes marriages between the two groups have been less uncommon during the last twenty
178 years. Although one can still identify families of different origins
186 by the gods they worship and the way in which they sacrifice to their
ancestors, many younger people are unaware of the significance of these

178 differences. When asked where their ancestors originated on the main-
186 land, several younger villagers told us that they didn't know. "That's
something you should ask the old people about."

186 But while the ethnic lines distinguishing the various Hokkien
648 groups have blurred with time; there still remains a sharp distinction
171 between the island's two major language groups, the Hokkien and the
Hakka. People can now talk in a disinterested manner about differences between Changchou and Chuanchou customs, but it is always with a certain amount of scorn that one compares the ways of the Hakka and the Hokkien. On their return from the burial site a Hokkien funeral party always stops at every stream or roadway to invite the soul of the deceased to cross the barrier. After explaining to us that this was so "the soul will always be able to find its way home," one villager then noted, "but the Hakka don't do this. They don't care whether their ancestors can find their way back or not." As a result of such prejudices, marriages between the two groups are still uncommon. Although Hsiachichou is only a few miles from an area in which the majority of the population is Hakka, our genealogies include only two marriages with a Hakka, and both of these occurred within the past five years.

186 Whatever the villagers' attitude toward marrying Hakka, it is not
582 nearly so negative as their attitude toward marrying what they speak
648 of as "mainlanders," those Chinese who have settled on Taiwan since
World War II. One reason is that many village parents fear that if they allow a daughter to marry a mainlander they may never see her

*583 a family living in Hsiachichou took a mainland Chinese as a son-in-law.
582 While the villagers may be prejudiced against marriages with Chinese from the mainland, any son-in-law is better than no son-in-law at all.

*583 One final form of marriage should be mentioned for the sake of
591 completeness. This is what the villagers refer to as a ciŏu-zîp-chǔa-chǔt marriage. When a man marries into his wife's family he is spoken of as "having been called in," ciŏu-zîp; and when a woman marries out of her family she is spoken of as having "left the family," chǔa-chǔt. A ciŏu-zîp-chǔa-chǔt marriage is thus a marriage in which "the man enters and the woman leaves." As the term suggests, this form of marriage is a compromise between the patrilocal and matrilocal forms
[606] of marriage. What happens in practice is that the woman takes up residence in her husband's home in the usual way, while the husband assumes some degree of financial responsibility for his wife's parents.
[851] In most marriages of this kind the children take their father's sur-
[555] name, although some informants claim that it is possible for one
178 child to take the mother's surname. To date only one such marriage has
*583 occurred in Hsiachichou, but they are said to be fairly common in cities such as Taipei, and one can easily see that they might very well become more common in Hsiachichou in the future. As we shall see, recent changes on Taiwan have given younger villagers more and more authority with regard to marriage, and as a result it is becoming more and more difficult for parents to force their daughters into matrilocal marriages. It may therefore be that in the future many families will have to settle for the ciŏu-zîp-chǔa-chǔt marriage in place of

583 the traditional matrilocal marriage. Such marriages do at least
178 provide for the economic security of families who do not have sons of
[591] their own, and as the times change there will undoubtedly be a weakening of the beliefs that now make it important for parents to have a large family and descendants of their own.

591 The most important single criterion distinguishing the various forms of adoption recognized in Hsiachichou is the sex of the adopted child. The childless American family will usually first decide whether or not they want to adopt a child, and after this decision is made they will then consider the sex of the child. Often they do not care whether the child is a boy or a girl; their goal in adopting is to obtain a child. The situation is very different with the average Hokkien family. To them the adoption of a male and the adoption of a female are not alternative ways of satisfying the same need. A family who is interested in adopting a male child will not ordinarily consider the possibility of adopting a female child, and the family who is thinking of adopting a female child is often not at all interested in the possibility of adopting a male. The motivation for the two forms of adoption often springs from different concerns, and the two acts are recognized as always having very different social consequences.

597 The language of adoption in Hsiachichou recognizes two distinct
192 forms of male adoption. In one case, the act of adoption is referred
602 to with the verb chī, and the adopted child is spoken of as a kùe-páng-kìa:. In the other, the verb indicating the act of adoption is either bûe or bùe, depending upon whether one is speaking of the family who is

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*592 data are taken was not designed with this problem in mind, and so we
128 do not have complete information for even those recent dicisions
which people might remember. We will therefore have to be satisfied
with inferences based upon our knowledge of the structure of the kê
and the way in which this structure has changed during the past sixty
years. While such inferences will obviously not be entirely accurate,
they will probably not be very much less accurate than the villager's
own reports. People are not only unlikely to remember the details of
events which took place thirty or forty years earlier in their lives,
but when these events involved decisions about such emotionally significant
matters as marriage and adoption such memories as they have are
likely to be distorted.

Initially then, we must determine who is usually present in the
kê at the time decisions concerning marriage and adoption are made.
We speak specifically of the time at which these decisions are made
because the composition of the kê varies over time in a cyclical manner.
*592 Given the vagaries of nature, there are, of course, many variations in
• [178] the cycle, but, in general, the cycle repeats itself in a period of
approximately twenty to twenty-five years and includes three phases,
the joint family, the stem family, and the elementary family.
596 In the joint family phase, the kê typically consists of a man and
his wife, their married sons and their wives and children, and perhaps
an unmarried son or daughter. The father of such a family will usually
be a man in his late forties or early fifties; his wife, a few years
younger; and his sons and their wives young people in their early

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> this one and that one. It is hard to believe that when you go out you don't have to spend any money. Does this money fall from the sky? When it is her turn to cook, my mother is always around helping her, but when it is my wife's turn to cook, my aunt is far away and her children sit there and cry and yell. Never once, even when it wasn't her turn to cook, has my aunt chopped up sweet potato leaves to feed the pigs. It is always my wife or my mother who has to do that.

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As a result of these tensions the joint family phase of the family cycle is ordinarily short lived. Within a year or two of the time that the second brother marries most village families divide into two separate units. Although there were twenty men living in Hsiachichou in 1960 who had at least one married brother, there were only three *kê* which included married brothers. In ten cases two married brothers actually lived in the same house, sharing the same *kōng-thiâ:*, but each had his own stove and controlled his own purse, constituting a separate *kê*. In most cases brothers did continue to cooperate in the worship of common ancestors, and in at least one case shared the use of a water buffalo, but relations were typically hostile and distant. The animosities which cause the *kê* to break up in the first place are often intensified by the haggling involved in the division of the family property with the result that even as elderly men many brothers barely speak to one another.

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After the division of the *kê* the parents either live with one of their sons and his family or live alternately with each in turn. There have been no cases in the recent history of Hsiachichou in which a man and his wife established their own independent *kê* after their children divided the family. There are various reasons for this.

596 The stem family usually lasts five to seven years and is then re-
599 duced to an elementary family upon the deaths of the senior generation.
• 178 The next phase of the family cycle, that of the elementary family, typically lasts somewhere between five and ten years. Whether it is shorter or longer depends, of course, upon how young the grandchildren of the family marry and how long the grandparents live. On the average it has probably remained fairly constant over the past fifty years.
582 The higher standards of living of the past two or three decades have tended to lengthen the average lifespan, but this has been offset by the fact that during the same period of time the age at marriage has moved up from somewhere between 18 and 19 years to between 22 and 23. Very few of the young married couples in Hsiachichou in 1960 were living in the same house with a grandparent. Of the 15 married men under the age of thirty only 4 lived in a family which included one grandparent, and none of these lived in families in which both grandparents were alive.

*593 The phase of the elementary family might be characterised as one of relative quiesence. For the husband, his quarrels with his brothers are no longer active concerns, and such tension as there may have been between him and his father has been terminated by his father's death. For his wife, the long period of trial with her mother-in-law is over, and as yet she does not have a daughter-in-law of her own. Later a man may have difficulties with his own sons, but at this age they are usually very much under his control. We must not forget, however, that while there may be few tensions in the family at this

*583 marriage, the two generations are the potential foster parents and
*584 either the foster father's or foster mother's parents; in the case of
*592 *597 the preferred patrilocal marriage and the matrilocal marriage, the
two generations are the young people to be married and one of their
sets of parents. Our next task, then, is to establish which of these
two generations was responsible for the decisions with which we are
concerned. When we speak of the motives for adopting a child, are
we speaking of the motives of the foster parents or of the foster
grandparents? When we ask why a family decided upon a particular
form of marriage, are we asking why the couple chose to marry in this
way, or why their parents chose to arrange this kind of marriage for
them? The answer depends on when during the past sixty years the de-
*592 cision took place. As a result of the various social and economic
*584 changes which have occurred in the past thirty years or so, the locus
*178 *597 of authority for making decisions about marriage and adoption has under-
gone a basic change.

*562 Forty years ago both the kind of marriage a young person made and
882 the particular person he married were chosen by his parents. Except
178 [584] in the occasional family in which the young women were needed to work
in the fields, unmarried women were not allowed out of the house except
in the company of their mothers or grandmothers, and even then they did
not often venture out of the seclusion of the family home. To do so
would be something less than proper. One old woman gave us the follow-
ing account of a young woman's life in Hsiachichou around the turn of the
century.

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> "Before women didn't go out of the house unless something really happened. One of our relatives who used to live here had a daughter and everyone knew they had a daughter, but no one had seen her. When there was that big flood and everyone was running for their lives, her older brother wrapped her in a blanket and carried her out. Even then they wouldn't let anyone see her. At that time buying and everything was done by the men. It wasn't like now when the women are the ones who take care of guests and do the marketing. The men who worked for the family were not allowed to go anywhere in the house. When they came back from work they had to go to their own rooms and stay there. If it was a big family there would be a separate room for them to eat in and to wash in. If they wanted water from the kitchen to take a bath in then it would be the men of the family who would come and get it for them. They couldn't come into kitchen. The women only did the housework and cooked. When it was about time to eat they would get all the food on the table and then go stay in the bedroom until all the men had finished eating. It wasn't very easy to even see a woman then. The only women you could see were old ladies."

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There was clearly little opportunity for romantic attachments to form, and even on those rare occasions when they did there was little chance for the young people to marry unless their preference happened to be their parents' preference as well. The authority of the parents over their sons and daughters was as nearly absolute when they were twenty as when they were two or three. The terms of filial piety provided a moral justification for unquestioned parental authority, and the importance of land in the economy gave parents the power to enforce this authority. There could be no prodigal sons because there was no place for the disaffected son to go. To earn a living one had to have access to land, and it was only through inheritance that such access could be achieved. It was the happy position of the parents of this time to have both morality and the economy on their side, and it was the unhappy fate of the young to be nothing more than sons and daughters, *584 In the case of the normal patrilocal marriage, the usual way to ● 178 arrange a marriage was for the parents of a boy of marriageable age to enlist the services of a go-between. The go-between would make enquiries of relatives and friends until she found a girl whom the family might consider suitable. If, through indirect enquiries, she felt there was a chance of approval on the part of the girl's parents, she would propose the match to the parents of the boy. If both sets of parents showed sufficient interest, a long period of negotiation would commence to settle the content of the dowry, the amount of the bride price, and the number of cakes to be distributed. When, after much debate, these questions were settled, usually to the complete dissatisfaction of both families, a date would be set for the engagement. Even after the engagement the boy and girl were not allowed to meet, and in many cases had no idea at all of whom they were marrying. One old man told us jokingly that after he was engaged he went with a group of his friends to a festival at the temple to try and discover which of the women who came was his future wife. As he put it, "I didn't know whether she was going to be a bear or a tiger." One might say that the bride and groom did not become parties to the marriage until they were actually man and wife.

*597 The parents played an equally important role in decisions concern- 178 ing adoption. If within a few years after marriage a young woman did not bear a child it was usually her mother-in-law who would initiate the procedure for adopting a child, and if for some reason it was necessary for the family to consider giving a child away in adoption

*587 178 it was usually the head of the family and his wife who made the final decision. We could cite numerous instances in which young women were provided with adopted children they did not want, and still more instances in which young mothers were forced to give in adoption children whom they would have kept.

*584 178 The years between 1920 and 1940 brought about some changes in the marriage customs of the village. The gradual breaking down of the traditional values gave young men and women the opportunity to meet, and the romantic attachments occasionally formed sometimes influenced parental decisions. What is perhaps more important, the growing opportunity for wage work made young men more independent of their fathers. As a result, many parents conceded to their sons the theoretical right to approve or disapprove a proposed match. It became the custom for the go-between to arrange a tea at which the parties to the marriage, including the principals now, were brought together for a social meeting. In some cases a young man might make strong objections and overrule parental plans, but for the most part the young people were so embarrassed by the situation that they left the choice up to their parents. When a woman who had been married in 1933 told us that her marriage had been arranged by her parents, we asked if she met her husband before the ceremonies. She answered, "Oh yes, but we were so embarrassed that we didn't even look at each other, and left it all up to our parents." Another woman told us that when she was trying to arrange a marriage for her son he refused to go with her to meet the girl and her family. "He said the girl's family would all be waiting

*584 • 178 to look him over as though he were a pig up for sale. He told me, 'I don't care if she is blind or without legs. If she is willing, that's fine; if she isn't willing, that's fine too. But, I won't go to look at her.'"

*584 Of the 55 marriages in Hsiachichou made by couples now over forty years of age, 51 (93 percent) were arranged by their parents. It is interesting to note that at least three of the four exceptions resulted from the untimely death of parents, and that the young people in question sent a go-between to negotiate the terms of the marriage as though it were being arranged in the conventional manner. It would seem that one of the elements which made the young people submit to an arranged marriage was the fact that any other kind of marriage had so little prestige in the village. But while most of the marriages were in fact arranged by their parents, it is not true that most of the young people were satisfied with this state of affairs. They submitted to their parents will because that was the way things were done and because there were really no alternatives open to them. When we asked some of the older people in the village if they thought that their lives would have been happier had they been free to choose their own spouse, the majority agreed that they would have been much better off if they had had this freedom. The only positive thing said about the arranged marriage was the remark made by one woman, "If you arrange your own marriage you can't say anything when things go wrong, but if you let your parents arrange it you can at least go home from time to time and scold them for getting you such a bad husband."

593 584 198 It was inevitable that once the younger people gained some authority in the family they would revolt against their parents in the matter of marriage. As we have already seen, this process began in the early 1920 but it was not until the 1930 that the younger generation began to assert their independence in any degree. By this time the majority of the families in the village were dependent to some extent on a wage income, and since it was easier for a younger person to get a job, their voices were heard more and more often in family affairs. Even those families who were still primarily farm families could not answer the challenge of a son who threatened to leave the kê and support himself if the parents did not consent to his choice of a marriage partner. The high value which the older generation placed upon genealogical continuity and the realistic fear which they felt in facing old age without children began to work against them. The loss of an adult son was an irreparable loss, and parents were reluctant to risk it by opposing their children in the matter of marriage.

198 882 Perhaps of as much influence on the changing marriage patterns is the very fact that the freedom the young people gain by their wage work also gives them new opportunities to meet members of the opposite sex. Young men and women work together in the same factories, travel back and forth together on trains to their jobs without the company of their parents, and have some opportunity to meet together in private. There is, however, still nothing like the Western notion of freedom of contact between the sexes. A young woman seen talking to a strange man in public will be very much gossiped about, and only a few years ago

* 178 882 the local hooligans took it upon themselves to severely beat a man seen walking hand in hand with a village girl. Despite such reservations, however, there is now a good deal more contact between unmarried people than ever before. It is not uncommon and causes very little comment in the village to see groups of four or five young men and women walking together toward the local market town. Some of the young people from the village have even organized their own dancing parties without completely destroying their good names.

*584 *593 178 In some cases parents still make the primary decisions regarding marriage, and in many more cases their opposition to a proposed match is enough to prevent it. This is particularly true in the case of girls who do not, after all, have the position in the family that a son does, and remain under much more effective parental control. For the most part, however, the marriages that have taken place since 1940 have involved the principals in a much more active role. Of the 51 marriages that have taken place in this period, 24 (47 percent) have been completely arranged by the young people, and the great majority of those that have not been completely the couple's doing have taken place only after their approval was given. In some cases, particularly with the young men, the parental choice resulted from their own abrogation of their new "rights". In the case of the girls, the exceptions belong primarily to a particular type of marriage in which the parents are forced by the circumstances of their situation to retain their authority and use every technique in their power to arrange the 128 178 *584 marriage they consider best. We will discuss these exceptions in more

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• 178 detail when in later chapters we turn to the effect of these changes
128 upon the marriage patterns.

+592 To summarize, then, we may say that at the time at which most of
+584 the decisions which interest us here are made the kê includes at
+599 least two adult generations. In the case of marriage they are the
178 parents and their adult children, and in the case of adoption they are the foster parents and the foster grandparents. When we ask which of these people made the decision we must specify the period of time at which the decision was made. By and large, the decisions about marriage and adoptions that were made before 1930 were made by the senior generations, while after 1930 these decisions were made by the younger people in the family. We shall see later that this change has had an important effect upon the kinds of decisions which are made and upon the kinds of considerations which enter into these decisions.

769 775 The ancestors are not considered gods, or, as one villagers expressed it, "If they are gods, they are just little gods." Although they are thought of as having somewhat more influence over the course of events than the living, they are, like the elderly head of a *kê*, dependent upon the younger, stronger members of their family. Without descendants to make offerings of food and spirit money the ancestors are no better off than a man who has no sons to care for him in his old age. They are doomed to an existence as "hungry ghosts" who are vividly imagined as congregating outside temples where they beg for a living like destitute humans. A few villagers assured us that the ancestors "don't really eat those things," and that the offerings are more "to show them that we remember them and respect them." But 769 [778] while such a conception of ancestral sacrifice has been common among the elite of China since Confucius, it is not the general conception [776] of the majority of the population of Hsiachichou. Sacrifices made to a god are thought of as "gifts," or gestures of respect, but the sacrifices to the ancestors are generally considered a form of sustenance. The difference is nicely illustrated in the form of the two types of sacrifices. The sacrifices presented to a god never include rice or spices, only cooked but unchopped slabs of pork or a whole chicken or duck, but offerings to the ancestors are always presented in the form of a meal, the meat in various sauces, rice and rice bowls on the table, chopsticks, relishes, everything the same as it might be served to guests. Just how literally some of the villagers think of the offerings as meals is evident in the pains to which they

CHAPTER 7

DECISIONS BY GRANDPARENTS

*597 When a child is born in Hsiachichou his natal family has the choice
128 of raising him as a member of the household, or giving him in one or
[851] another of the various forms of adoption. How often do people in
Hsiachichou choose to give away their children? How often do they
relinquish their male children, and how often do they part with their
female children? When they choose to give away a male child, do they
usually give him in adoption to an agnate or sell him to a stranger
or a dealer? Are female children usually married out of the family
as "little daughters-in-law," or are they more commonly sold to fami-
lies which want a daughter? Are some children more likely to be given
out in adoption than others? If so, what are some of the considerations
*597 which increase a child's chance of adoption? As a result of changes
128 which have taken place in Hsiachichou during the course of the past
• 178 several decades, the answers to these questions depend in large part
on whether we are looking at decisions made early in the century or
those made more recently. We will therefore begin by considering those
decisions made in the years before 1930, and will leave until the
following chapter those decisions made after 1930.

178 Before 1930 the village of Hsiachichou was a poor if not an im-
511 poverished community. Although most of the villagers earned their
463 living as farmers, no family owned more than one acre of land, and most

178 less than half an acre. Many were tenant farmers who owned no land at
511 all, cultivating the fields of wealthy landlords in return for some
463 [427] percentage of the annual yield of the land. Until the relocation of the
Taipei Hsinchu railroad in 1923, a few landless families made a living
transporting local goods down the Tamsui River to markets in Wanhua,
[464] Hsinchuang, and Taipei. The only opportunities for industrial employ-
[346] ment were in the coal mines of Tucheng and Hsinchuang, and the work
178 there was often sporadic and always poorly paid. The generally low
511 standard of living in Hsiachichou was reflected in the construction of
342 333 village homes. Although kiln brick and tile had been inexpensively
produced in the Taipei region for at least a hundred years, there was
no one in Hsiachichou who could afford to build a brick house or to
roof his house with tile. Houses were built instead of wattled mud and
roofed with thatch. It was not until the early 1920's that the first
brick and tile house was constructed in Hsiachichou, and the use of
these materials did not become common until the end of the next decade.
Of the 47 houses in Hsiachichou in 1935 only 15 boasted a tile roof, and
of these only 4 had more than one brick wall. As the older villagers
so often put it in describing their former condition, "We were the kind
of people who had to sell our rice and eat sweet potatoes."

*599 Living so close to poverty and yet aware of the luxuries enjoyed
511 by their landlords and the wealthier merchants, many families in
435 Hsiachichou must have been tempted to sell one of their male children
as a biĕng-liĕng-kià:. There was always a ready market for male children
on Taiwan, and the price they commanded was for most village families

*597 nothing less than a small fortune. A go-between acting for some local
* 511 party could usually get as much as a year's income for a male child, and
435 dealers who bought male children on Taiwan for resale in Amoy would some-
*597 times offer even more. The returns from the sale of a male child would
511 at the very least enable a family to replace a thatch roof with tile,
454 and it might even finance the purchase of a small plot of land or pro-
vide the capital for a small business undertaking. Since a family's
regular income went almost entirely for food and other daily essentials,
it was only by such means that a family might obtain the capital for
● 178 any major investment. We must also remember that it was not the parents
*593 of the child who decided his fate. Most children are born during that
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608 phase of the family cycle at which their grandparents are still alive
and active, and in the years before 1930 this senior generation had
complete and final authority over all decisions concerning marriage
and adoption. Although one can understand that a parent with only
one male child would be reluctant to sell him for any price, one can
imagine that a grandparent with several grandchildren might find it
somewhat easier to part with one of his sons' male children.

*597 While there were good reasons for a family to sell one of its male
*562 children, there were even more important considerations weighing against
842 such a decision. As we have seen in the last chapter, male children
181 are the focal concern of the Hokkien family. It is by means of his
male descendants that a man fulfills his most important responsibilities
as son and grandson, and it is with reference to his male offspring
that a person calculates the achievement of his own lifetime. If a

597 593 It is interesting to note that Ong Chun-a's husband was the second of two sons, and that the older brother had several male children who were not sold. Ong Chun-a's husband's parents could afford to sell their second son's male children because they had other grandchildren to carry on their family line. If Ong Chun-a and her husband had been in a position of authority in the family, they probably would not have sold all four of their sons. When asked how she felt about selling her four children, Ong Chun-a answered, [172] "In those days we did what our parents told us." We do not know for certain who made the decisions in the other four families who sold male offspring, but the position of the children in the family indicates that it was probably their grandparents. Three of the four were the children of later born sons, and in all three of these cases the father's older brother had male children at the time the sale took place.

597 602 It was thus only the very poor who ever sold any of their male children, and they only did so after the continuity of the family line was assured. What then of the kùe-páng-kià: form of adoption? How frequently did families give male children in adoption to an agnate? The question is an interesting one because the considerations which enter into the decision are entirely different. The kùe-páng-kià: form of adoption does not require the adopting parents to compensate the child's parents, and so there is no question of material gain in giving a child to an agnate. The family which relinquishes one of their male children to an agnate does so because they feel obliged to help their kinsmen, or because they hope that by helping their kinsmen they will create obligations which will later be of use to them. The decision thus

597 602 involves weighing the relative importance of lineal and collateral kinship ties. The family which gives a child to an agnate naturally strengthens their ties with the adopting family, but they do so by sacrificing a potential tie with the descending generations of their own line. The question which a family must put to itself is this: Are strengthened ties with one's agnates worth the price of an heir and descendant? The answer is no. The frequency of such adoptions in Hsiachichou indicates a clear preference for lineal ties as the more [178] dependable and more significant. Although every family living in Hsiachichou has had agnatic kinsmen who did not produce sons in one generation or another, we find that not one of the 110 males born into the village before 1930 was given out as a kùe-páng-kià:. The only two such adoptions of which we have any record occurred after 1930, and neither of these are really exceptions to the preference for lineal ties. In both instances a child's grandparents decided to give a childless son one of his brother's male children. These two adoptions were thus made from lineal rather than from a collateral perspective, and did not involve a sacrifice of lineal ties for the sake of collateral ties.

562 842 In speaking of a male infant a village mother will sometimes refer to the child as her pô͘-pǔe, her "treasure." The term is never used with reference to female infants, nor is there any female counterpart of the term. The term which one hears repeatedly with reference to female children is the term liâu-cī-hǔe, "something to lose money on." Male children are "treasures" because it is through its male offspring

*583 hand-drawn carts, the contents laid out on sheets of red paper for all
554 to see. The children of the bride's family often spend an entire morning
pinning ten dollar bills onto the sheets of red paper to make the usual
gift of a thousand dollars cash as impressive as possible. Such a
colorful procession naturally collects crowds of curious housewives all
along its route, and their shrewd estimates often serve to fix the
family's social standing for years to come. As a result, few families
attempt to economize on a dowry, if not for their daughter's sake, then
at least for their own sake.

*593 We might therefore say that while male children are valued as heirs
*562 and descendants, female children are regarded as something on which one
842 stands to lose either money or face. Parents and grandparents may be
as personally fond of their female children as they are of their male
children, but it is simply not sensible for them to raise a number of
*593 their own daughters. If a family is going to raise any female children
*597 at all, it is better for them to adopt sīm-pûa than to raise their own
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*[584] daughters. A sīm-pûa can marry a son of the family and bear children
who will belong to the family, while a daughter is forbidden by the
incest taboo from ever playing such a role. She can only remain a
member of her natal family by making a matrilocal marriage, and such
[178] marriages are pointless if a family has sons of their own. A wealthy
[556] family can, of course, choose to raise both their sons and daughters,
but in the years before 1930 people in Hsiachichou were too poor for
such luxuries. The cost of raising a daughter might make it difficult
for a family to provide for their male children, and it would be

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*593 impossible for the family which wanted to adopt girls as wives for
*562 their sons. Thus, we find in Hsiachichou in the years before 1930 a
*597 rate of adoption for female children that is much higher than the rate
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● 178 of male adoption. Whereas only 8 (7 percent) of the 110 males born in the village before 1930 were given in adoption, more than half of the females born in this period were sent out in adoption. Of a total 103 girls born into the village before 1930 we find that 67 (65 percent) were given in adoption. As striking as this figure may seem, the rate of adoption was apparently even higher in Hsiachichou in the past. Of 45 girls who were born before 1910 a total of 32 (71 percent) were given out in adoption.[1]

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*593 According to our informants in Hsiachichou, landlord families living in the market towns almost never gave their female children
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566 away in adoption. They were wealthy enough that the expense of raising a girl was not a matter of concern, and so were able to spare their
[583] female children the often unhappy fate of the adopted daughter. Some parents who were particularly fond of a daughter even went so far as to arrange a matrilocal marriage as a means of keeping her in the family. By contrast with these exceptionally well to do families, there have always been some poor families living in the area who have had to sell all of their daughters. These were the really impoverished who could not afford to raise their sons let alone their daughters. The contrast is one to which a friend living in Hsulin often referred to illustrate

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[1] These figures and those which follow exclude the female children of a number of women who were prostitutes. Since the circumstances are so different from the case of the normal family, we will analyze these decisions separately.

*597 *592 178 [511] In the first place, as we have already suggested earlier, most families living in Hsiachichou at this time were so poor that they could not afford to be unconcerned about the costs of raising a female child, for this expense might make it difficult for them to realize other and more important goals. A family had to think first of providing for their heirs and descendants, their sons and grandsons, and this often meant adopting girls to raise as their wives, a role which a family's own daughters could not fulfill. Except in the case in which a family did not have male children, it was a luxury for them to raise a daughter "for someone else," and most families could not afford luxuries. Secondly, there was the fact that those persons who would naturally feel most strongly about the welfare of the children, their parents, were not in a position of authority with regard to decisions concerning adoption. In the years before 1930 the authority for making such decisions rested with the head of the family, and in the course of the typical family cycle the head of a child's family was usually her grandparents rather than her own parents. While they were undoubtedly not entirely unconcerned about the welfare of their female grandchildren, most grandparents were probably not as concerned as the child's own parents. More importantly perhaps, their age and experience, as well as their position of responsibility, gave the grandparents a different perspective. The parents of a child were likely to look at the decision concerning her adoption in terms of the child's welfare and their personal concern; the grandparents were likely to look at the decision from the point of view of the family's

*597 ultimategoals and overall responsibilities. The result was that most
*592 female children were given out in adoption despite the fact that this
178 comitted them to an unhappy life. Whatever fears a child's parents may have had about her fate as an adopted daughter could not save her because they were not the decision makers, and even if they had been it is doubtful that they could have done other than give the child away. Most families were so constrained by their limited means and their goals that there was little room for concern about the child's personal welfare.

*597 In the years since 1930 this situation has changed considerably.
511 For one thing, the poverty which forced many families to give away
178 their female children as a means of conserving their resources has been
[427] greatly alleviated. Most of the villagers of forty and fifty years
[463] ago earned a living as tenant farmers, but the post-war population of the village has included a number of skilled workers, several families with fairly large land holdings, several school teachers and petty officials, and a dozen or more families who own small and fairly prosperous businesses. Even those who still earn a living on small land holdings and as laborers are now earning more and living somewhat more comfortably than did their fathers and grandfathers. The general improvement in conditions in Hsiachichou is apparent in an improved diet, the widespread use of bicycles and radios, and most
[342] strikingly in the construction of village houses. The thatch roofs
[333] and wattled walls of the early decades of the century have been almost entirely replaced by tile and kiln brick. Of 49 houses in Hsiachichou

*597 511 • 178 [842] [335] in 1960 only 8 had one or more mud walls, and none of the 49 were roofed with thatch. The average family is still not so well-to-do that they can afford to raise many daughters, and a daughter is still generally regarded as "something to lose money on." The difference is that now many families can afford the luxury of losing money on one or two of their daughters without sacrificing other values.

*597 592 *593 178 An equally important change has also taken place in the authority structure of the *kê*. Although the senior generations of the family still usually occupy the position of *kā-tìu:*, they have lost much of their authority over decisions concerning adoption. These decisions are now most often made by the child's own parents. As in the case of marriage, the senior members of the family still exert a considerable influence, and in a few cases the younger members of the family may leave a decision up to their parents. But while the grandparents are thus often able to negotiate the decisions they prefer, they are no longer able to dictate the disposition of their grandchildren. A woman who is now in her forties told us that when she was married her mother-in-law told her that she could only keep one of her daughters, and that she would have to give the rest in adoption. This could not happen today. A persuasive mother-in-law with firm control of her son might succeed in getting a daughter-in-law to give away several of her female children, but a strong willed daughter-in-law could probably manage to keep all of them if she so desired. As one of the older men complained to us, "Young people now won't listen to their parents. They do what they want to do. You can't tell them to do this or that.

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They'll do it if they want to, but if they don't want to they won't."

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The inevitable result has been a sharp decline in the rate of female adoption. As we have seen in the last chapter, a total of 67 (65 percent) of those 103 girls born in Hsiachichou before 1930 were given away in adoption. By comparison, we find that only 43 (26 percent) of 163 girls born after 1930 were given out in adoption, a drop in the overall rate of adoption of nearly forty percent. By way of qualification, it is important to note that this decline was not entirely due to more favorable economic conditions and changes in family structure. For reasons which we will discuss later, the decline in the number of adoptions has been accompanied by a lessening demand for adopted daughters. As a result, there have been some families who would have liked to give away a daughter but who have not been able to find anyone interested in adopting a child. We knew of at least two women in Hsiachichou in 1960 who said that they wanted to give away one of their daughters if they could find someone who wanted them, and there were probably others who would have happily relinquished a daughter had they been presented with the opportunity. Just how many more girls would have been given away during the last thirty years had it not been for the decrease in demand is difficult to say, but it is our impression that it would not have been more than five or ten percent. While we heard of several families who would have given away a daughter if they could have found a family to adopt her, we know of many cases of families who were asked for one of their daughters and refused.

*597 The past thirty years in Hisachichou have thus seen a sharp
*562 decline in the rate of female adoption. Partially this is due to
*592 a decreased demand for adopted daughters, but primarily it is a result
858 of changes in the economy and the structure of the *kê*. But is this
• 178 the limit of the effect of these changes upon decisions concerning
182 female adoption? We have seen in the last chapter that in the pre-1930 period the likelihood of a female child's being given in adoption was a function of her utility to her natal family. Those girls born into families who might need them to bring a son-in-law into the family or for their labor were retained, and those born into families with sons of their own and adequate domestic labor were given out in adoption. Do these same considerations enter into decisions about adoptions in the years after 1930? The question is an interesting one because of the very fact that the authority for these decisions has shifted from the older to the younger generations of the family. In asking whether or not the same considerations are relevant in the two cases we are asking whether or not the younger and the older generations of the family share the same values with regard to the nature and purpose of the family.

Despite the generally impoverished conditions of most families in Hsiachichou prior to 1930, very few families ever chose to give away in adoption a girl who was born before they had any other children. With no sons as yet the family had to face the possibility that they might not have male heirs, and so they chose to keep their daughter as a possible means of bringing a son-in-law into the family. Of 18

*597 girls born into childless families only 4 (22 percent) were given out
*562 in adoption, and in at least 3 of these 4 cases the family was so
*592 poor as to be unable to afford such insurance. This same tendency is
858 also found in the case of those decisions made after 1930. Of 35
• 178 female children born into childless families during this later period
182 only 2 (6 percent) were given out in adoption, and in one of these cases the child's parents did not have any choice in the matter. Adopted by a village family as a sīm-pûa, the child's mother objected to marrying her foster brother, and was then allowed to marry out of her foster family on the condition that she give them her first born child in adoption.

In the years before 1930 the rate of adoption among those girls born into families with male but no female children was also relatively low, although somewhat higher than among those girls born into childless families. While not needed as a potential means of bringing a son-in-law into the family, girls born into families with no other daughters were valued for their labor, and hence were not commonly given out in adoption. Of 13 girls born into families with at least one son but no daughter only 4 (31 percent) were given away, and in several of these cases the child would probably have not been given away if it had not been that her grandparents already had other granddaughters. Again we find the same tendency for those decisions made after 1930. Of 17 girls born into families with sons but no daughters only 3 (18 percent) were given away, a rate of adoption which is higher than that found among girls born into childless families but still somewhat

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lower than the overall rate for girls born after 1930. It is interesting to note that in two of those three cases in which a family reclaimed a daughter given away in adoption the girl was an only daughter of a family with several male children. These families apparently did value their only daughter to some extent even though they had given her away in adoption, and when offered the opportunity they were not too reluctant to take the child back.

The highest rate of adoption in the pre-1930 period was among those girls born into families with female children or both male and female children. These families already had all the female labor they could afford as well as the means of perpetuating their lines, and so they gave away their later born daughters to save the expense of raising them. Of the 47 girls born into such families 37 (81 percent) were given out in adoption, a rate substantially higher than that for girls born into families without female children. The same is true of those decisions made after 1930. Although the absolute rate of adoption among girls born into families with female children or both male and female children is much lower than in the pre-1930 period, it is much higher than among those girls born into families with no female children in the post-1930 period. Whereas only 5 (10 percent) of those 52 girls born into families without female children were given out in adoption, a total of 32 (31 percent) of those 103 girls born into families with female children were given in adoption.

We thus find much the same pattern of adoption in the years since 1930 as in the years prior to 1930, a correspondence which suggests

*597 that all of these decisions were made in much the same terms. It
*592 would therefore seem that there is a close agreement among the
*562 generations of the family with regard to certain values concerning the
858 goals of the family. Having more resources available to them and being
• 178 more concerned about the personal welfare of their children, parents
182 gave away fewer of their female offspring than did the grandparents when they held primary responsibility for these decisions. When circumstances did force the parents to give away one of their children, however, they generally made their decisions as to which child in much the same terms as had the grandparents. They gave away those girls who had little value as labor or as a potential means of bringing a son-in-law into the family, and they retained those girls who could be useful as domestic labor and who might be needed as a means of insuring continuity in the family line. Although we shall see later that the shift in authority from the older to the younger generations of the family has affected some decisions about marriage and adoption, it apparently did not alter the kinds of considerations which go into a decision about female adoption.

Another comparison between the adoption patterns of the two periods adds further weight to this argument. In the years before 1930 families almost always gave away girls born after a female but before a male as well as those girls born after the family had both a son and a daughter. Of those 13 girls born into families with at least one daughter but no sons 11 (85 percent) were given away in adoption, and of 33 girls born into families with both sons and daughters

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26 (79 percent) were given in adoption. This is what one would expect if most families were so poor that they could not afford to raise their female children. When a family which did not have any sons as yet produced a daughter they would keep her as insurance against the possibility of not bearing sons, but they would tend to give away all of their later born girls whether or not they had borne a son in the meantime. They simply could not afford to keep two female children as insurance. If a family was not so pressed by their limited financial means, however, we might expect to find a very different attitude towards raising a second daughter when they had no sons. Until a family actually bore a male child who could act as an heir and descendant, they might very well want to keep more than one daughter as a potential means of bringing a man into the family. Just as it is considered wise to have more than one son "because you can't tell how one of them might treat you," it is also wise to have more than one daughter in case one of them rebels against the prospect of a matrilocal marriage. We might therefore expect to find a very different rate of adoption among girls born into families with daughters but no sons in the years after 1930. Living in a generally more favorable economy, most families could afford more insurance, and so we might expect them to keep all of their daughters until they actually produced a son, giving away their girls only if they were assured of continuity through a male heir. This is just what we do find. After 1930 girls born into families with a daughter but no sons were retained as members of the family nearly as often as those girls born into

599 childless families. Of 35 girls born into childless families 2 (6
*592 percent) were given away in adoption, and of 25 girls born into fami-
*562 lies with at least one daughter but no sons 3 (12 percent) were given
856 away in adoption. The only relatively high rate of adoption in these
178 later years is among those girls born into families with both male and
182 female children. Of 78 girls born into such families 29 (37 percent) were given away in adoption. While the younger generations who were in authority after 1930 were less inclined to give away their female children, they appreantly did take into account much the same kinds of considerations as had entered into the decisions of the senior generations before 1930.

The same point might be made in relation to decisions concerning male adoption. As in the years before 1930, male children are still very much in demand on Taiwan. In 1960 we recorded a case in which a [435] family living in the town of Hsulin paid NT$5000 for a male child, and we were told by informants in Hsiachichou that the more common price for a male child is somewhere between NT$6000 and NT$7000. Since this amount of money is equivalent to half a year's income for most village families, one might assume that if the basic value of male children had changed at least a few families would have sold one of their sons. The fact is, however, that now that most families are better off than they were in the earlier decades of this century, even fewer families sell a male child than in the years before 1930, and this despite the fact that most families have more sons than they did earlier. We know that 8 of the 118 boys born into the village before

*597 1930 were sold as bīeng-līeng-kià:, but we do not find a single case of
*562 the sale of a male child among those 144 boys born after 1930. The
*592 only cases of male adoption in Hsiachichou in the last thirty years
858 have been the two cases already mentioned in which a boy was trans-
• 178 ferred by his grandparents from one brother to another. Whatever other
182 changes have taken place in Hsiachichou in recent years, it is obvious
that the desire for an unbroken chain of male descendants has remained.

*597 In the last chapter we saw that the likelihood of any particular
*562 girl's being given away as an adopted daughter was not to any large
556 degree a function of the wealth of her natal family. Most families
178 in the village at that time were so poor that they could not reasonably
undertake the responsibility of raising a female child if she was not
needed, and only a few families were so poor that they could not reasonably
undertake the responsibility of raising at least one female
child if there was good reason for them to do so. The likelihood of a
girl's being given in adoption was thus a function of her value to her
natal family, and this was determined in large part by the composition
of the family into which she was born. The general poverty of the
village forced all families to seriously consider giving away their
female children, but it did not make any one family more or less likely
to give away their daughters than another family. In the language
of the experiment, wealth was a constant. But this is not the case
[833] in more recent years. As the general economy of Hsiachichou has changed
during the course of the last three or four decades, some families
have benefited from these changes more than others. In the early

*597 decades of this century every family was more or less on a par. The
*562 only important difference between families was the amount of land
556 owned, and none of them owned very much. In 1960 some families were
• 178 still farmers with less than half an acre of land or coal miners
[463] earning only a few dollars a day, but others were working as techni-
[434] cians or petty bureaucrats or had managed to establish themselves in some kind of a business. As a result, we find that in recent years wealth has become an important factor in determining whether or not a family will decide to give away a child in adoption. Some families are still forced to give away many of their female children simply in order to raise their sons, while there are other families who can afford to raise their daughters without sacrificing other goals.

*597 Since our information concerning the relative income of the var-
*562 ious families living in Hsiachichou is not so detailed as to permit
556 a direct comparison of individual families at different points in time,
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178 the extent of these changes can best be illustrated by comparing those two areas of the village known as Shangchou and Hsiachou, the former now containing more of the affluent citizens of Hsiachichou and the latter housing their less successful neighbors. The families originally living in Shangchou took advantage of the opportunities offered by the changing economy early, giving them an initial advantage over their neighbors in Hsiachou. More importantly, most of the better building sites in the village are located in Shangchou and those families who have improved their lot in recent years to the point that they could afford to build a new house have built it in Shangchou, leaving their

*597 *562 621 556 178 less fortunate neighbors as residents of the decaying Hsiachou. This imbalance of wealth between the two areas is reflected in the adoption rates. Of the 93 girls born into Hsiachou 32 (34 percent) were given out in adoption as compared with only 9 (14 percent) of the 66 girls born into Shangchou. Were our information detailed enough to permit a comparison of individual families, we would undoubtedly find that relative wealth is an even more important variable, but gross as it is, even this comparison clearly makes the point that her family's ability to raise her has become an important determinant of a girl's chance of remaining in her natal home.

*597 *562 *592 178 556 621 We must therefore take into account two sets of factors rather than one in order to calculate the likelihood of a girl's being given in adoption in the post-1930 period. We must consider the composition of the family into which she was born, and we must also take into account the relative economic status of her natal family. When both sets of factors are considered a clear pattern of adoption emerges, with girls born into some situations being much more likely to become adopted daughters than girls born under other circumstances. The daughters of wealthy families who are born before the family has either sons or daughters are almost never given in adoption, and those born into families with both male and female children are only occasionally given in adoption. Of 39 girls born in Shangchou to families of the first type only 2 (5 percent) were given in adoption, and of 24 girls born into Shangchou families of the second type only 5 (21 percent) were given in adoption. The composition of the family into which a girl

*599 *592 *562 • 178 556 621 is born is thus not an important variable among wealthy families, most of the families in Shangchou deciding to keep their female offspring regardless of the number and sex of their other children. In the case of the poorer village families living in Hsiachou, on the other hand, the composition of the family into which a girl is born does make a difference, the rate of adoption for girls born into some types of families being almost as high as in the years before 1930. We find that girls who are born into families which have both sons and daughters are much more likely to be given out in adoption than those born into childless families or families which have only sons or only daughters. Whereas only 6 (15 percent) of the 39 girls born into Hsiachou families who did not as yet have either male or female children were given in adoption, we find that 26 (48 percent) of those 54 girls born into families with both sons and daughters were given in adoption.

*599 *562 *592 182 We are now in a position to answer some of the questions raised at the beginning of our last chapter. Whether or not a family living in Hsiachichou decides to give away one of their children depends primarily upon the child's value in terms of the family's economic and social needs. Males are less likely to be given away than females because of their importance as heirs and descendants, and girls born into childless families are less likely to be given away than those born into families with sons because of their potential utility to the family. The composition of the family is thus probably the most important single factor influencing decisions about adoption, *583 As the villagers themselves often say, "It is better to look at."

Other things being equal, then, every family would choose the
preferred form of marriage. Unfortunately for the people of Hsiachichou
other things are seldom equal. There are considerations other than
propriety and prestige which a family must take into account in choos-
*583 ing between the two forms of marriage. As we shall see in the next
*584 chapter, the advantages of the *sīm-pûà* marriage relevant to these other
• 178 considerations have been largely lost in the last three decades, but
before 1930 these advantages were such that decisions in favor of the
sīm-pûà marriage were almost as common as those in favor of the pre-
ferred form of marriage. Of 98 men who were born in Hsiachichou prior
to 1930 at least 41 (42 percent) were paired with *sīm-pûà*, and it is
likely that the number of decisions for this form of marriage were even
[128] higher than these figures indicate. There were undoubtedly a number
of such adoptions that we did not learn of because the girl died in
infancy, and there were possibly other cases in which the child's
parents demanded her return because of ill treatment -- a contingency
that would make the boy's family reluctant to mention the fact of the
adoption. We would probably be closer to the mark to say that half
of those decisions made before 1930 were in favor of the *sīm-pûà*
marriage.

*583 When asked why they adopted a *sīm-pûà* for a son, villagers usually
*584 begin by mentioning economic considerations. "We were so poor that
435 there was nothing else we could do," or "We had so many children that
we couldn't afford marriages for all of them." The expenses of the

*583 informant pointed out that "this makes it better because she won't
*593 always be talking to her husband about his parents." The following
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183 statement by an elderly village woman is typical of statements by
606 other villagers.

> "It is always better for a boy to marry an adopted daughter than to marry a girl from another family. This is because you can get to know an adopted daughter's disposition better and can correct her without causing a lot of trouble. A girl from another family will always get mad when you try to correct her, and then she will say things to her husband and make trouble with his parents."

*583 The choice between the *sīm-pûà* marriage and the preferred marriage
*597 would thus seem to involve at least three major considerations.
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556 Weighing in favor of the preferred marriage is the fact that it is the
182 socially correct way of marrying and the most prestigious form of
183 marriage. It is the form of marriage which everyone in Hsiachichou
would choose if form were the only consideration. Favoring the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage is the fact that it is the cheaper way of obtaining a wife for a son, and also the recognition that it creates a
[606] structure which is more compatible with the goals of the family. By adopting a girl and raising her as a wife for their son a family replaces a tense and dangerous relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law with the more satisfactory mother-daughter
• [178] relationship. Generally speaking, wealthy families of the pre-1930 period chose the preferred marriage more often than the *sīm-pûà* marriage because they were more concerned with status and could afford the expense of such a marriage. Poorer families, on the other hand, more often chose the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage as a way to avoid the

CHAPTER 10

MARRIAGE AND INCEST

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In the early decades of this century decisions about marriage and adoption in Hsiachichou were the perogative of the senior generations of the family. When they decided to adopt a sīm-pûà and raise her as a wife for a son this decision committed the boy to a particular kind of marriage. He had little more to say about marrying the girl when he reached the appropriate age than he had had to say about her adoption when he was a child. Only the parents could reverse their original decision and that they would change their minds was very unlikely. The investment was too great. To arrange a preferred marriage with its tremendous expense after having already spent the money to raise a sīm-pûà would be to invite disaster for some families and a painful economic waste for all families. As a result, the great majority of sīm-pûà adoptions made in the early part of the century led to marriages. Of the 22 sim-pua adoptions which took place before 1910 all but 6 culminated in a marriage, and in 4 of these 6 cases the failure of the arrangement was due to the death of either the sīm-pûà or her foster brother. The two exceptions involved one case in which the boy's mother "decided that she didn't like the girl and sent her back to her natal family," and one unusual case in which the son was able to dissuade his parents from their original plans.

178 As we have already seen, the years between 1930 and 1960 were
*589 years of change in Hsiachichou. The completion of the rerouted
*593 Taipei-Hsinchu railroad and construction of factories in the nearby
[496] market town created new wage earning opportunities, and the rapidly
[464] expanding population of Hsiachichou put pressure on the village to take
[161] advantage of these opportunities. Agriculture became a less important
[933] element in the economy of the community, and as agriculture declined
in importance so did the traditional authority of the senior generations.
[464] A young man formerly dependent upon his parent's land for a livelihood now had the option of seeking an independent income as a wage worker. Backed by the potential of economic independence, the younger generations began to challenge their parents' perogatives with regard to marriage and adoption. The traditional system of arranged marriages gave way in the 1920's to a system in which the younger members of the family were granted a nominal voice in marriage negotiations, and by the late 1930's the unmarried and recently married members of the kê had secured control of their fates and those of their children. Although arranged marriages were still common in Hsiachichou even in the post-war period, they were arranged only with the consent of the young people. In 1960 we found that most of the parents in the village felt that they were no longer able to exert any real control over decisions concerning marriage and adoption. As one of our elderly informants complained, "The young people now have to do everything their own way. They don't care at all what their parents want them to do."

*584 *593 *597 desirability of the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage, at least not when it is a question of their own marriage.

*584 *593 *121 • 178 [171] In view of the findings of studies of juvenile behavior in the United States, one is tempted to interpret this rejection of the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage as one symptom of a more general rejection of parental authority. From this perspective one might argue that there was nothing undesirable about such marriages other than the fact that they represented an extreme case of the imposition of parental will. But while such a general motivation may account for a part of the younger people's resistance, it is not an adequate explanation of their complete rejection of this form of marriage. If the revolt against the *sīm-pûà* marriage were just one aspect of a more general revolt against parental authority, we should expect to find a general resistance to all forms of arranged marriages, but such information as we have seems to indicate that this is not the case. At least 9 of the 15 men who refused to marry their *sīm-pûà* did allow their parents to choose a bride and make all of the arrangements to marry them in the preferred way, and in only 2 or possibly 3 of the cases did the young man insist upon marrying a particular girl against his parents' will. It would therefore seem that what the young were resisting was the specific form of marriage rather than simply the imposition of parental authority.

*584 178 177 Another possible explanation of the rejection of the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage is that it is the result of what most foreigners are pleased to call "modernization." Since this form of marriage is

#584 178 177 regarded by foreigners as one of the more unusual Taiwanese customs, it might easily become identified for the younger generation as symbolic of the traditional society. Young people might therefore be particularly reluctant to make such marriages because of their association with the "old" as contrasted with the "new". Such a line of argument undoubtedly contains a certain amount of truth. As Japanese and Western influence became strong on Taiwan and the younger generation was attracted by what was identified for them as "modern" and "new," the *sīm-pûà* marriage did tend to be tagged as "traditional" and "the old way of doing things." Again, however, this cannot be the whole picture, for resistance to the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage is not a new phenomenon. There is evidence which seems to indicate that even before foreign influences had any appreciable effect on Taiwan the *sīm-pûà* marriage was generally regarded as an unhappy fate by #584 those who had to make such a marriage. While many of our older informants in the village would argue that the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage was a good thing, this was always from the point of view of their status as parents or grandparents. When asked if they themselves had been happy to make such a marriage they were generally as opposed [585] to the idea as their children. It is also relevant here to note the use of the term *sàng-cùe-tûi* to refer to the brief New Year's ceremony which unites a man and his foster sister as husband and wife. The term is best translated simply "pushing them together," and is usually explained with a rough pushing movement of both hands. Since the phrase is traditional as well as common usage, it would seem to

*583 *597 men born after 1910 would thus seem to lend weight to our argument that it is the condition of early association which is responsible for the general aversion to this form of marriage. If the rejection of the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage were simply a revolt against a symbol of parental authority and the traditional way of life, these two couples would have been just as likely to reject this form of marriage as those who grew up in the same household.

*584 *597 •178 *[593] The refusal of so many poung people to acquiesce in their parents' plans for a *sīm-pûà* marriage naturally had the effect of making parents reconsider the advantages of *sīm-pûà* adoptions. If the couple refused to marry after the parents had gone to the expense of raising the girl, the family then stood to suffer a double loss. They would have wasted the money invested in raising the girl, and they would also have to bear the expense of marrying her out of the family. The advantages of the *sīm-pûà* form of marriage were thus overshadowed by the risks, and as a result we find a sharp decline in the rate of *sīm-pûà* adoptions after 1930. As compared with a rate of 41 (42 percent) adoptions for 98 boys in the years before 1930, we find only 5 (15 percent) adoptions among a total of 34 boys born in the years 1930-1940. If one or two of the adoptions made during these ten years had matured into a marriage, a few parents would probably have been encouraged to make adoptions in later years. The advantages of the *sīm-pûà* marriage are perhaps worth a certain risk. But when none of the 5 adoptions made in the years between 1930-1940 culminated in a marriage, the inevitable result was a further decline in the rate of adoption after 1940. We

*584 find only 3 (2 percent) adoptions for a total of 142 boys born in the
*597 years between 1940 and 1960, and it would appear that the sīm-pûà
• 178 marriage will soon be an institution of the past in the village of
*[592] Hsiachichou. In order to restore it one would have to reinstitute complete parental authority in the kê. It was a system which had many advantages for the senior generations of the family, but it was an arrangement into which the younger generations entered only under compulsion.

*583 We began this analysis of the sīm-pûà marriage in Hsiachichou by
*589 noting that most villagers take the view that children exist for the
*593 sake of their parents and the family rather than the family and the
858 parents for the sake of the children. We are now in a position to offer some evidence for this statement. We have seen that the sīm-pûà form of marriage has several very real advantages for the senior generations of the family, and we have also seen that it is at best an unhappy fate for those who are forced to make such a marriage. Since we can safely assume that those parents who have made sīm-pûà marriages themselves are vividly aware of its difficulties, it is significant to note that they are no less likely to adopt sīm-pûà for their sons than are parents who did not make such a marriage. Sīm-pûà marriages were planned for 12 (27 percent) of the 45 boys born to parents who had themselves made such a marriage, and for 40 (19 percent) of 208 boys born to parents who had married either matrilocally or in the preferred way. While it would be a mistake to conclude that village parents are unconcerned about the happiness of their children, it would be an even worse mistake to assume that they put the welfare of their children before that of the family.

*599 involved in paying a large sum of money for a child whose loyalty would always be a matter of concern.

The reluctance of most families to buy a male child is also evident in the fact that in 5 of the 8 cases of male adoption in Hsiachichou [842] the family had already adopted at least one female child. It is commonly believed in the village that the adoption of a female child will increase a woman's chances of bearing a male child, it being said that "the girl will lead a boy into the family." We might say that it is only when a family is convinced that they have exhausted both natural and supernatural means that they finally turn to buying a male child. In terms of their alternatives for insuring their future, the family is then in a position of having to adopt a son or arrange a matrilocal marriage for a daughter. When faced with these alternatives some families which can afford to do so run the risk of buying a son, but never before. The only exceptions are those very few cases in which a family is able to adopt a son from an agnate, and the occasional unusual case such as the young man who received a son in adoption as payment for having allowed a *sīm-pûà* to marry out of the family.

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The adoption of male children by families living in Hsiachichou is thus very rare. The adoption of female children, on the other hand, is surprisingly common. While only 4 (4 percent) of 112 boys born before 1930 and raised in Hsiachichou were adopted sons, we find that the girls raised in the village before 1930 included more adopted daughters than daughters. Of 113 girls born before 1930 and raised by families living in Hsiachichou 80 (71 percent) were adopted daughters. In more

*597 *562 • 178 recent years the rate of female adoption has dropped considerably, but it still remains much higher than the rate of male adoption. Among 144 boys born after 1930 and raised in Hsiachichou we find only 4 (3 percent) were adopted sons, while by comparison we find that of 160 village girls born during the same period of time 38 (24 percent) were adopted daughters.

*597 When asked why they had adopted female children village informants gave a variety of explanations. One village mother told us she had adopted one of her daughters simply because she was fond of the child, and as best we can judge this probably was her primary reason for the adoption. The woman was reputed to be particularly fond of children, and as she had been the child's wet nurse she had had a chance to become attached to her. In several other instances the reasons for adoption seem to have been loneliness and a fear of isolation on the part of elderly women. One woman told us that she had adopted a girl in her old age because all of her own children had grown up "and it was [597] so quiet and dull around the house." We were also told that two families had adopted girls "in order to change the family's fortune" after several of their own children had died, it being generally believed that the adoption of a female child will somehow insure the good health of a family's later born children. But while these and a multitude of other considerations undoubtedly play a part in decisions about female adoption, the reports of the villagers and certain regularities in the timing of their decisions indicate that most adoptions are the result of one or more of three salient considerations.

*562 *597 *592 182 to raise as a wife for one of their sons. The family with at least one female child and no sons, on the other hand, would not have any reason to adopt a daughter. Their own daughter would be evidence of the wife's fertility as well as insurance against the possibility of her not bearing sons, and there would obviously be no reason for them to adopt a wife for sons which they do not as yet possess.

*597 *562 • 178 When we test these hypotheses by comparing families of varying composition in terms of the relative number of girls born and girls adopted, the results provide a surprisingly good confirmation of our argument. In the period before 1930 when all three of these motives were still operating we find strikingly different rates of adoption among the three types of families. Of a total of 46 female children who were either born into or adopted into village families without children 26 (57 percent) entered by way of adoption, and of 74 girls who entered village families with at least one male child 35 (49 percent) came by way of adoption. By contrast with these very high rates of adoption we find the expected low rate of adoption among families with at least one female child but as yet no male children. Of 16 girls born or adopted into families of this type only 2 (12 percent) were adopted. *[584] It would thus seem that most adoptions during this period were made either as a means of bringing a male into the family or as a means of obtaining a wife for a son.

The picture in the years after 1930 is somewhat different. We still find a very high rate of adoption by childless families, and a low rate of adoption by families with female but no male children. Of

*597 *562 • 178 48 girls entering childless families 18 (38 percent) entered by way of adoption, and of 27 girls entering families with female children but as yet no sons 2 (7 percent) came by way of adoption. The difference is that we now find a relatively low rate of adoption among families with male children. Of a total of 103 girls entering families with at least one male child 12 (12 percent) entered by way of adoption, and 8 of *[584] these were girls who were adopted before 1940. Adoptions by families with male children were almost always for the purpose of obtaining a wife for one of their sons, and such adoptions became pointless once it was apparent that very few of them would culminate in a marriage. The rate of adoption among childless families remains high because while there is no point in adopting a girl to raise as a daughter-in-law, it is as important as ever for families to have sons and to make some other provision for the perpetuation of the family if they do not.

*597 842 Whether or not a family adopts their first child depends primarily on how long it is after marriage that the wife becomes pregnant. The sooner she demonstrates her fertility, the less likely the family is to adopt a daughter. There is, however, one other variable. A family is somewhat more likely to adopt a daughter for the wife of a first born son than for the wife of a later-born son. Whereas we find among 54 first born sons 16 (30 percent) whose first child is an adopted daughter, we find only 6 (17 percent) adopted daughters among the eldest children of 36 later born sons. The reason is simply that the husband's parents are more concerned about a daughter-in-law's fertility before they have grandchildren than after they have grandchildren.

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591 Considering the changes which have taken place in Hsiachichou during the course of the past thirty years, one would expect a decrease in the frequency of men making matrilocal marriages. As the village has become somewhat wealthier fewer families should have been forced to let a son marry out because they were unable to afford the price of a wife. In fact, however, there has been very little change in the frequency of matrilocal madriages by village men. Of 50 men born in the years before 1910, 7 (14 percent) made matrilocal marriages, and of 102 men born after 1910, 11 (11 percent) left their natal families by way of a matrilocal marriage. What appears to have happened is that the years since 1930 have produced more men like Lim Liong-hong married into their wife's family simply because they had no family of their own, so that even though there have been fewer men who have married matrilocally for financial reasons the rate of matrilocal marriage has not declined appreciably. So long as most children continue to be raised in large extended families there will probably always be some men willing to make matrilocal marriages. Whatever the disadvantage and dangers of such a marriage, it is preferable to a life of solitude and death in a lonely room without the comfort of relatives.

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581 When a woman marries into her husband's family there is very little possibility that the marriage will not succeed. His parents may repudiate the girl for any one of several reasons, but they seldom do so because of the expenses of obtaining another daughter-in-law. More often it is the daughter-in-law who would like to extricate herself from her husband's family, but this is even less feasible.

*562 herself could earn as much money as any man who might be willing to *584 marry into the family, and she had also provided them with a granddaughter and a grandson.

*583 591 581 The decision which a family must make about the matrilocal form of marriage is thus very different from the choice between the two forms of patrilocal marriage. In choosing between the preferred marriage and the *sīm-pûà* marriage a family decides between two alternative ways of achieving the same goal. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, but either will assure the family of a satisfactory posterity. The matrilocal marriage, on the other hand, is a form of marriage which is always to be avoided if at all possible, but which in certain situations becomes an absolute necessity. Rather than being a case of weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages, the choice sometimes becomes a matter of a family's achieving the goal of continuity or not. A family with sons will allow its daughters to marry out of the family, but a family which does not have sons has no real choice but to marry their *583 591 daughters matrilocally. As a result, we find that even though the fre- 581 quency of *sīm-pûà* marriages has declined sharply in the last thirty 178 years, the frequency with which families have arranged matrilocal marriages for their daughters has not declined to any appreciable extent. There are families which still fail to produce sons, and there are therefore still families which are forced to arrange matrilocal marriages for their daughters. Of 41 girls born before 1910 and raised in Hsiachichou a total of 8 (19 percent) made matrilocal marriages, and of 100 girls born af-

*583 591 ter 1910 a total of 17 (17 percent) made matrilocal marriages. Here again we
581 find a demonstration of a point we have made several times already. Although
178 many aspects of marriage and adoption have changed in Hsiachichou
593 597 in recent years, the basic meaning and values of the family have not
58 changed. When a decision about marriage or adoption involves the possibility
181 of a family's not achieving the goal of genealogical continuity,
they make and somehow manage to enforce whatever decision is necessary
in order to achieve this goal.

*121 to such a position, it would seem that Levi-Strauss is thinking of a society in which the senior generations of the family ordinarily arrange marriages. He agrees that it would be necessary for the members of the society to recognize the advantages of a wide network of alliances, and we can see that it would be the older and more experienced members of society who would be most aware of the advantages of such a network. It is usually the mature men and women in any society who occupy positions of formal and informal leadership, and it is naturally people in such positions who are most impressed by the importance of group solidarity. Homans and Schneider, on the other hand, clearly assume that the junior generations of the family arrange their own marriages.[2] A child's attitude towards his mother and father would not have any effect upon the likelihood of his wanting to marry one cousin rather than another unless he himself were making the decision. Although it is outside the scope of the present discussion to pursue the idea any further, we would at least suggest that the two theories may not really be in conflict. In a society in which it is the parents who arrange marriages Levi-Strauss' structural argument may be the better explanation, and in the society in which the younger people arrange their own marriages, Homans and Schneider's view may be the more appropriate.

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We have seen that as the senior generation of the family gradually lost control of decisions about marriage and adoption the frequency of

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[2] See George C. Homans and David M. Schneider, Marriage, Authority, and Final Causes: A Study of Unilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955).

*121 the sīm-pūà marriage dropped sharply. While more than a third of all
*583 marriages made in the years before 1930 were of this variety, there have
*593 only been two such marriages in the years after 1930. Since this change
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182 was a direct consequence of the younger generation's dislike of the sīm-pûa form of marriage, we can say that the causes of their distaste are also among the determinants of the present social structure of
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[839] Hsiachichou. A higher frequency of sīm-pûa marriages in the village in the preceding thirty years would have meant weaker affinal ties for many families, a more harmonious relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, a less satisfactory husband-wife relationship, and probably a much higher frequency of extra-marital relations. By refusing to marry their foster siblings the younger generations of the village brought about a sharp change in both the internal and external relations of their community. Why then did the younger generations of
*121 the family reject the sīm-pûa form of marriage? In our earlier discussion we considered two possible explanations. As Edward Westermarck's view of the incest taboo suggests, it may be that the intimacy which obtains between foster siblings results in their having an aversion to sexual relations; or it may be that the social identification of foster siblings as "brother" and "sister" provides the basis for an inadvertent generalization of the incest taboo. We cannot decide between the two hypotheses on the basis of these data alone, since the two crucial variables are confounded. The parties to a sīm-pûa marriage always grow up in intimate association, and they are also always identified as "brother" and "sister." There are, however, other data which indicate that the

ago. I doubt that the more recent arrivals in Peihotien are even aware 175
of the origin of the cooperation between the four areas. Although it is 613
apparent to the least observant that the area is dominated by Lims,
the exclusiveness found in clan villages in mainland China does not 634
exist here. The ties which connect the four villages of Hotien more
closely to each other than to the surrounding villages are not questioned, nor are the rights and obligations of those within the district,
regardless of surname. The temple in the center of Hotien is sup- [778]
ported by all four areas and though the list of donors is dominated by [794]
the name Lim, it is in no sense a Lim temple. When it was Peihotien's [783]
turn to cleanse the gods of the temple by carrying them across a bed [776]
of hot coals, the carriers were not limited to Lims but to residents of [789]
Peihotien village.

In many ways this temple, the home of Shang Ti Kung, is a focal 634
point for the district of Hotien. During my stay in the area the vil- 778
lagers spent a great deal of time and money in totally refurbishing the 776
temple, and celebrated its completion in a three-day festival of rededi- 794
cation. Shang Ti Kung is responsible for the district of Hotien in much 796
the same way as the Mandarins of old were responsible for particular
districts. Once each year he is placed on a sedan chair and carried [178]
through the four sections of his district on a tour of inspection. The sound of cymbals and firecrackers punctuates his progress and along the way his subjects greet him with bows and incense, mingling prayers and offerings. During the rest of the year he stays in his temple where he is visited daily by villagers seeking advice and help. Shang Ti Kung can cure a sick pig, raise the price of rice, discipline an unman-
ageable daughter-in-law, make a barren woman fertile. He is not [782]
obliged to provide these services, but if approached with respect and handsomely bribed, he might.

While Shang Ti Kung influences the welfare of the entire district 776
of Hotien, his underling, Tu Ti Kung, is associated with smaller areas, 778
the villages. To one side of the main path into Peihotien there is a 621
magnificent old tree, thick of trunk and limb. Beneath it is a small stone shrine, the home of Peihotien's Tu Ti Kung. Although he lacks Shang Ti Kung's influence in heaven, Tu Ti Kung is a valuable inter-
mediary. He passes on complaints about local conditions and makes 776
decisions about where and when new buildings may be constructed and old ones torn down. He is the scribe and recorder for the supernatural bureaucracy; to him the villagers must report each birth,

776 death, and marriage. In Tapu, Tu Ti Kung is the patron of the business establishments in his neighborhood. In Peihotien, he watches over the village farmers.

361 Peihotien is by far the most attractive of the villages of Hotien. • 178 The others have become dusty tangles of buildings in a maze of [161] narrow paths. Unwilling to give up the precious paddy land for anything so unprofitable as living space, the growing population has built new wings and even new houses in courtyards and passageways, destroying trees and shrubs that once gave grace to their setting. Few houses enjoy the filtered shade of old trees, and the scraggly bushes scattered among them are so frequently attacked by animals and 361 children that their life expectancy is short. Peihotien's site on the bank of 13 the Tamsui is, by comparison, luxuriant in large healthy trees and a variety of smaller greenery. In the days when the area was settled, long before modern truck farming, the thin, sandy soil appeared useless, fit only for building sites, kitchen gardens, and drying grounds. [161 Peihotien has grown as rapidly as its neighbors, but there is still an unusual amount of space between houses. Several families make use [249] of it by maintaining bamboo groves, adding tender bamboo shoots to their diet and another source of shade and texture to their landscape. Even in the dry days after the rice harvest when hot winds carry the dust from the drained paddies high into the air, Peihotien seems more protected, cooler, cleaner. From a distance the other villages of Hotien can readily be identified for what they are, but Peihotien is a pleasant uncertainty, a clump of dark green foliage with a suggestion of rose brick and a glimpse of the soaring lines of a rich tile roof.

178 621 505 433 Before 1920, when the railroad was laid through Tapu, Peihotien's location on the Tamsui River had more than aesthetic value. The river, as a major thoroughfare, was important to the economy of the village. Two or three families supplemented their farm income by poling ferries across the river and several village men supported their families by transporting goods between the remote villages and Taipei. Peihotien was an agricultural village, but its farmers depended upon the river to tide them over when crops failed or families became 178 621 433 496 too large. The advent of the railroad with its faster, more comfortable transportation soon ended river travel and the advantage of Peihotien's position beside it. Before long the railroad took the river's place in the village's economy, and then some. It was less than a half hour's walk from Peihotien to the railway station in Tapu and only a few more minutes by train to the factories in other cities.

Moreover, efficient transportation brought some light industry to 178 •
Tapu itself. Instead of working with their fathers on the land as they 464
had for centuries, young men began going to the factories. The wages 433
they brought home often made the difference between having just
enough to eat and having plenty to eat. Few farmers sold their land or
gave up farming, but by 1960, nearly every family had at least one
member working outside the village for a cash income to supplement
the seasonal income from the land.

During the period in which they were building the railroad, the 178
Japanese also built a large network of irrigation canals in the Taipei 177
basin, easing greatly the burden of Peihotien's farmers. An irrigation 503
dam built across the river a mile or so upstream from the village 505
lowered the frequency of flooding in the village and ended completely
the economic usefulness of the river. Large boats can no longer go
freely up and down the stream, and fishing has disintegrated to a sport
enjoyed by village boys. The only economic value the river now has 178
for villagers is in the employment of a few of the more destitute 339
women. Building contractors hire them on a piece-work basis to 462
gather stones of a particular size for making concrete. The work is
hot, heavy, and miserably paid, but it is vital to several village families
during the seasons when the women can find no work weeding
fields or cleaning vegetables for market.

Nowadays the river is considered at best a convenient supply of 312
water and at worst a threat, be it real or imagined. Every morning a 296
dozen or so women come down to the river's edge to do their laundry 231
and gossip, and in the evening the village water buffalo are allowed a
leisurely soak in the shallow water. For the greater part of the day the
beach is deserted. An occasional handful of children venture down to 857
play in the sand, but for most of them the river area is forbidden. During 481
the hot days of summer, busy mothers are hard put to keep their
children from wading and by the time they are through primary 165
school, most boys have learned to swim by one stratagem or another.
Parental fears are not unjustified. Besides the many drownings that
resulted from capsized ferries in the old days, there have been several
swimmers lost in more recent years. To the villagers these past 775
drownings add immensely to the realistic dangers of the river since it
is believed that the souls of those who drown must remain in the
water as unhappy ghosts until they pull in another victim to take their
place.

A man in his forties described the ways of ghosts in telling me

moments, but it is their father whose example continues to guide their 596*
lives. Their mother was only a woman and died; their father created for 159*
the family a reputation and standards that survive in his name. He became
a symbol of what the family could and should be, and as a
symbol he is still present—as much a reality as he was when alive.

Lim Han-ci's wife was a fortunate woman in one respect. The
first child she bore her husband was a son, Lim Hue-lieng. A bride 596*
comes to her new home as a complete stranger, both to the family and 606
to her husband. For the first year or two she has the duties of, and 178
little more status than, a servant. She is expected to release her
mother-in-law from the drudgery of cleaning and cooking, bring her
morning tea, help her dress, and see to her comfort in every way. In [304]
the days of Lim Han-ci, a bride also had the humiliating task of
washing her mother-in-law's foot bindings and rewrapping the twisted,
deformed feet. She was expected to serve her father-in-law's meals
whenever he wished them, with her eyes lowered and her mouth shut.
Unless summoned to fill his pipe or perform some other service, she
avoided his presence. To her husband, a man whom she had not 596*
met until the day of her marriage, she was also subservient. If ill 593
temper prompted him to beat her, she must accept it without complaint. 562
She was expected to provide his meals, keep his clothes in
order, and, in the old days, make his and the rest of the family's cloth 178
shoes. Above all, she was expected to provide the family with a
son—the means of continuing their line of descent. The life of a bride
today is considerably less onerous, but there has been no change in
the family's primary requirement of her. Until she produces a son, she
has no secure place in the family. Bearing a girl at least gives evidence [851]
of her ability to bear children; the birth of a son ends the anxiety in her
husband's family and gives her at last an undeniable status in it.

Probably Lim Han-ci's next child was a girl, but for this I must 596*
rely on hearsay and my knowledge of other village families. During 159*
our first weeks in the village, Lim Chieng-cua spent nearly as much
time interviewing us as we did interviewing him. As a result he had a 124
fair knowledge of what Chinese practices were not common in the
United States and a cunning instinct for the kinds of things we were
not to be told about his own family. He was extremely cooperative in
explaining the idiosyncracies of other family genealogies and the
disposition of their unwanted children, but in theory the gods had not
blessed his family with any unwanted children. His neighbors, how-

596 sure; and that by his late twenties he was considered an important
159 man. During this time he was no stranger to Peihotien, but he did not
548 enter his father's house as a son. The villagers followed his escapades
avidly, particularly his romantic attachments, since the women in his life were many and most were far from respectable. For the village youths and even their sober parents, he came to be pictured as a kind of Chinese Robin Hood.

159 In describing Lim Hue-lieng's early career, an eminently respect-
able old farmer told me, "Lim Hue-lieng started out as the leader of
596 all the *lo mua* in this village and then of all the other villages around
548 here. He and the other *lo mua* from here used to fight a lot and they
626 were so famous that even now no one dares to do anything to hurt this
627 village. If someone made a comment about somebody's walking too close to one of our girls, they would fight them right away, or if someone said something in public they would set a time and fight with them later. And if they heard a man was coming to our village to visit a prostitute who lived here, they would wait for him on the path and beat him up. They did all of this to protect the good name of the village.

"They were also famous for 'squeezing the oil' from gamblers and made a lot of money protecting the houses and names of wealthy families in Tapu. Those *lo mua* didn't have to use force. If they wanted money, they just asked someone to loan it to them, and the person didn't dare refuse."

Even the peaceful, quiet men of the village who abhor the kind of life Lim Hue-lieng led are willing to admit that there is still an aura around the name of Peihotien that causes thieves to pass it by. American friends in the well-policed city of Taipei maintained elaborate systems of locks and watchmen, but were robbed repeatedly. We left expensive cameras, typewriters, and watches scattered about our un-
178 locked rooms and never lost so much as a pencil. The petty *lo mua*
548 activities of today's young men are as disapproved by the older and
626 more stable elements of the population as they were thirty years ago,
and perhaps with more reason since there seems to be considerably more fighting and far less activity in support of the community and traditional morality. Peihotien's reputation provides the young men of the village with a high status among their peers, but it also demands that they maintain certain standards. They are less able than other youths to ignore a slight or an insult.

+596
+159 wife. Considering his prosperous independence, this step in itself was
+593 as exciting to the villagers as would have been the traditional return of
584 erring sons in Confucian tracts on filiality.

Why did Lim Hue-lieng choose this way of publicly reinstating himself in his father's home? The least generous answer might be that at that particular moment he had need of a respectable tie, a semblance of a stable family background, and that his father had set the marriage as a formal act of contrition. Considering the nature of Hue-lieng's power, this seems unlikely. More likely his decision came from a growing maturity that allowed other elements of his personality to take precedence over his glowering independent pride. His respect for the traditional mores of his society had threaded its way through all of his *lo mua* activities, had prompted him to keep Hotien as the base for his life rather than to move into the gayer world of the city, and had maintained his loyalty to relatives and friends. He had rebelled against his father's domination, but in his own way he respected him. His rebellion had not altered his affection for his mother, nor for his younger brother, although the latter out of loyalty to his father was sometimes cold and hostile to Hue-lieng's overtures. And perhaps Lim Hue-lieng felt pity for the desolate future of A-pou if she had no position in the growing family beyond that of unmarried adopted sister.

584 Unlike the elaborate feasts and festivities that mark the marriage
[585] of two unrelated adults, the wedding of foster siblings is a quiet
ceremony witnessed only by members of the family and perhaps a few other relatives. In recent years, this form of marriage has almost completely disappeared from Taiwan. Parents find in it many advan-
• 178 tages, but the young people themselves loathe it. Nowadays when jobs
584 outside the village give young men more bargaining power with their
831 parents, they refuse to marry their foster sisters. Their objections are
835 primarily to the sexual aspect of the union. In China, as in the West,
sexual relations between siblings are forbidden. Sexual intercourse between two people who, though unrelated, have called themselves and behaved as brother and sister all their lives seems "wrong." The social technicality that condones such relations between foster siblings is not sufficient to overcome their revulsion. Since Lim Hue-lieng expected to continue his life in the outside world where "normal" sexual activity was readily available, perhaps the incestuous feelings that make such a marriage unbearable to others did not worry him.

*159 former village beauty, but Gioq-ki is of another type. She resembles
far more her half-brother A-bok and her uncle Lim Chieng-cua than
142 her short, stocky mother. From her father's family she inherited the
unusual long, thin face with its high cheekbones, narrow nose, and
*159 firm, somewhat pointed chin. She also inherited, or imbibed, that family's
157 hot temper and fierce character. In Lim Hue-lieng, his brother,
and his father, these traits were awesome and even admired; in a
Taiwanese female, they are labelled insolence. Gioq-ki is better educated
than most village women and though overly proud of her education,
she makes no use of it. She is clearly intelligent, but her quick
mind only intensifies her restlessness and her dissatisfaction.

It is not difficult to see why Gioq-ki was attracted to the newspaper reporter who grew up on the mainland of China. Chang Jong-kuei is handsome, assured, and sophisticated. His carefully tailored, imported business suits look out of place on village paths, but he shows no signs of self-consciousness. Although the expression on his face suggests affability, his only contact with his village neighbors is at the gambling tables. When Gioq-ki met him, her experience with sophistication was limited to the practiced posing of young village toughs. While bold in a fight and defiant of their enemies, these young men withered at a glance from her father. They speak with confidence and respond quickly to any insult, and yet they are cautious of public opinion in their villages and accept the dictates of local custom. Chang Jong-kuei knows nothing of these restraints. He is an educated mainlander, a city dweller without obligation. Gioq-ki saw him move with ease and assurance through expensive hotels and restaurants in which her father would have looked out of place and slightly uncomfortable. Her father and the *lo mua* feared no one but deferred to the community; Chang Jong-kuei knew no community. The average villager would not trust Chang simply because he is not subject to the usual social pressures, but to Gioq-ki, living in the glow of her father's reputation for independence and power, Chang Jong-kuei's freedom from restraint looked like a personal quality.

*159 At the time Gioq-ki and Chang met, young people in the villages
*593 were just beginning to demand the right to choose their own marriage
• 178 partners. The objections of Gioq-ki's parents to her choice were balanced
by her contemporaries' admiration of her boldness. What doubts
582 she herself may have had about marrying a rootless mainlander were
584 cancelled by her fiance's confidence and his dangerously foolish belief
in her father's inability to interfere.

*593 If Lim Hue-lieng and his wife had married
*159 Gioq-ki to a young Taiwanese willing to enter their family as an
595 adopted son and descendant, he could have provided the family with a
future in the true Taiwanese sense of the word—a chain of descendants
769 continuing for generations after the personalities of the present
851 representatives are forgotten. Even if Gioq-ki and her husband had
551 given one of their sons the Lim surname, obliging him to make offerings
181 to his grandparents' ancestral tablets, there would have been
some hope for a future family. Chang Jong-kuei, for reasons known
only to him, was unwilling to give even this solace. Although he let his
father-in-law believe that the oldest boy bore the Lim surname, he
secretly registered him as a Chang.

*159 The marriage of A-hua, So-lan's adopted daughter, is yet to be
59 arranged, and many childless couples have provided their link between
past and future through the marriage of an adopted daughter.
• [178] But times are changing; couples are making their own decisions about
marriage partners; young men are now less willing to make the low
[594] prestige marriage that cuts them off from their own ancestors and
joins them to someone else's. So-lan had little luck with Gioq-ki and it
[428] will be difficult to arrange a good match for A-hua. An adopted
daughter's inheritance is always questionable when there is a "real"
[737] daughter alive. Due to her own ingenuity and the assumed loyalty of
her daughters, Lim So-lan need not worry about support for her old
age, but she must be satisfied with a pseudo-family that will end with
her death. She no longer dreams of a house that can be enlarged to
shelter generations of descendants—an apartment in a row house is
[769] her present and she has no future. If after her death anyone thinks to
make an ancestral tablet for her, it will rest uneasily on an altar
dominated by other surnames—a meaningless piece of wood, a link
without a chain.

done to Lim Hue-lieng or he himself would be guilty of with later 159*
grandchildren, but enough to soften his commands and make allowances 596*
for A-bok's occasional lapses. A-bok learned everything his 578
grandfather knew about farming and was encouraged by him to develop 603
that talent for innovation which has played such a major role in
the family's history. As Lim Han-ci had been among the first farmers [177]
to switch to wet rice farming when the irrigation system was built by [176]
the Japanese, so A-bok was among the first to devote large tracts of [241]
land to the now profitable truck farming.

According to the village gossips, A-bok was not devoted to a life 159*
of hard work until after his marriage, but since this notion is traditional, 596*
particularly among females with unmarried near-adult sons, I
take it lightly. The fact that he submitted to an arranged marriage 461
without even meeting the girl who was to be his bride was taken by 159*
many villagers as evidence that he lacked the spirit and independence of 596*
his father and grandfather. Indeed, if he had insisted on choosing his 584
own wife, he would probably have been allowed to. But even today in [178]
Taiwan, opportunities for young people to meet and become acquainted
are few, particularly if they are not employed outside their homes. The [548]
kind of young women that Lim A-bok met through his *lo mua* recreations
were not women he would wish to raise his children or care
for his mother in her old age. His notoriously independent father had
compromised also, and when he made a second choice of his own, it
was not from amongst the accomplished women he knew in the outside
world but a quiet village girl. A-bok married the girl selected by
his mother and the go-between, and with the birth of his first child, a
boy, he settled easily into the pattern of his grandfather's life and gave
up the pleasures of his father's.

All of the farmers in Peihotien put in long, hard hours and hire 159*
help only when essential. Lim A-bok works harder than any and hires 596*
help less often than most. Some say that he wouldn't have to work so 461
hard if he took a few short cuts, but A-bok wants his fields to stand
out from the others by being freer from weeds and with neater windbreaks.
In general, he succeeds, but certainly at great cost to himself.
I have often seen him nodding over his evening meal, but if it is still
light after dinner he goes back to the fields. When the hours of daylight
are fewer, he spends his evenings repairing equipment and making
rope. Because of his industry and his reluctance to discuss the 159*
family's affairs, he is a difficult person to interview. His mother is 596*
124

instead of turning to the dubious activities of the *lo mua*, they are 159*
violent only in defending the good name of their district and chastising 596*
in dark alleys any luckless mainland soldiers who force their 882
attentions on "good" Taiwanese girls. Currently, their main activity 561
seems to center on finding places to dance and people to dance with, 573
an illegal activity during this period. Masa is much sought after as a
dancing teacher and is reputed to be "the best." He is a romantically 159*
handsome boy with a surprising wave in his thick hair, but he does 596*
not look like a Lim. He has the charm, the temper, and the leadership 142
potential typical of the rest of the Lims, but he is the only child of [157]
Lim Hue-lieng who has no physical resemblance to him. He has instead
the short, square, powerful body of his mother, a rounder face
and the broad Taiwanese nose.

I neglected to ask the family why he was known by a Japanese 159*
nickname, but regardless of the reason the name is appropriate. The 596*
image of Japan held by the younger people in the village is a composite 177
of Japanese popular songs, colorful Japanese movies, and soft 829
drink advertisements picturing pretty Japanese girls with friendly 883
smiles. Masa is one of many village boys who cherish this image as an
alternative to the life they know in Peihotien. As the men of his
grandfather's generation chaffed under the restrictions of a Japanese
colonial government and longed for the return of a Chinese administration
that they could not remember, so the young men of today look
upon a past they were too young to know, as a time of freedom and
plenty. They read the second rate Japanese novels that are banned on [291]
Taiwan, and wear with excessive arrogance the humble Japanese *zori*
that the Chinese government foolishly attempted to ban (and has
since started manufacturing themselves). Nearly all of these young 159*
people have stop-gap jobs of one sort or another which bring them a 596*
little spending money but nothing that suggests a beginning in adult 883
life. They simply wait, passing the time as pleasantly as they can. 178
Masa and several others his age participate in the village band that 771
marches in all religious processions, but the religion itself they scorn. 561
Few Taiwanese take religion with the earnest seriousness that Westerners
demand, but the young men of Masa's group (and that does
not include all the young people of the village) laugh at the
shamans, regard the priests in the temples as cynical men who have
found a soft job, and ancestor worship as a tradition that must be
carried on only for the pleasure it gives the old people in the family.

*159 On the day I watched the annual fire-walking—an awesome ceremony
*596 in which barefoot men in a state of possession carry the images of the
771 gods across a bed of hot coals—I saw Masa stop for a moment on his
• 178 way to Tapu to look at the proceedings. I asked him later if he
796 thought the gods had really entered the bearers' bodies and if not, why
789 they acted so strangely. He laughed at me and at the whole affair and
said the men looked to him like they were dancing "rock and roll"—for
all he knew, they were practicing their dance steps.

*159 Instead of remonstrating with Masa over the rather frivolous life
*596 he leads, A-pou and A-bok feel very sorry for him. Although A-bok
*593 has some understanding of his uncle's problems, his mother does not,
882 and she assumes that if his uncle wanted, he could find a good paying
178 job for Masa that would provide him with the kind of future he
desires. Neither his mother nor his brother make any attempt to interest Masa in farming or confess to any hope that he will stay in the village. They act as if he had no responsibility to the family and is indeed only their pampered guest. His life and his grandfather's over-
[604] lapped too briefly for the old man to leave his stamp. Masa resents his uncle's management of the family, but instead of urging his brother to divide the household, he rejects the whole system. The struggle within the family is to him but one more indication of what is wrong with the old ways.

epilogue

SEPARATE STOVES

*596 592 578 A few months after our return to America, we received a letter from a friend who had recently visited the Lims. The price was too high, the innovation has failed. The Lims have divided their property and established independent households. Lim A-bok continues to cultivate all the family land, but he now works Lim Chieng-cua's share of the land as a tenant. The family remains in the same house. They continue to share the guest hall and to worship there together, but some of the doors connecting their apartments have been nailed closed. The final admission of defeat is the presence of a new kitchen in the back of the house: they have divided the stove.

*596 592 578 123 Our physical presence in the house was obviously the last delay of the inevitable. With our rooms scattered as they were through the building, it would have been difficult to arrange an equitable division without disturbing our living arrangements and creating even more controversy over the terms of the property settlement. The Americans and their rent were part of the estate. No matter how much she desired the division, even Lim A-pou was unwilling to have it take place with the acrimony common to most family divisions. If there had to be a step down, it must be made with dignity. Perhaps they viewed those final months of waiting as a sacrifice to Lim Han-ci—that his hope for a united family of many generations living under one roof might be a reality somewhere, even if only in the minds of foreigners.

*596 • 178 769 [183] Essentially, the house of Lim is no more. From the point of view of their neighbors, the Lims are "just like us now." They have returned to the cycle of growth and division which is the Chinese farmer's compromise with an ideal. But, on the altar in their guest hall there remains the ancestral tablet of Lim Han-ci. The strength of his personality and of his memory held them together for many years. In the end, it was not enough.

121 general, may be relatively close or relatively distant to
each other on the continuum. Traditional should also not
imply stagnation for no village we visited in Taiwan was
not extensively changed during the past twenty-five years.
Easily contrasted factors distinguishing traditional from
modern included housing types, extensiveness of material
goods such as television sets, motorcycles, and sewing
machines, changes in occupational structure, average level
of formal education, and types of health practices. The
traditional village was one which had changed relatively
little in the last twenty-five years; the modern village
was one which had changed considerably. I will illustrate
121 with one concrete example. In the traditional village,
178 mid-wives attended at births which have usually
844 been in the home; in the modern village, most women went
by bus to a Western-style clinic in town which was staffed
with doctors, mid-wives and nurses.

121 Personal factors not directly relevant to the research design also influenced selection of the village: we would have to be accepted and locate housing. These two conditions did not prove to be problems since every site that approached reasonable congruence with the other above requirements would have seemingly made out entry easy.

122 Finally, I traveled with my family which included two school-age children. Since we planned on a residence

262 the highest level in history. Low-priced powdered milk [855] is available in the village stores but only given to small children. The citrus orchards allow a large consumption of fruits in season, particularly rejects, i.e., bruised and undersized fruit. The appearance and taste may be poor but nourishment remains the same. Previously, fresh [178] fruits were consumed only on special occasions. The village stores now sell many eggs although eggs too once were only for rare special occasions. Probably the biggest change is in the quantity and variety of fresh vegetables. [178] The diet is greatly improved and information about vitamins and a balanced diet is filtering into the community.

Food and Diet

146 No villager goes hungry, starvation is non-existent. Even in the large cities, the people appear well fed and beggars are rarely encountered. In Sanlei, the daily calorie intake seemed adequate for healthy life. In spite of the villagers' opinions which were expressed above, it does appear that there is an imbalance in the distribution of needed items. According to the Western-style doctor at the public health station in Hsin Tien, the rural villagers in the Hsin Tien area probably have serious shortages of protein, riboflavin, calcium, and thiamin. As an investigator from America, I was most struck by the lack of milk and milk products plus the comparatively small

146 portions of meat, fish and eggs. The doctor also stated that there were probably insufficient quantities of niacin, vitamin A, and iron although not as serious as the first listed items. Finally, outside of the citrus season, there were shortages of ascorbic acid.

125
262 The daily pattern of eating was checked in a number of different ways. I had five cooperating households (a stratified sample) keep records of food for a month which we checked each evening. Food was richer the first few days, probably indicating a "face saving" process. A second method was to check all 66 households on a single evening for that day's consumption. Alternatively, houses were checked following a single meal. Finally, random interviews on any subject periodically noted the food being prepared or recently consumed.

262 Polished rice was the main item of the diet in about 45% of the households; a combination of rice and sweet potatoes in about 52%; and primarily sweet potatoes only in about 3%. All households eat sweet potatoes, as a kind of fried pancake, steamed, or as a type of mush. [178] According to villagers, the trend over time has been towards a greater emphasis on rice and a lesser emphasis on sweet potatoes. Rice, if available, is eaten at every 261 meal, hot, cold, or as hsi-fan (a thin gruel). All vil- 855 lagers agree that gruel should not be eaten in the morning by any man who must do hard work in the fields as it

261 is not sufficiently nourishing; also, it should be denied
855 to small children along with other liquids in the evening
252 in order to prevent bed wetting. Rice was usually steamed
or boiled; it was only fried for a dish at a banquet or
when mixed with left-overs for lunch.

262 Almost every meal also included liberal quantities
of vegetables which were lightly cooked and were usually
placed on top of the rice to eat. The particular vege-
tables were drawn from those that were in season. Although
many of them were grown in the village, others were pur-
262 chased in Hsin Tien. Men were asked to shop on the way
443 home from work or a trip to town. If a woman went to
462 town, she usually shopped for herself and several others.
[493] One village man drove his three-wheeled bicycle cart into
the Taipei market each morning about 3:30 a.m. and bought
a load of vegetables and pedaled home. After he left Hsin
Tien, he stopped in each small village or group of houses
other than the two villages with vegetable markets and
sold produce from the cart. As he got closer to Sanlei,
he lowered his prices. He almost always was able to com-
262 pletely sell out the last of his load in Sanlei. Villag-
178 ers generally felt that there had not been significant
changes in the absolute quantity of vegetables consumed,
but there had been great changes in the variety used and
that people now ate more out-of-season and fresh vegeta-
262 bles. This was probably true but it seemed to us that

262 than one-quarter of a pound per man per day. It is a rare
village household that would have two meatless days in a
• 178 row. Some older villagers claimed that in their youth,
262 meat appeared on the table only once each week but others
claimed it was more often. Any question about economic
conditions in the past almost always produced mild arguments
252 and disagreements. Pork is cut in very small pieces
and mixed with vegetables in cooking and most often, seems
262 to be used primerily for flavoring and for the fat. Villagers
826 agreed that a person needed meat regularly in order
to provide grease for the joints in order to prevent sore
262 muscles. It was said that beef (water buffalo or yellow
[231] oxen) was eaten in the city. However, the water buffalo
was so important to the villagers that no village man
could bring himself to eat it. However, when one was
killed in an accident, it would be sold to a meat store.
Small boys occasionally snared mountain rats which were
eaten but the house rat was considered too dirty to eat.
[751] Dog meat was quite expensive and rarely eaten although
everyone said that a bit of dog meat in the fall would
help prevent colds all winter. No village dog could be
eaten however. Fowl were also significant but only on the
special occasions averaging about three to five times per
month.

261 According to most Chinese, eating is one of the
252 joys of life and cooking is a well-developed art form.

264 fields, especially if the field is quite distant or the activity is a particularly demanding one such as harvesting or transplanting. The food may be carried in a tin or may be brought to the workers by a woman or a child.

178 Everyone agrees that the diet now is the best and
262 richest in village history, both daily and especially for
511 the Pai Pai (religious festivals, see Chapter VIII) on
special days. It is often remarked by villagers and professional economist alike that one of the first things a Chinese peasant will do with increased income is improve his diet. "Engel's Law" states that in a subsistance economy, over half of the income will be spent on food. It does seem that Sanlei figures are still close to this
262 percentage of income spent on food. It also appears that
511 the non-agricultural workers have a better and richer diet
[463] than the farmers, although their net worth is much less.
The poorest diets are in households which do not include a vigorous young to middle-aged man. The only exception
262 is the rich tea processor who farms by hiring labor. The
574 poorer householders do obtain better food than their finan-
556 cial condition might warrant by the village custom of inviting guests on special days. There is no expectation that a poor man will invite a rich man to dinner. Conversely, a rich man should invite a poor man to eat. The poorer households benefit by the fact that one way a rich man earns prestige is in accordance with the number of guests he serves at a banquet.

316 commercially important in the area for over fifty years.
316 Prior to World War II, the mines employed only full-time
178 miners but due to the labor shortage during the war, some
433 villagers were added on a part and/or full-time basis.
The most recent period is witness to a rapid expansion of
industrialization on Taiwan and a consequent increased
demand for Taiwan's coal. Coal production in 1965 was
5,054,463 metric tons, the highest in the history of Tai-
[464] wan (China Yearbook, 1966-7:302). Satisfying the demand
for coal has created serious labor shortages which are
being overcome by retired Mainland soldiers, migrants from
labor-surplus areas, and villagers on a full-time or part-
time basis.

316 Some miners live in dormitories near the mines, but
others, including all villagers, commute daily. Most mine
work is compensated on a piece-work basis. Mines usually
operate on shifts for a six-day week. Men may work indi-
vidually but most often, unite into small permanent work
316 teams which share output equally. Income varies according
465 to the skill, energy, and the richness of a particular
vein but the latter factor levels out over time. The aver-
age wage is about $80.00 per day with some men consistently
earning $100.00. Few men earn less than $70.00 on a regu-
lar basis, a rate which is considerably higher than farming
wages.

463 most of the T'oulei business and vice versa for the
621 T'oulei electrician. Although it is now not considered a
628 direct exchange on a one-for-one basis as in barter, it is almost as if the two villages were trading services for there are felt obligations on each side. For most of the different kinds of technical services required in Sanlei there are regular known sources to be utilized with only a few alternatives. Going outside the boundaries, i.e., hiring an electrician from Hsin Tien instead of T'oulei for instance, will cause more comment and pressure than to do the job yourself. In a sense, Sanlei village may be perceived as a unit in a large system of units with which it engages in economic transactions. Although no single unit is self-sufficient, the larger collectivity could easily exist as a closed system in spite of the fact it is currently a part of a larger world market.

A Case of Technological Obsolescence

178 About 1935, a Mainlander who injured his foot in a
231 mine accident moved into Sanlei village to earn a living
472 since he could no longer work in the mines. As a boy in Fukien, he had learned to make the wooden clogs that were so popular in Taiwan. They were constructed of wood and saisal bands, both of which were available in the mountains near Sanlei. Since it was difficult for the Mainlander to travel to the mountains for the raw material and to town to sell the finished products, he brought two

178 291 472 neighbors into the business as partners. The business seemingly filled a necessary niche and one man taught another and before long, over 30 of the 40 families in Sanlei were engaged full-time or part-time in the clog business for a man often could earn more making clogs than he could as a farm laborer.

[458] [177] Business dropped off slightly during the war because of a shortage of labor although two villagers branched into the production of the thick Japanese clogs and installed a special machine in the village. After the war, there was another spurt in production but the plastic industry (replacing saisal bands) and mass production techniques came to Taiwan and as a result, the village clog business was totally wiped out within six months.

Both the inauguration of the clog business and its eventual demise were factors affecting village life. The inauguration was especially important for women's roles as will be illustrated.

178 423 The literature which deals with underdeveloped countries often calls attention to the shortage of land. In Sanlei village there is a felt need for more land, particularly paddy fields which is openly expressed and reflected in the artificially high price of the land. That is, the rate of return from a rented piece of paddy land is currently not as much as can be earned by selling

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423 the land and putting the money in many other kinds of
investment.

621 It is not profitable to discuss land values without
461 reference to the kind of crops and the technological sys-
464 tem employed in the community. A village can be viewed
121 on one level as a potential labor pool. That is, all its
members are capable of contributing increments of labor
which vary in accordance with age and physical condition.
There are few societies (if any) which maximize utility
or achievement of this potential for there are always per-
iods set aside for rest and recreation and certain indi-
viduals, particularly children, the aged, and often women,
are not assigned responsibilities commensurate with their
physical potential. A community seems to aim at some
reasonable level of satisfaction although the target may
be raised or lowered over time.

178 At the time the clog business was introduced, San-
621 lei was an agricultural village surrounded by fields oper-
461 ating in terms of a technological system which required
464 certain inputs of man hours to manage its crops. Over
182
241 time, a system had developed for assigning certain indi-
viduals requisite portions of the necessary labor inputs
and as expected, women, children, and old people were es-
pecially underemployed.

182 The clog industry required adult male labor inputs
241 which tended to be drawn out of the agricultural labor
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464

665 important for township affairs and for such quasi-governmental units as the farmers' association or fruit cooperative, one faction may be mobilized by a county candidate who will then incur an obligation which must later be repaid. (These factions are considered more fully in a subsequent section.)

Local Government

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621 Historically, self government on the local level has been a significant part of the Chinese system for the federal government rarely extended below the county level. [648] When Taiwan was controlled by the Japanese, partial local control at the community level was still a regular practice and in many respects today, there are still significant elements of traditional local control governed by a principle of consensus. Secret elections, majority vote, universal female suffrage, and voting individually rather than by families are new.

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562 Some men are still seemingly not aware of the fact that their wives may vote as they wish in spite of their husband's instructions. I was told by more than one man that his wife would not vote for his candidate's opponent for that would just cancel both their votes while many other men just claimed their wives did not understand politics and asked them how they should vote. On the other hand, several village men actively promoted candidates by stating reasons for their selection in the presence of

594 621 the three single men are omitted, the range in size is from 2 to 9 with an average of 5.2. The distribution of these three family types is indicated in Table 6.

Historical Changes in Family Size

178 59 621 Historically, there has been a steady growth in the average size of the family in Taiwan (see Table 7). There is an additional factor however, which is not revealed in the kinds of data usually presented. There is an increasing percentage of stem and extended families at the expense of nuclear families in the rural area. While the average size of the family in Sanlei Ts'un is about the same as Taiwan's overall figure, it is significant that sixty per cent of Sanlei villagers are living in households larger than the nuclear family. Several explanations for this development can be suggested.

121 178 59 One reason is related to a concept recently developed in a provocative article by Marion Levy which was supported mathematically by Ansley Coale (1965:1-69). Levy draws on the work of demographers who posit a demographic transition characterized by three stages: (I) high birth rate and high death rate, (II) high birth rate and low death rate, and (III) low birth rate and low death rate. Levy argues that in Stage III, the "actual" family is the nuclear type. A nuclear type is necessary because of the restraints imposed by the larger society.[4] Moreover, the "ideal" size will be congruent with the "actual" size.

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Table 7. Historical Changes in Average Family Size in Taiwan (1940 and earlier from Barclay, 1954:175; later figures from United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1968:787)

Year	Average Size	Year	Average Size
1905	5.2	1935	5.8
1915	5.3	1940	6.0
1920	5.3	1950	6.1
1925	5.5	1960	6.1
1930	5.7	1965	6.3

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In Stage I however, the "ideal" type may be any form with a tendency towards something larger than a nuclear unit but because of the high death rate, there will be few families which achieve this "ideal." The biological facts alone are sufficient to prevent its achievement. Thus, a vast majority of the "actual" families in a Stage I society will be nuclear no matter what the "ideal" may specify. Coale (1965:65-69) created a computer simulation model of family cycles with all conditions set to maximize achievement of unilineal extended families in a Stage I society, i.e., families would not divide unless both members in the senior generation were dead. Yet, these conditions only created an average family size of 7 while the average for an "ideal" of nuclear families under the same conditions was 4. Since we know that families do divide for a number of other reasons, even this figure would be rarely realized.

However, it is Stage II, the transitional stage, which is of most interest in this paper. In Stage II, the mortality rates are changing such that they would now

124 permit the "ideal" to be achieved biologically. Yet, there
178 will now be pressure for a change in the "ideal" size[5]
59 towards a nuclear family because other conditions are approaching congruence with those of a Stage III society. In any case, we would expect both an increase in the average family size and an increase in the percentage of families that approach the "ideal" form in a Stage II society.

The above argument will be applied to Taiwan. The data in Table 2 clearly indicates that 60 years ago, Taiwan was a Stage I society, possessing both a high birth rate and a high death rate. Furthermore, they also indicate that Taiwan slowly changed to a Stage II society, which was achieved after World War II because of the falling death rate. Finally, Taiwan now appears to be moving towards Stage III as indicated by the falling birth rate. The figures in Table 7 indicate that the average size of the family steadily increased with the changes in stages as Levy's theory would predict. Moreover, Sanlei now has its highest percentage of families larger than the nuclear type: stem and extended forms total 50% of the families in Sanlei.

However, there are two other possible explanations for the current growing family size and high rates of families larger than the nuclear form. In a study of Hsin Hsing village on Taiwan's West Central Plain, Gallin

121 (1966) found that only 40% of the families were larger
178 than the nuclear type. In both Sanlei and Hsin Hsing
59 there was pressure on the land although the availability
of yet undeveloped mountain near Sanlei meant less pressure. Additionally, the growth in population (associated with the falling death rate) meant that some people were forced to seek employment outside the village in both communities. In Hsin Hsing, it is often necessary to migrate to the city for a job (Gallin, 1966:210). However, the availability of work in the mines and the availability of work in the city within community distance means a man can work outside but continue residence in Sanlei Ts'un.
596 For example, the extended family of Chiu Yung-man which is
121 diagramed in Figure 6 includes four adult males although
178 the family land holdings are not sufficient to support the
entire group. The old man (1), is a full-time farmer although he has withdrawn to a large degree because of his advancing age. His oldest son (2), works about 80% of the time on the family farm and 20% in the family store run by his wife (3). The second son (4) works about half the time on the family farm and half the time in the coal mine. The third son (5), who is a full-time truck driver at a lumber yard in Taipei, commuting daily, rarely assists with farm activities. The family farm requires male labor inputs totaling about the equivalent of two full-time adult males and could support their respective elementary

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

Figure 6. Kinship Diagram, Chiu Yung-man *Chia*.

121 families. However, the other employment opportunities
178 locally available allow this extended unit to continue
596 living in a single household. On the other hand, in Hsin
Hsing, it is likely that the youngest son would have had to move to Taipei for work. His wife might not have moved with him, but given the fact that three adult males still meant too much pressure on the land, and that he had obtained a steady job with good wages, she would probably have joined him before long.

121 The final possible explanation is based on the im-
59 proving financial conditions in Taiwan.[6] Most accounts
178 of the Chinese family stress that the large form is related
to economic well-being (Hsu, 1967:7; Fei, 1939:29, C. K.

121 Yang, 1959a:9, Lang, 1946:16). It may well be that
178 neither the biological explanation nor the convenience of
59 job opportunities are relevant for if the theories about economic improvement are correct, they may be a sufficient explanation.[7]

There are few longitudinal studies of Chinese communities. Gallin found a significant increase in material possessions in Hsin Hsing between the original study of 1958-9 and the restudy of 1966 (verbal communication). The strength of the theory could be examined by looking at the present distribution of family types in Hsin Hsing. There are suggestions that the theory of increasing financial well-being has merit for the increasing size of the family (Table 7) corresponds with economic improvement as well as demographic changes. The final support for this explanation comes from the neighboring village of Erhlei which was studied by my wife. In comparison with Sanlei, Erhlei is more prosperous although the average net worth of each family is less (reflecting the smaller investment in land), houses and material goods are richer and monthly income is higher. In both villages the demographic rates would have changed at about the same rate although Erhlei is making use of modern Western medical treatment to a greater extent than Sanlei. As the theory would predict, the average size of the family in Erhlei is higher and additionally, there is a higher percentage of families

121 larger than the nuclear unit. In another recent study of
178 a prosperous Hakka community in Taiwan, Cohen found an
59 average family size of 10.9 and 55% of the families were
larger than the nuclear form (1969:161-180).

The above discussion of the family is basically a "static" one, a snapshot of Sanlei at a given moment in time. Even the discussion of changes over time is essentially "static" because it merely describes and attempts to understand the differences in two or more distributions of family types distinguished by time. Such a description of the incidence and classification of domestic forms is fairly standard in most ethnographies and has been called by Buchler and Selby (1968:48), the "Statistical Approach." They further suggest (1968:52-8) it is necessary to provide a "Diachronic Approach" in analysis which focuses upon the total process of development and change in domestic units. Although often omitted, such analysis is growing in importance and appearing more frequently in ethnographies (Fortes, 1949; Mitchell, 1956; Hammel, 1961). Some of the impetus for these studies comes out of sociological studies of the American family under the heading, "life cycle of the family." There are only a few studies of the life cycle of the Chinese family (Morioka, 1967:595-606; Fukutake, 1967:13-24). The life cycle of the Sanlei family, a "moving picture" so to speak, will be discussed later in this chapter after the

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59 explication of jural rules, ideal patterns, and strategies to achieve goals.

Family Surnames

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621 The various surnames in Sanlei are indicated in Table 8. As previously stated, Sanlei was founded essentially as a single surname family and the major surname, Liao, continues to be dominant in both number of representatives and socio-political affairs. Counting married women as if they retained their maiden names, 180 people of the 409 in the village (over 44%) are surnamed Liao. Only 34 people (just over 8%) have the second most popular surname (see Table 8).

As can be seen in Table 8, the Liao are even more strongly represented among the chia chang (nearly 55%) than they are in the village overall. Eliminating married women's maiden names, i.e., counting them in terms of their married names, would result in an even greater percentage of Liao surnames (over 50%). Moreover, many surnames other than Liao are connected in some manner to a Liao family. For example, one chia chang named Chien moved to Sanlei some years after his eldest son married a Liao girl from the village and one chia chang named Lin is living with a Liao widow in her house as a common-law husband.

584 established between the bride's parents and groom's
parents through the auspices of a matchmaker, the bride
[178] and groom not meeting until the wedding. This form, once
very popular, is declining in frequency, constituting
about one quarter of the recent marriages in Sanlei Ts'un
from data and estimated about the same for the li.

A second form is what we have called a "veto marriage." It is closely related to the strictly "arranged marriage" because the procedures are similar, initial negotiations being handled by a matchmaker between two sets of parents. However, before the engagement, the young people meet each other, frequently at the potential bride's home in the presence of both parents and the matchmaker. Alternatively, they may observe each other but not meet by both attending the same function such as a movie or amusement park in separate groups. Each potential spouse retains the right to veto the marriage but this is seldom done openly. The negative sentiment is expressed by pointing out faults, "He doesn't look strong." "She looks like she has expensive tastes." Positive sentiment, on the other hand, is merely a statement by the child to the parent that "You know best," or "Whatever you think." (See Glossary C.) This data was obtained by both interviews and observation. I accompanied one village boy, his parents, and the matchmaker to the home of the potential bride where we visited for an hour and left. In the taxi on the way back to the village, the boy told his father that he should

584 make the decision because he had more experience. The boy had previously rejected two other girls by politely pointing out possible faults. The boy and his father did not openly discuss the boy's role in determining the marriage, but that evening the father told me that if the young couple later had trouble the son could not blame him for making a poor choice as he had played a part in the selection of the bride. I also observed two similar visits to a village girl's home and the conversation which followed;
a [178] one suitor was rejected and the other accepted. This form has always been present in Chinese culture but in the modern period has supplanted in frequency the arranged form.

The final form which we are calling a "love marriage" is increasing the most rapidly in frequency. It is simply the self-selection of mates. Often, the engagement and wedding are legitimized in traditional terms by employing a matchmaker to carry on negotiations and arrangements as if the decision had not already been made. Among the oldest generation still living in the village, there seemed to have been only one true "love marriage" that was opposed by parents. The couple registered the marriage with the Japanese police and ran off to the mountains to live and did not return until after the girl was obviously preg-
[588] nant. The term, "love marriage," could also be applied to common-law marriages and many remarriages, especially among couples who marry rather late in life.

Chao Fu (Adopted-in Husband)

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591 In order to continue the family line and provide descendants to carry on ancestor worship, a man may bring in a wife for his son as described above. However, some families will have daughters but no sons. There is a culturally specified means for overcoming the problem, the adopted-in husband, chao fu, a culture trait which is found all over China (Gallin, 1966:155-6; Fei, 1939:71-2; Hsu, 1967:98-103). It is often called a matrilocal marriage although China is classified as a patrilocal society (Murdock, 1967:196). Its frequency is yet to be properly assessed for a few statistics are ever provided. Fei lists 12 examples for Kaihsienkung and states that this is significant but provides no percentages (1939:72). Gallin lists six such marriages for Hsin Hsing, again without percentages, but states that it is "difficult to see any tendency for or against the practice in Hsin Hsing" (1966:188). Only in West Town does the practice appear to be frequent where one third to one half of the marriages are matrilocal (Hsu, 1967:98). However, there is a serious question as to whether or not West Town is in the mainstream of Chinese culture (Hsu, 1967:17).

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591 The exact numbers of matrilocal marriage in Taiwan based on official records provided by Barclay for the period from 1906 to 1943 (1954:229) indicate a steady decline from a high of 21.8% in 1906 to a low of 6.2% in

178 583 591 1943. The decline appears to continue for the P. K. C. Liu study in 1967 for Shihlin indicates less than 5% of the households were matrilocal (1967:34). No matter what year is selected from the above as a standard, Sanlei is deviant. Of the 94 marriages previously listed, nineteen were regular matrilocal with an adopted-in husband and six more are also classified as matrilocal, an adopted-in husband for a daughter who had been previously adopted-in as a child. Twenty-five such marriages constitute 26.6% of the total studied, a percentage higher than Barclay lists above for any year in Taiwan, even 1906. Only Wolf furnishes exact figures based on full data acquired ethnographically for a village also located in the Taipei region. Among 119 married men, 26 were chao fu (1966:889) resulting in a percentage of 21.8% which is not unlike Sanlei's 26.6%.

114 583 591 Barclay's figures regarding this form of marriage are questionable. He reports that there were significant problems in translation for "the terms are Japanese and the facts Chinese" (1954:228). Furthermore, he points out that other compromises may be made, the marrying male may assume the wife's surname (1954:228) and this could make errors in [559] records. As discussed by Gallin (1966:156-8) and Barclay (1954:229), because the adopted-in husband loses his dignity and authority and is often insulted, there would be strong reasons favoring an attempt to conceal the true incidence.

585 of attention. Important guests toast them and speeches are made about them and their families. In the whole life cycle, the funeral of an old person is the only rite de passage approaching it in importance. If a person does not have a wedding party, it is likely he will never be the center of attention at any major affair. Since he also goes to his friend's weddings, he wants his family to
[885] reciprocate as a host. The wedding also marks his status change from immaturity to full adult, since an unmarried man of 30 cannot hold traditional positions available to a married man of 24. The wedding party marks this status change for everyone in the area to see and without a big ceremony the status change is not clearly communicated.

178 This kind of marriage, the siaosiv, is often dis-
584
597 cussed in Chinese ethnographies but, once more, rarely are statistical data provided. Gallin points out that the practice is relatively important in Hsin Hsing but declining in frequency (1966:155) as is also true in Sanlei. Adoption of daughters remains very common in Sanlei (see subsequent section), but marriages of the siaosiv type are relatively rare given the number of possibilities, i.e., families with an adopted daughter and natural son of appropriate ages. Of the 119 marriages previously listed for another Hokkien village, 23 were siaosiv (19.3%), even higher than the 12.8% listed for Sanlei (A. P. Wolf, 1966: 889).

584 581 837 However, four promiscuous women do reside in Sanlei and villagers consider one insatiable. Of these four women, two were formerly *siaosiv*. This frequency is highly significant by sign although the "n" is too small for adequate testing. Among *siaosiv*, there is a high proportion of quite unhappy marriages and one childless marriage, the only childless marriage of ten years or more in which the wife was under 25 at marriage and in which the couple still refuses to adopt a child.

584 183 Everyone in the village argues why a *siaosiv* marriage is a good idea for someone else. Their reasons emphasize both the economies to be realized and the positiveness of good relations between mother and daughter-in-law which must have been present if the match had been proposed. The reasons given for not personally desiring this kind of marriage was always either, "I would be too embarrassed," or, "It would not be interesting" (see Glossary C). It is significant that no man or woman in the village would prefer a *siaosiv* marriage.

178 584 The last *siaosiv* marriage in Sanlei Ts'un was in 1959 and since that date, three girls who had been adopted into the village as future mates married out in the regular fashion. As far as I could tell, only one of these was after an argument (a "love marriage" to a boy from T'oulei) while the adopted fathers of the other two claimed that they married the girls out because *siaosiv* marriage now

584 • 178 [561] would only result in trouble for "young people make more decisions today" (see Glossary C). The frequency of siaosiv marriage is inversely related to prosperity and directly related to the lessening power of older generations over younger generations.

Implications of Marriage Forms

591 606 The variety of marriage residences are particularly significant for the status of women. The major stress for the bride in her new home largely originates from the groom's mother according to the traditional literature (see Chapter X). Combining the 12.8% siaosiv marriages in which the bride was raised in the groom's home with the 25.6% of the brides who married chao fu and thus did not move to the groom's home at marriage and then adding in the "neolocal" forms suggests that close to half of all brides in Sanlei do not have the kind of "mother-in-law" problem in their homes so characteristic of the Chinese literature.

Reasons for Adopting Daughters

597 There are a number of different reasons for the adoption of a daughter. Gallin lists, in addition to a future mate for a son as discussed above, such reasons as no children in the family, to replace a dead infant, to invite a natural baby boy (chao ti), and as a servant (1966:161-3). These reasons are also common in Sanlei except that the last is very rare and, of course, always

599 paid to the natal family but it is said that the older
[435] the girl and the more attractive her appearance, the
greater the amount required as an adoption fee. However,
no villager knows of a Sanlei girl who was merely sold
but, as discussed above, given the characteristics of some
people who release girls, i.e., parents of an illegitimate
[548] child, this does not mean it has not occurred. Villagers
did know of two girls in another village a mile distant
who were sold to become prostitutes. Three Sanlei village
girls have become prostitutes in Taipei but they departed
[178] for their own reasons after reaching maturity. Once again,
impressions indicate that the frequency of adoptions currently is slightly less than it was in the past.

599 The traditional literature suggests that the treat-
562 ment of adopted daughters in a household was often extreme-
593 ly harsh, while adopted sons were treated well (Latourette,
1959:679-80; Burkhardt, 1953, 174-6; Smith, 1899:237-311). For the most part, girls adopted into Sanlei were about as well treated as natural daughters. There was strong sentiment also that girls given out in adoption should go to a good home, particularly one that had the potential for a later siaosiv marriage because it was said that if the girl was an intended future bride, she would be raised under conditions to promote good relations in the family. A Sanlei family which merely sold a girl would be strongly censured.

183 791 787 There is a final kind of service that religious practitioners provide for community residents although few villagers would be likely to admit it explicitly, i.e., they provide justification for social acts which might be contrary to community standards or which might otherwise create difficulties in interpersonal relations. For instance, assume a family wants to give up a daughter in adoption but also does not want to create an impression that they are releasing her because the family can not afford her support. If a shaman of some kind orders the adoption, the family can accomplish it without censure by claiming the gods wishes must be obeyed. Someone can be found to interpret the god's desires in a manner so that anything and everything can be justified.

A Fire Purification Ceremony

796 As an extended case study, I will present an account
783 of a non-cyclical but important religious event held in
[171] Sanlei in November of 1966. The ceremony was entitled the
"Fire Purification of the Gods" and differs only in minor
details from that described by DeGroot for Mainland China
(1892-1910). The essential part of the ceremony is ritual
purification of the gods by carrying them through a fire
of god's paper money in sedan chairs carried by bearers
who are ritually clean and have no foot coverings.

[171] Similar ceremonies have occurred throughout Taiwan
[184] periodically with strong evidence they have increased in
[178]

783 796 176 [171] [184] frequency during the past twenty-five years, probably for two different reasons. One reason is related to the recent increased prosperity. Although people seem to greatly enjoy the big festivals, they are very expensive. With the increased prosperity, there are both more ceremonies such as the "Fire Purification Ceremony" and greater participation together with increased expenditures on regular ceremonies.

The second reason is more explicitly related to the "Fire Purification Ceremony" in particular for the ceremony is considered partially a response to crises and change. During these past twenty-odd years there have been many significant events in Taiwan such as a change in the official government and a multitude of cultural and social changes accompanying the expanding economy. Moreover, there is a constant fear of a Taiwanese attack on the Mainland or a Communist attack on Taiwan. Consequently, there have been four "Fire Purification Ceremonies" in Talei Li in the past twenty-five years, two of them during our eighteen month period of study and one of the remaining two, the previous year.

783 796 776 Carrying a god's statue through the sacred fire after proper ritual purifies it and helps make the god more powerful and thereby, temporarily raises the rank of the temple in which the god resides. Higher rank will bring more people to the temple to worship and the more people

796 The affair involved a sizeable expenditure of re-
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435 sources. The temple committee collected and spent over
[585] $5,500.00. The two weddings scheduled because of the cere-
mony, one with eight tables (80 guests) and the other with
five tables (50 guests) meant a dinner guest fee[10] alone
of over $6,000.00 without the additional gifts and expenses.
Sixty-one other households held elaborate dinners with
feasts too for there were more guests in the village than
residents. For one of the richer households, the addition-
al expenditures on food and drink as compared with a typi-
[434] cal day exceeded $700.00. To assess the size of this
figure, note that an experienced farm laborer earns but
$50.00 for a full day's work. No villager seemed too un-
happy about the expenditure as people claim they now "dare
[178] to spend money" (see Glossary C). The expenditures for pai
pai have increased in Sanlei village, a process that seems
common to all of Taiwan and which reflects the overall
growing prosperity.

Summary.

791 Religion is very important in Sanlei Ts'un. Although
little importance can be attached to an organized hierarchy
of religious functionaries, there are many kinds of unorgan-
782 ized specialists who are consulted as needs arise. Addi-
tionally, almost everyone in the village can and does per-
form religious acts regularly. There is daily worship in
most homes and special worship connected with almost every
important event: life crises, health, and economic.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LIFE CYCLE

121 Although the most general patterns will be abstracted below, it must be made patent that there is great variability in the life histories of individual villagers. China is a high civilization and a defining characteristic of a civilization is the existence of a large number of modal patterns of behavior. In addition to differences due to sub-cultural variation and individual personalities, there is structured variance related to wealth, sex, birth order, family type, etc. For example, the fact of an adoption would make a significant difference in an individual's life history and although not everyone is adopted, a sizeable minority of village children are adopted.

• [178] Taiwan is experiencing great economic and political changes and these too are modifying traditional patterns of
121 the life cycle and its stages. Formal education furnishes
871 a prime example. Currently, two significant stages in the
882 life cycle are marked by entrance into the first grade, the pre-schooler versus the student and the next stage is marked by graduation at the end of the sixth year of school, the change from student to young adult status.

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Very few villagers are educated beyond the compulsory six years although the government is now planning a change from six to nine years of compulsory education.[1] This change too will have a major effect on the typical life cycle for entrance into the labor market (and achievement of young adult status) will be delayed an additional three years. The immediate direct effects on the economics of village life are obvious but there will undoubtedly be concomitant social and cultural effects. For example, at present, boys do not start smoking until their formal education is completed. Even if a boy's age cohorts are working and smoking, the village boy still in school does not. If education is extended three more years, boys will probably not start smoking, on the average, until they are three years older than the present beginning age.

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The effects resulting from a change in the length of compulsory education suggested above are more than mere idle speculations, they are derived by extensions of a process which has already been realized in the last twenty years. [212] Among people over age 70 still living in the village, there is only one literate person, a male. He claimed that when he was a young man, although the village population exceeded 250, only about 15 people attended the local school, only two of them girls. As a clear demonstration of a pattern change, at the time of the study, there were only three village children (one male, two female) of appropriate ages not

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Table 11. Percentage of Sanlei Villagers Who Graduated

Age in 1965	Year of Graduation	Percentage Graduating Male	Female
15-19	1960-64	96.7	87.6
25-29	1950-54	90.0	50.0
35-39	1940-44	66.7	22.2
45-49	1930-34	66.7	16.7
55-59	1920-24	50.0	10.0
65-69	1910-14	27.6	2.3

in school and satisfactorily progressing within one year of the normal grade for their respective ages.

The figures in Table 11 suggest the rate of change in education over time for Sanlei village by means of an analysis of current living residents in various age groups. In 1915, school was not really a significant stage in the life cycle for most villagers but by 1925, it was the most frequent (over 50%) pattern for males and by 1955, for females. By 1960, there remained scarcely any other pattern with reference to ages between 6 and 12 except to attend school. Actually, the current three exceptions are not a single structural type for each truant has a unique reason.

178 With reference to the stages to be discussed below, changes such as the above example have occurred in the memory of living villagers. In addition to those related to economics and education, important changes are connected with the population growth, increased life expectancy, and the availability of modern medical facilities including Western hospitals and birth control clinics.

581 children, an adoption is still likely in order to provide
842 security in old age. Historically, Taiwan has had a high
597 sex ratio (Barclay, 1954:212) and nearly all females were
able to marry; the rate exceeded 99% married every year
since 1905 for women over 40. However, some men were
necessarily without mates; never-married men over 40 always
exceeded 4% for the same period (Barclay, 1954:211). Most
men who never marry have some kind of social defect such
as poverty or a drinking problem but many of these men
also adopt children such as the two never-married men in
Sanlei with adopted children.

842 Martin Yang reports that the number of children desired
178 in the "ideal" family for Taiwan has been decreasing
183 over time (1962:69). This finding is not based on a longitudinal
125 study but on a comparative study using respondents
in different generations. Interviews in Sanlei village
support his findings. However, all attempts to simulate
longitudinal studies by assuming an age range suffer the
same obvious defects. For example, if Sanlei women beyond
child-bearing ages are divided into two groups, those who
bore more than four children and those who bore less, there
is a strong positive correlation between the actual size of
183 a woman's family and her report of an "ideal" size. For
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842 young married women, it is possible that the attitude may
change in time, i.e., her desires and expectancies may become
congruent with her real situation. Nevertheless, the
number of children desired for an "ideal" family is

178 183 842 [562] significantly less for each ten-year age cohort. It is interesting that men's reports are nearly identical to their wives and both sexes agree that women are predominantly in control of the eventual family size.

183 842 562 The typical desired family size among women of child-bearing ages (and their respective husbands) is now four or five with no one listing less than three and only three women and five men, more than six. The pair who desired the largest number was a married couple with ten children who both wanted twelve. In spite of the reported bias towards males, if the number is even, the desire is usually for an equal number of males and females, but if the desired number is odd, males are nearly always expected to constitute a majority of one. Only a few very old men reported a desire for nearly all males but everyone agrees that if a couple have only one child, he should be male.

842 562 These reports from Sanlei should not be construed such that there is not a strong preference for males. Rather, the preference is not as strong as has been suggested in some of the literature (see Chapter X). Almost everyone desires a male for the first child and a family with all boys will be viewed by neighbors as fortunate while a family with all girls is something to be pitied, but not as much as a family with no children at all. After a string of girls, a family may name the last as "our last daughter" in hope of breaking the chain of misfortune. There is no corresponding practice for a string of boys.

843 and moreover, since a woman typically is pregnant for a
776 [856] period of time before becoming aware, the bedrooms of po-
[846] tentially fertile women are seldom cleaned. The only truly
safe period is 30 days after a child is born, the morning
before intercourse is resumed. If Tai Shen is inadvertent-
ly offended, which can be detected through a sharp pain
in the abdomen at the time of the disturbing activity, it
844 is necessary to call in a shaman to pacify him. Because
776 of Tai Shen it is necessary that parturition take place
in the regular bedroom.

• 178 An interesting change in this belief about Tai Shen
844 is related to modern medical practices emanating out of a
776 [865] small public hospital in Hsin Tien which provides a doctor
for child birth. The mines provide the families of workers
with medical insurance and many miner's wives are therefore
having babies in the hospital, fairly common in Erhlei but
still rare in Sanlei. Twenty years ago, it was impossible
to discover the hiding place of Tai Shen but today, reli-
gious specialists are able to detect his hiding place so
the object in which he is hiding can be taken to the hos-
pital in Hsin Tien with the woman in labor.

843 There is a whole host of other taboos for the preg-
nant woman: tying strings in her bedroom will effect the
baby's fingers: using scissors, the ears; needles, the eyes,
etc. Funerals are likely to cause miscarriages. Wedding
ceremonies are also off limits because the belief in hsi

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464 The child can now assume a regular full-time job but girls have much better opportunities than boys for there are many clothing factories in the general area which employ girls as low-paid unskilled operators. Only a few boys are able to get jobs in factories or as apprentices. Additionally, since most of the farm labor work for females is compensated on a piece-work basis while the bulk of that for males is on a daily rate, girls have another advantage over boys because the payment on a piece-work basis is less risky
[562] because one only pays for results, not efforts. Since girls
[178] now produce more income than boys, many villagers remark, "Perhaps girls are worth more than boys!" (See Glossary C.)

885 Achievement of adult status is blurred; there is no real agreement in many cases. Marriage is nearly the only means for girls. Because of the increasing age at marriage and the fact that men are older at marriage and some never marry, it is possible for some boys to become men before marriage. There is not full agreement even on marriage al-
[274] though everyone agrees that parents are adults. People note when an individual earns enough to fully support himself and a boy rarely smokes before reaching this stage.

572 Boys and girls have little to do with each other. Boys pal around in intimate groups which often eventually become sworn brothers associations and in this way, a friendship relationship is institutionalized which is likely to last the rest of the boy's life. Girls too have intimate

902 582 [465] boys are not expected to marry until after completing service. This expectation has served to raise the average age of boys at marriage.

Marriage

584 Marriage has been discussed in Chapter V. To review briefly, there are a number of different ways to classify marriages. In terms of decision making, there are three types: 1) arranged, with parents fully in control of the decision; 2) veto, with parents making the initial arrangements but the bride and groom each possessing veto power; and 3) love, where everything is decided by the bride and groom. 178 584 581 Historically, changes have occurred from a majority of arranged marriages to the veto type and more recently to the love although all three types appear to have always been present in Chinese society. Currently, each constitutes about one third of the marriages in the village. There is some difficulty in obtaining accurate assessments of the frequency of each type because there is an attempt to disguise others as if they were the arranged form which carries the highest prestige.

584 In its ideal form, an arranged marriage is achieved through a process of negotiation between the two families through a matchmaker and the couple do not meet until the wedding day. Even at the engagement, the groom's mother goes to the bride's house and puts the engagement rings on the prospective bride's finger.

593 opera. A few older couples may hold hands in public at night if it is dark. Today, many young couples do things together that their parents would never have dared such as going to a movie together. [178]

[551] Terms of address between married couples are difficult for use of the given name or an affectionate name is improper and there is no appropriate term of address until after a child is born when teknonomy can be used. Before the birth of the first child, they just avoid addressing each other with a term. A woman often "follows her children" in using their terms for her husband's relatives. While a woman does have a term used for address and reference, "Kuan - ren" , which roughly translates as "lord and master," the term should not be interpreted as descriptive of the relationship. Like many terms, it has a meaning not directly based on its roots as illustrated by the fact that it is not too uncommon to hear a woman address her husband as follows, "Lord and Master! Go feed the pigs. Right now!"

Women have much control in the household. They very frequently control the household budget, doling out money to husbands as needed and even when the husband is fully in charge or where there is shared control, the woman still does much of the shopping for everyone agrees women can best bargain to obtain lower prices. In general, the longer the marriage lasts, the greater the amount of power the woman acquires. Of course, there are many exceptions. If she is

593 in a joint household, she usually does not take much part in money management or training for money management until about age 30 or more. In a few households, the man is extremely dominant.

Sex

836 [178] Most brides and grooms are virgins. Today, several of the young men have previously visited houses of prostitution while in the service and many visited tea houses in Hsin Tien where they play with women but do not have intercourse. When the bride is not a virgin, she has usually only had relations with the boy she marries in a love match. [848] Some of the girls who work in the factories have had illegitimate children arousing reluctance among some villagers about letting their girls go to work.

864 Even small children know a lot about sex for the village is rural and children observe the mating of farm animals and know the function. Given the sleeping arrangements and the proper site for sex, i.e., in a bed which will be shared with sleeping children, it is likely they have also observed human intercourse. I remember one occasion when the barber, a bachelor, was building a new three-room house because he planned on marriage. A group of 9 to 10 year olds were showing me around and when we came to the prospective bedroom, a boy said, "He is getting married and this is where he will stick it in her" (See Glossary C). Men and old women talk about enjoying sex when children are

545 443 prolong the show rather than because they are convinced of 207 the efficacy of the medicine. Every evening people gather to watch the television set which faces the street at the front of one of the village stores as the storekeeper sells soft drinks and ices. Finally, nearly every home has a radio which blares loudly from early in the morning to late at night. Although farmers listen to a few reports on weather and the occasional news report, the usual program features Taiwanese opera or some of the new popular music featuring singers with guitars which is preferred by young people.

546 Occasionally, trips are made to a cheap movie house 571 in Hsin Tien by middle-aged women in groups of 4 or 5 for a matinee or unmarried young people in groups which are [882] separated according to sex. There is some dating but the [178] boy and girl must sneak off and meet in town. Some young [593] married couples now go to the show together but this is a new trait and still partially condemned by older people. 517 Also, people leave the village for recreation in the parks 574 and to see sights such as the zoo. However, most people getting on the bus alone are usually going shopping or on business and most family groups are usually going to visit relatives. Relatives, friends, and former residents often 295 come to the village to visit. Some middle-aged village men 265 occasionally visit a small restaurant in a nearby village to chat, drink cheap wine, eat light snacks, and play word

CHAPTER IX

CYCLES IN TIME

● 178 805 Time is subdivided into many different categories which play a significant part in structuring social life in Sanlei Ts'un. For certain kinds of divisions, adherence to which of two conflicting systems for reckoning time provides a key to evaluating the level of modernization achieved by an individual. For example, years are subdivided according to both a traditional lunar calendar and a modern Western solar calendar. Although farmers place prime emphasis on the lunar calendar, businessmen and urban dwellers rely on the solar calendar and both calendars are important for determining village activities.[1]

Another relationship between the level of modernization and the type of time system employed may be seen in the new emphasis on clocks. Clocks were unimportant in rural traditional Chinese villages and according to older informants, Sanlei Ts'un had no clocks when they were children. As late as 1950, there were still only a few clocks in the village. Currently, almost every village house has a clock and an electric clock in the kung t'ing has almost become a necessary status symbol in spite of the fact no member of

178 the household pays any attention to its time. Punctuality
805 according to a clock is important for miners, factory workers, and those who work in town. For other villagers, only
the bus and the school operate according to time scheduled
by a clock but even then, the school bell and bus passage
through the village ten minutes before leaving for town
make the clock unnecessary.

805 The traditional Chinese conception of the passage of
822 time in general is that time movement is cyclical. That is,
time proceeds as if it were traveling down a corkscrew.
Whatever is happening has happened before in the past and
will happen again in the future. I have employed the analogy of a corkscrew rather than a closed circle because of
the recognition that although events are individually
unique, the general patterns are repeated.

In addition to this contrast with the American view
of time as if it were passing along a straight line into
infinity, there is a comparative long-range approach in opposition to the American short-range approach. Illiterate
villagers are aware of events which occurred hundreds of
years ago or at least an idealized reconstruction of the
events and the memory of the events remain important factors
173 in decision processes in the village. For example, some
805 village family lines were said to have originated in Honan,
emigrated to Fukien 500 years ago, and then to Taiwan 130
years ago. Other village family lines with the same surname

805 787 There are similar pairs of two characters specifying the month, day, and hour of one's birth. The eight characters, pa tsu, thereby produced are employed in determining compatibility or incompatibility of persons about to be married,[3] and are also used in fortune-telling. However, most people in the village could not immediately recall their own eight characters although most said they could be figured out.

Calendars

805 178 527 There are two important calendars which function simultaneously in the village. The first is the standard Western calendar with which all readers are familiar. It has become more important in the past few years, especially for those employed in modern firms because work schedules and payrolls are based on the Western solar calendar. The only major events in the village area which are determined by this calendar are the national holidays such as Restoration Day, Independence Day, and Chiang Kai-shek's Birthday. Meetings of government agencies and dates for paying taxes are set according to this calendar too.

805 [796] The second calendar, the lunar, is the traditional form and is employed to determine the traditional religious holidays. Individual months are of 29 or 30 days duration, intermixed so that each new moon falls on the first day of a month. Months are simply numbered from one to twelve. Years are of unequal length, having either twelve or

796 241 The above events serve to break up the year. Moreover, the period of the year when the required agricultural activities are at a minimum, from the middle of the twelfth month to the middle of the first, is witness to the most festive period which commences with the last monthly-cycled event of the year and ends with the first monthly-cycled event of the new year (see next section).

527 178 369 There are also the national holidays which are scheduled according to a calendar, but in this case the western calendar. These are not as important in the village as the religious affairs but are growing in importance as time passes and there is a greater degree of urban contact and more individuals start working in factory, business, and mining occupations. Businesses tend to close for the important events and thus, the workers remain home. There are usually parades and decorations in the cities and many of the younger people go off to observe. The major events are Double Tenth (the establishment of the Republic), President Chiang Kai-shek's Birthday, the Birthday of Confucius, and Restoration Day (the return of control over Taiwan to the Republic of China).

The Monthly Religious Cycle

796 In accordance with the lunar calendar, there are two pairs of worship days each month devoted to gods, ancestors, and the Good Brothers which also serve to punctuate the calendar with religious events. One pair falls on the first

796 and fifteenth and the other, on the second and sixteenth. 796 Some villagers claim the first pair is for gods, soldiers, 463 and their horses and the second, for the Good Brothers but there is much disagreement over this contention. There is agreement that the first pair is primarily for worship by farmers and the second, for worship by businessmen. Most village households worship on one pair of days or the other but no household worships on all four days in any one month. If a household worships on the first day of the pair, it always worships again on its corresponding mate, i.e., if worship is made on the first day of the month, there will be worship again on the fifteenth, but not worship on the second or sixteenth, etc. However, a few households alternate the pair of holidays each month. For example, the Liao Chin-wei family who operate both a farm and a store worship on the first and the fifteenth of one month and on the second and sixteenth of the next.

796 In the past, most Sanlei families tended to worship 178 on the first and fifteenth but currently, there is an increase in worship on the second and sixteenth accompanying the growing importance of business and mining. In the clothing factories, the owners provide the workers with a free lunch on the second and sixteenth of each lunar month as part of the ritual worship activities even though the factory itself is operating in terms of the solar calendar. Presently, over eighty-five per cent of the households in

796 [178] Sanlei worship on one or the other pair of days regularly.

The worship activities on these days do not seriously interfere with the normal work activities but most farmers usually quit work a little early. The family will have a big dinner with rich food although guests are extremely rare. After dinner, there is a longer leisure time in the evening as compared with a normal day and instead of performing any constructive tasks, almost everyone just sits and chats.

The first of the monthly-cycled days of the year (the fifteenth day of the first month) and the last of the monthly-cycled days (the sixteenth day of the twelfth month) are major holidays.

The Weekly Cycle

177 178 527 [805] The growing importance of the week of seven days, Sunday in particular, is strong evidence of Westernization in Taiwan and its penetration into Sanlei Ts'un. There was a traditional ten-day week in China but few living villagers were aware of its details or operation. Almost every villager could quickly name the current day of the week according to the Western calendar when asked. Although there were no Christians in Talei Li according to villagers, Sunday has become a special day with greatly reduced productive work [369] activities. This is related to the fact that many business places are now closed on Sundays so the workers who live in the village stay home while many residents in the city

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178 527 369 come to the village to visit. Villagers, in turn, visit relatives who live in the city more often on Sunday than any other day.

[871] There were a number of different factors contributing to the institutionalization of the Western week. The li school, in accordance with national directives, operated full days Monday through Friday and a half day on Saturday with Sunday, a school holiday. Several of the mines were closed on Sunday as were all but one of the factories where villagers were employed. Many of the businesses and stores in town and city were also closed on Sunday. Thus, Sunday has become a day of rest and few farmers now work a full day on Sunday. Except during the busiest season, there are few labor exchanges on Sunday and few farm workers are hired on Sunday. Most farmers who do work on Sunday are only working on their own fields.

517 527 571 882 Village young people often go off to town on Sunday, to the parks, the theaters, the zoo, and merely to walk around and see things. Where boys do meet girls for the secret dates which would be disapproved by parents and village elders, they are usually arranged for Sunday afternoons when both are most likely to have available leisure time. [574] As previously stated, migrants to the city often come back to the village for visits on Sunday and more recently, villagers are going to the city to visit relatives and friends now living there.

243 Late July, August, September--Light. Fertilize, weed,
245 and apply insecticide to paddy fields twice. Fertilize
221 and cultivate orange orchards. Weed tea fields and
continue harvest.

[244] October, November--Very Busy. Harvest second rice crop.
Prepare fields and plant vegetables. Complete last
small harvest of tea.

244 December and January--Moderate. Harvest vegetables
245 and oranges. Plant and transplant tea bushes and
221 orange trees.

241 The above schedule provides a general picture of the agri-
cultural activities devoted to the major crops but there are
244 many other minor crops which are not listed. Vegetables are
planted, fertilized, weeded, and harvested during various
periods all year around. For example, onions and leeks are
planted and harvested during nine different months of each
313 year. Finally, during any slack period, trees may be cut
down and left on the ground in open piles until sufficiently
dry to be carried down the mountainside for home consumption
or sale.

182 Currently, the ecological adjustment is such that
464 the demand for labor is spread relatively evenly over the
entire year. There are now only two periods lasting a to-
tal of about eight weeks when there are serious labor short-
ages and conversely, only about six or seven weeks when
there is a moderate to heavy labor surplus.

178 When the village was first established, the main
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243 crops were subsistence vegetables and paddy rice. Rice pro-
464 duction in a double cropping area necessarily involves large
seasonal variations in the demand for labor.

178 Tea was added later and since the demand for labor
245 464 inputs in tea production tend to occur during relatively
slack periods in the cycle of rice production, tea helped
even out the demand for labor.

Oranges, which were added more recently, are a second
leveling factor in the seasonal labor demands because the
date when most required work such as fertilizing, spraying
with insecticide, and weeding must be completed is not cru-
[243] cial to eventual production quantities. This technology is
unlike that for rice which permits few delays in many steps
without serious reduction in the eventual size of the har-
vest. The only requirement in citrus cultivation for large
prompt labor inputs comes during the harvest season which
falls in December and January when both rice and tea cul-
tivation activities are either non-existent or are at their
slackest periods.

178 This ecological and technological adjustment has
562 been a prime factor contributing to the elevation of the
464 [245] status of women. Some agricultural tasks such as tea pick-
[464] ing and tea sorting are considered appropriate only for
women, and other tasks such as orange orchard weeding are
[314] considered appropriate for either men or women. Because
there are jobs such as coal mining readily available for
mature men in the immediate area around the village, there
has been little surplus of male labor exerting pressure to
[288] replace women with men. In the younger age groups, the

178
562 operations of the cloth and clothing factories around Taipei
464 which require relatively unskilled labor inputs of a nature
[288] which can be accomplished by women, again draw on the female
labor pool in Talei Li. Together, these various factors
function to make female labor valuable and this fact necessarily
means a level of relative economic independence for
females. Moreover, in terms of agricultural activities
alone, the addition of citrus cultivation to tea cultivation
has made possible employment for women every month of
the entire year since the demands of each have very little
overlap. The combination covers the entire year fairly
evenly.

The Daily Cycle

512 From the above facts, it can be seen that there is
[221] no such thing as a typical day in Sanlei Ts'un. There are
seasonal differences due to the great differences resulting
from the major agricultural activities being performed at
[796] the particular moment in time. There are at least 60 special
[527] religious holidays each year, some relatively minor, when
the daily pattern of behavior varies and a few national
secular holidays as well with similar varying behavior patterns.
[871] Monday through Fridays differ from Saturday which
has a half-day of school instead of a full day and even more
from Sunday when the school and several factories are
closed. A greater number of visitors come to the village on
[871] Sunday and most farmers reduce their work loads. The summer

121 562 inaccurate) is true; although change is endemic, the data in Sanlei is consistent with concrete data in the traditional literature in spite of the many converse generalizations.

562 871 It is supposedly a Chinese value that women in traditional China should not be educated (Fairbank, 1958:30; C. K. Yang, 1959:111; Chiu, 1966:19). Currently, education in Sanlei village is compulsory for a full six years for boys and girls alike. One of the three junior high school graduations ever achieved by Sanlei residents is a female. Even eighty years ago, two of the fifteen village children [212] in school were girls. One of the original female settlers was semi-literate and was said to possess a fine form for [178] characters.[2] Although change to near equality of educational opportunity has occurred (See Chapter VIII), it was not from an initial position of total denial of education for females. Rather, females went from a minority position in education to one of near equality with males.

We are unable to fully assess the nature of Sanlei villagers' attitudes towards the education of women in the [582] past but we can attempt an educated guess. Today for instance, although it is felt that education is more important for males, any man who goes beyond elementary school should [581] not marry an illiterate woman. This belief is related to the general proposition advanced in the section on marriage (Chapter VIII) that spouses should not be extremely different from each other in any major attribute[3] such as

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There is some suggestion in the literature that the woman's status has been recently elevated only by her economic contributions to the family. This contention has been most strongly expressed in some of the Japanese material (Koyama, 1959). It should be realized that the traditional literature clearly indicates that rural girls and women have always worked hard and made valuable contributions, especially in the majority of the Chinese households which were poor. The two facts of the importance of economic contributions in elevating status and the large numbers of contributing working women, although juxtaposed in the literature, are rarely logically confronted with each other. That is, no one seems to consider the logical implications of the two sets of beliefs. This is not unlike the many other examples of this inconsistent behavior we have demonstrated. The number of women who were economic contributors was always probably high for it appears that about 85% of China's population were peasants living in villages and the majority were fairly poor. There is little concrete data on the extent of female participation in general farm work but it appears to be significant. In addition to these regular contributions to the family farm work, there were agricultural specialties in various parts of China which largely depended upon the labor and contributions of women such as the silk industry described by Fei (1939) and the tea industry discussed in Chapter III. For

562 many centuries, such industries which covered large areas
462 of China meant that women's work constituted valuable addi-
● 178 tions to the farm family income. Tawney (1932:117-149) discusses the significance of female labor in cottage industry and in small factories but provides no percentage of male to female contributions. If the recent argument that the contributions of females served to elevate their status is true, then the status was elevated long ago.

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562 As stated in the beginning of this dissertation, because the official historical record from the past contains few facts about the peasant or the nature of rural life, we are forced to make many assumptions and guesses. One kind of clue may derive from fiction for the fiction which tends to endure in any society usually embodies the ethos and values of the society. An analysis of the part females play in most of the classical stories reveals roles usually quite unlike the traditional normative standards abstracted from the Great Tradition but very similar to what we have described for Sanlei. It is argued that the ideal normative standards of the Great Tradition for women in China are not in accord with the facts on the actual level for both Great and Little Traditions nor on the ideal level for the Little Tradition, i.e., peasant men seem to prefer a wife to be somewhat thrifty and domineering so they can achieve success.

There is a phrase in Shakespeare which seems appropriate, "Methinks he doth protest too much." It is

121 school board official, etc. It is further demonstrated
562 that although changes leading to increased status for women
[178] are in process, even at the time when the village was
originally established, women were playing roles similar to those found today, i.e., the changes are quantitative rather than qualitative in most respects. In summary, Sanlei Ts'un is not congruent with the patterns portrayed in the traditional literature.

121 As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, this
184 deviancy from traditional patterns might be explained on
562 the basis that Sanlei was not like most Chinese communities.
In order to refute these possibilities, Sanlei was tested for its degree of uniqueness by comparing it with other Chinese communities in space and time. Women's labor was found to be important in most rural Chinese communities and special tasks in cottage or factory industries or in connection with certain crops such as tea or silk were commonly assigned to women in many other communities. In any major attribute such as the value of labor contribution, family size, practice of religion, etc., Sanlei did not appear to be unique. That is, the village was a unique combination but the general patterns were found in many other villages whether separated by time or by space. Rates of some items varied (when provided) but such practices as adopted-in husbands, neolocal residence, girls fleeing to the city for work, etc., were found everywhere. Sanlei did not seem